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AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LOOK AT 
FEDERALISM IN TAXATIONt 
Daniel Shaviro * 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past thirty years, state and local tax receipts have more 
than doubled in real terms, and have even increased relative to U.S. 
government tax receipts and gross national product.1 They now ac-
count for more than $400 billion annually, or in excess of thirty per-
cent of the taxes collected in this country and ten percent of gross 
national product.2 Over the next few years, state and local taxation 
may continue to increase in importance, since government service ex-
pansion seems more likely to occur below the national leveP and since, 
for political reasons, the taxing authority is often the same as the 
spending authority. 
As a result, the interaction between taxation and federalism is 
more important than ever. What are the consequences of assigning to 
limited geographical jurisdictions, subject to congressional and federal 
judicial review, so much of the power to levy and collect taxes that 
inevitably have national effects? Given the danger of protectionist or 
burden-exporting local legislation, as well as the overlap with national 
taxation - in tension with the maxim of federalism that generally 
t © 1992 by Daniel Shaviro. All rights reserved. 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1978, Princeton; J.D. 1981, 
Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to the American Enterprise Institute, which commissioned and pro-
vided financial support for this paper, and which will be publishing a slightly different version as 
part of a larger study of federalism. I am also grateful to the Russell Baker Scholai:s Fund and 
the Walter J. Blum Faculty Research Fund for financial support. Earlier versions of this paper 
were presented at workshops held at the University of Chicago Law School, Columbia University 
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1. On the growth in state and local tax receipts, see JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LoCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5, 9 (5th ed. 1988). On 
their growth relative to U.S. government tax receipts and gross national product, see JOSEPH A. 
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 3 (5th ed. 1987). 
2. See PECHMAN, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
3. From 1980 through at least 1987, state and local governments' share of total government 
expenditures in this country increased. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, 
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 476 (5th ed. 1989). 
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only one level of government should regulate any subject4 - one 
might expect the existing practice of federalism in taxation to have 
attracted widespread criticism. Yet the literature has proven surpris-
ingly favorable to current practice. The conventional viewpoint, 
rooted in deference to our historical traditions, 5 goes something as 
follows: 
While the state and local exercise of taxing power has costs given the 
danger of discrimination against interstate commerce and the incentive 
to export the burden of state and local taxation to outsiders, these costs 
can be kept relatively modest. States gain from reciprocal forbearance, 
market forces impede tax exporting, 6 and states face constitutional con-
straints under the commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses. 
The remaining costs imposed plausibly are offset by the advantages of 
local control, such as interstate tax competition, smaller government 
units' increased responsiveness to voters, 7 and voters' ability to exercise 
the "exit option."8 
I think this answer is too optimistic and in some respects wrong. 
First, "discrimination" is too narrow a conception of how state and 
local taxation can distort or impair national markets. Even if no juris-
diction targets interstate commerce for unfavorable treatment, dispari-
ties in state and local taxation have many of the same effects on 
business and personal decisionmaking as an outright tariff at the juris-
dictional boundary. The problem in both cases is one of locational 
nonneutrality due to tax rules. Second, the attempt to limit discrimi-
nation (as distinct from requiring locational neutrality) is inherently 
complicated and costly, especially if left to the courts.9 Third, polit-
ical forces such as reciprocal forbearance operating at the state and 
local level cannot always be counted on to limit locational distortion, 
even when no discrimination is deliberately intended. In particular, 
even if political decisionmaking is no worse at the state and local level 
4. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULA-
TION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 47 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1980). 
5. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: 
Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 19 MICH. L. REV. 113, 160 (1980) ("[A]bsent some 
pressing need for federal intervention .•. the states should be free to go their own way. Our 
constitutional system contemplates concurrent state and federal taxation, with considerable lati-
tude accorded to the states in this domain." (footnote omitted)). 
6. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause, in FISCAL 
FEDERALISM AND THE TAXATION OF NATURAL REsouRCES 169 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. & 
Peter Mieszkowski eds., 1983). 
7. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987). 
8. The seminal work on the exit option's relevance to local government is Charles M. Tie-
bout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956). 
9. This is not to say that the logical endpoint of a locational neutrality standard, requiring all 
states and localities to levy precisely the same taxes at the same rates, would be either good policy 
or a constitutionally defensible position for a court. See infra section 111.C. 
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than at the national level, the administrative and compliance costs im-
posed by even seemingly trivial variations between tax systems present 
powerful grounds for desiring greater uniformity. Fourth, the belief 
by state and local governments or voters that they can export tax bur-
dens to outsiders need not be factually correct in order to have adverse 
consequences. Fifth, in the tax area, the benefits of increasing govern-
mental responsiveness by placing authority at the state and local level 
seem overrated. These benefits tend to be especially less significant 
when the issue is how to define a tax base, rather than how much 
revenue to raise through taxes of one sort or another. 
While constitutional and political constraints, along with the better 
counterarguments in favor of state and local government taxing au-
thority, defeat an unambiguous "right answer," we should move to-
ward confining states' taxing authority to the determination of their 
tax rates, not the precis,e contours of the tax bases to which they apply 
these rates. Thus, I urge that Congress require the states to use partly 
or wholly uniform tax bases for business and perhaps personal income 
taxes, to make greater use of tax credits and uniform allocation rules 
where taxpayers have a multijurisdictional presence, and, when levy-
ing taxes that seem directed principally at outsiders, such as excise and 
severance taxes on oil and coal, to use rates no higher than those ap-
plying to comparable in-state levies. Such legislation would almost 
surely be within Congress' broad Commerce Clause powers. How-
ever, given that for two hundred years Congress has almost never used 
these powers to constrain state and local discretion in the tax area, 10 
the enactment of such legislation may be unlikely. Absent congres-
sional action, the courts should more consistently and coherently bar 
discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce and attempted 
tax exportation, and should attach less weight to the countervailing 
concern for state and local government autonomy. 
My arguments might support stronger limitations than the above. 
By keeping my proposals relatively modest, however, I aim to stay 
unambiguously where the costs of decentralization continue signifi-
cantly to exceed the benefits. Complete centralization of authority 
over taxation, while having significant advantages, would on balance 
be undesirable. My primary point is not that federalism in taxation is 
wholly misconceived, or that state and local governments have no val-
uable role to play, but that the balance is askew. 
10. Congress did not exercise its powers to restrict state and local taxation of interstate com-
merce until 1959. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 324. It has continued to 
exercise such power only rarely. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Per-
spectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 37 (1987). 
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Part I of this article examines the reasons for preferring location-
ally neutral taxes and explains the basic tension between locational 
neutrality and state and local autonomy in taxation. Part II examines 
the federal judicial check on state and local taxation, which often relies 
on a principle barring discrimination against outsiders or interstate 
commerce. Part III explores the need for a broad federal judicial 
check by examining state and local governments' reasons for imposing 
(or avoiding) locationally distortive taxes, the countervailing benefits 
of allowing such governments broad autonomy in taxation, and Con-
gress' willingness to strike down locationally distortive taxes under its 
Commerce Clause powers. Part IV, the conclusion, provides specific 
recommendations for congressional and judicial action. 
I. TARIFFS, TAXES, AND LOCATIONAL NEUTRALITY 
A. The Harms To Be Avoided 
The capacity of state and local taxation to burden national markets 
has long been recognized. Indeed, the paradigmatic form of burden -
protectionist tariffs on the passage of goods across state boundaries -
provided one of the chief motives for the Constitutional Convention in 
1787.11 In explaining why protectionist tariffs were undesirable, the 
Framers principally stressed the enmity resulting from states' competi-
tion to tax and disfavor each other.12 Yet they also recognized, at 
least roughly, a second type of harm tariffs cause: adverse wealth ef-
fects or inefficiency, which result from reducing aggregate social gains 
from trade and on a locational basis distorting economic decisions and 
substituting high-cost for low-cost production.13 These two types of 
harm continue to be recognized today as the principal grounds for 
aversion to state and local government tariffs, 14 as well as to taxes that 
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 
THE FEDERALIST, supra, No. 42 (James Madison), at 275-76; John B. Sholley, The Negative 
Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 559-60 (1936). Interstate com-
merce issues, despite their importance to the calling of the Constitutional Convention, mostly 
dwelt in the background during drafting and ratification. See id. 
12. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 39-41; THE FED-
ERALIST, supra note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 283-84. 
13. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton), at 69-70 (describing 
the benefits of a flourishing and unrestricted commerce). 
14. See, e.g., Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to 
State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 882 (1986). Pro-
fessor Donald Regan places great weight on a third objection to tariffs: that they are "inconsis-
tent with the very idea of political union .•.• the economic equivalent of war , ••• hostile in 
[their] essence." See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986). I disregard this 
objection on the consequentialist grounds that notional "wars" only matter to the extent that 
they harm or anger people, and that it is unduly difficult to decide which actions, among a 
variety that are consciously or implicitly self-serving, are impermissibly hostile. 
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have similar effects even if they do not formally tax the act of crossing 
a boundary.15 
As a matter of policy, I focus principally on locational distortion 
on the ground that, at present, enmity between the states is far less 
important, and locational distortion far more so, than was the case in 
1787. Moreover, a conventional ground for emphasizing enmity -
the fear that one state's tariffs will provoke retaliatory tariffs by other 
states, leading inexorably to trade wars16 - contains a circularity. 
Unless tariffs are for some independent reason undesirable, what could 
be wrong with having more of them? The likelihood of retaliation 
may be relevant to deciding when the federal government should inter-
vene, but it fails to enlighten the question of what state and local taxes 
are undesirable to begin with, and why. 
The Framers, while concerned about retaliatory tariffs, also feared 
that the enmity among the states arising from taxation would have far 
broader consequences, including a possibility of actual armed con-
flict.17 This concern was understandable and, at the time, probably 
realistic. The American Revolution had been prompted in large part 
by disputes over taxing authority, 18 the classical and recent European 
history that the Framers studied so carefully revealed that commercial 
disputes could lead to war, 19 and government power and citizen loy-
alty were very differently distributed than they are today. The state 
governments were truly sovereign entities that had a primary claim on 
most people's loyalties and that even the Framers expected to remain 
preeminent.20 This is hardly surprising in an age of relatively low mo-
bility and trade, when travel and communication over geographical 
expanses were vastly more difficult and expensive than they are now 
-and when the country was new and the Civil War had not yet been 
fought. Today, not only is actual war between the states a chimera 
(the former Soviet Union's or Yugoslavia's problems notwithstand-
15. The Framers recognized that tariffs were only one means of causing geographical distor-
tion. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 39-41 (noting that so 
long as states can pursue commercial policies peculiar to themselves, there will be injurious regu-
lations of trade designed to benefit in-state at the expense of out-of-state residents). 
16. See, e.g., Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 14, at 883; Regan, supra note 14, at 
1114. 
17. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), at 28-29, 34-35; THE 
FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 39-41; THE FEDERALIST, supra 
note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 283-84. 
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. GIPSON, THE CoMING OF THE REVOLUTION 1763-1775, at 69-
100, 162-95 (1954); EDMUNDS. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763-1789, at 14-27, 
43-60 (1977). 
19. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), at 31-35. 
20. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). 
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ing), but even lesser degrees of interstate conflict or rivalry, while per-
haps not irrelevant, are a greatly diminished concern.21 
Even to the extent that enmity or rivalry between the states re-
mains an important problem, it fails to suggest a clear generalizable 
standard for identifying objectionable state and local taxes.22 One's 
enmity toward others is a product of one's perceptions about them, 
not necessarily of what they are actually doing, and perceptions can-
not easily be measured or predicted. Other than on an ad hoc basis, it 
would be difficult to identify the class of state and local taxes that were 
likely to create excessive enmity. 
On the other side of the comparison, the principal argument for 
attaching such great importance to locational neutrality is one of effi-
ciency. As an economic matter, all else being equal - an important 
qualification that I will later relax23 - it is optimal that the tax levied 
on a given amount of profit or a given taxpayer be invariant with re-
gard to where property or persons are located. 24 As I discuss in the 
next subsection, taxes generally are transfer payments, rather than net 
costs to society or compensation for the use or consumption of scarce 
resources. Thus, stylized economic actors making cost-benefit calcula-
tions but selflessly seeking to maximize social rather than personal 
utility would disregard their tax bills in making personal and business 
decisions. Equally stylized but selfish actors will not disregard their 
tax bills in making locational decisions, however, unless taxation is 
constant across different locations. Accordingly, under standard eco-
nomic assumptions, locational neutrality minimizes the real social 
costs of production and ensures that low-cost producers will out-com-
pete high-cost but otherwise equivalent producers. Even when per-
21. While regional loyalties (for example, as a Southerner or New Englander) remain cultur-
ally important today, state tax rivalries often involve neighbors from the same region. See, e.g., 
Speno v. Gallman, 319 N.E.2d 180 (1974) (concerning New York's attempt to tax New Jersey 
residents who worked in New York). 
22. A standard barring discrimination against interstate commerce, which might be thought 
to address the enmity/perception problem, has difficulties that I discuss in Part II infra. Even if 
this standard worked better, however, I doubt that an empirical study would reveal much effect 
on popular perceptions regarding the behavior of other states. Ironically, perhaps the clearest 
recent example of a tax that created interstate enmity, Montana's severance tax on coal, viewed 
by many as an OPEC-style extraction of monopoly rents by "blue-eyed Arabs," was upheld by 
the Supreme Court under the antidiscrimination standard. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Walter Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Ex-
portation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 48-51, 75. 
23. See infra section 111.C. 
24. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves' 
Clothing, in THE EcONOMICS OF TAXATION 327, 345 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskins 
eds., 1980). McLure notes that this insight, while standard in discussions of international taxa-
tion, tends to be ignored in discussions of state taxation - a point that is as true now as when 
McLure made it more than ten years ago. Id. at 344. 
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sonal consumption rather than business decisionmaking is involved, 
locational neutrality in taxation permits people to maximize their util-
ity net of social costs.25 
To put the point more precisely, while taxes inevitably have in-
come effects - by reducing the taxpayer's wealth, they affect her be-
havior - they ought not, to the extent avoidable, to have substitution 
effects. When they cause a taxpayer to substitute an activity for the 
one she would otherwise prefer in order to reduce her tax liability, 
they create a deadweight social loss in the amount of the reduced 
pretax benefit to the taxpayer by reason of the substitution. Absent 
externalities, the conclusion that the substitution is a loss follows logi-
cally from assuming that people generally know (better than the tax 
authorities, if not absolutely) what is best for themselves. 
I have thus far treated locational neutrality as important purely for 
reasons of efficiency. This might suggest that its import depends upon 
the relevant elasticities of taxpayer behavior. Disparities in taxation 
have no efficiency consequences absent behavioral responses - that is, 
if that which is differentially taxed is wholly inelastic. Inelasticity, 
however, does not eliminate the problems caused by locational dispar-
ity, but merely changes their form from inefficiency to inequity. This 
may follow, for example, if persons who are equivalent except for loca-
tion ought to pay the same amount of tax. To illustrate the tradeoff 
between inefficiency and inequity, a discriminatory tax on out-of-state 
merchants that they cannot pass on to consumers seems mainly ineffi-
cient if the merchants substantially reduce their in-state business and 
thereby largely avoid paying it, and mainly inequitable (at least in the 
short run) if they continue to operate the same size in-state business 
(for example, due to sunk costs) but at a tax price that substantially 
reduces their profits below those available to in-state merchants. 
While locational neutrality is desirable only because it serves the 
more primary ends of efficiency and equity, I generally will, for rea-
sons of convenience in exposition, refer to locational neutrality as if it 
were an end in itself. This practice resembles the convention, in dis-
cussions of federal income tax policy, of treating conformity to the 
Haig-Simons definition of economic income26 as a normative goal. 
25. Locational neutrality may be desirable even if market outcomes are flawed by externali-
ties. Problems with market outcomes merely make possible a second-best defense of locational 
disparities as an offset to other distortions. Absent any good reason for expecting such offset, 
however, it is common to assume that avoiding further distortions is desirable. See, e.g., E.J. 
Mishan, Second Thoughts on Second Best, 14 OXFORD EcoN. PAPERS 205, 214 (1962). In addi-
tion, locational neutrality within the United States is desirable even if absent worldwide if only to 
benefit the doing of business within the United States. 
26. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1189, 1190 (1989). 
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There too the more primary ends are efficiency and equity,27 but the 
reciprocal relationship between these two ends, ensuring that one or 
the other generally will be implicated,28 permits use of the shorthand, 
so long as one keeps the ultimate ends in mind when one must to 
balance the advantages of conformity to the standard against compet-
ing objectives.29 
Locational neutrality is far more important today than in 1787. 
Today's far greater set of economic interrelationships among the 
states, founded above all on drastic reductions in the costs of travel 
and communication, suggest a far greater elasticity of response to loca-
tional tax disparities. Thus, the efficiency consequences of locational 
disparities probably have grown immensely.30 While this initially 
might seem to suggest merely a shift from inequity to inefficiency, 
rather than an increase in the sum total of the two problems, it seems 
clear that the sum total has increased. First, the immense real growth 
in state and local taxation since 1787 would make the problem a larger 
one even absent any other changes. Second, as I will discuss shortly, 
the notions of state and local tax equity and efficiency involve more 
than merely comparing the tax burdens in different locations. They 
are complicated by the question of whether the taxpayer has received 
sufficient offsetting benefits, a condition that is particularly likely to be 
met if the taxes are in some sense paid voluntarily (for example, she 
has chosen them as a voter in order to finance higher spending). Taxes 
that are borne by persons not residing or voting in the taxing jurisdic-
tion thus are relatively likely to be inequitable and inefficient. Today's 
more integrated national economy presents far greater opportunities 
than existed in 1787 for states in effect to reach across their borders 
and tax nonconsenting nonbeneficiaries. 
The analysis thus far has depended upon incompletely explored 
assumptions about taxation, going both to the efficiency reasons for 
preferring that taxpayers base decisions on pretax rather than post-tax 
outcomes, and to the meaning of tax equity. Before further discussing 
27. See, e.g., id. at 1220-30. 
28. Cf Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misal/ocations Drive 
Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979) (describing the inequities and inefficiencies 
attributed to departures from Haig-Simons income taxation as inversely related depending on the 
relevant elasticities). 
29. For similar reasons of convenience and convention, I ignore the existence of nontax bar-
riers to locational neutrality (such as protectionist state and local regulation) that ultimately 
might be more important to furthering the integration of the national economy, and which con-
ceivably might support second-best arguments for locationally nonneutral taxes. 
30. On the other hand, the efficiency consequences of a particular jurisdiction's undesirable 
taxes and regulations have been reduced, since greater mobility permits disfavored activities to 
move to other jurisdictions instead of being wholly suppressed. 
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locational neutrality and comparing it to a standard barring discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce, I will explore more carefully the 
definitions and assumptions about taxes that qualify the meaning and 
importance of locational neutrality. 
B. The Definition of a Tax and Its Significance for Locational 
Neutrality 
In common usage, not all laws requiring value to be transferred to 
governments are taxes. We speak of income, sales, and property taxes; 
business, excise, and severance taxes; gift, estate, and inheritance 
taxes; and the like. Yet items such as highway tolls, public transit 
fares, tuition charged by state universities, and fines for criminal be-
havior commonly are not called taxes. More generally, transfers of 
value to the government are not called taxes when they have either of 
two characteristics. First, if paid dir~ctly in exchange for specific serv- . 
ices (such as a subway ride or college education), they are called user 
fees. Second, if levied principally to affect behavior rather than to 
raise revenue, they are called regulation. 31 
Both distinctions are imprecise. Consider a "car user fee," enacted 
to replace a substantively identical personal property tax on cars, that 
directly benefits the payer only in the sense that she avoids penalty for 
nonpayment and is permitted to drive. 32 Or consider a tax on the 
rental of hotel rooms - arguably a user fee if it merely defrays the 
costs imposed on the taxing jurisdiction by visitors, but more of a tax 
as it begins to swell general revenues. 33 
As for the distinction between taxes and regulation, colonial 
Americans encountered its vagaries when they took the position, in 
connection with their claim that England could regulate but not tax 
their trade, that a sixpence duty on foreign molasses was within the 
power of Parliament because it would end the molasses trade, but that 
cutting the duty in half to three pence, so that it was no longer prohib-
31. A tax could alternatively be defined as any regulatory provision that imposes costs on 
private parties, even if the costs are deadweight social losses rather than transfers. I define taxes 
more narrowly, and distinguish them from regulation, given this article's purpose of examining 
the provisions that state and local governments use primarily to raise revenue. 
32. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 212, define a user fee as a "voluntary" pay-
ment, but this begs the question of whether, for example, an income tax is voluntary because one 
could avoid it by earning no taxable income. 
33. The hotel example helps to clarify that even what looks like a market exchange involving 
a government may belong in the tax realm if the government is using its coercive powers to 
charge a monopoly price. Thus, imagine that the above government repealed its hotel tax but 
used its eminent domain and police powers to take over all hotels in the jurisdiction and bar any 
new hotels from entering the local market. Tlie example would be substantively identical to that 
in the main text if the government then set room prices to equal the "normal" (i.e., previous 
private) charge plus the earlier hotel tax. 
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itive and therefore raised revenue, would infringe the fundamental lib-
erties of English subjects.34 Even when the substantive distinction 
between raising revenue and seeking behavioral responses appears 
clear, common usage is not always consistent with it. Consider a tariff 
set high enough to keep out all foreign trade, thus raising no revenue. 
While the provision meets my definition of regulation, it might be 
called a tax given its form and the likely surreptitiousness of the regu-
latory motive. Similarly, an income tax rule permitting homeowners 
to deduct lodging costs against taxable income, thereby understating 
the consumption component of income for the regulatory purpose of 
favoring home ownership, commonly is classified, in keeping with its 
form, as part of the income tax. 
While mindful of the murkiness of the distinctions, I define "taxes" 
for purposes of this article as provisions that (unlike user fees) are 
simple transfers to government rather than market-style exchanges of 
value for specific goods or services, and that (unlike regulation) princi-
pally serve revenue-raising objectives. To the extent that a transfer is 
part of a market-style exchange or serves regulatory objectives, my 
analysis remains relevant but is incomplete. In particular, consider 
the statement in the previous section that, from an efficiency stand-
point, taxes are costs one would prefer the taxpayer to ignore. Plainly 
it is not efficient for prospective payers to disregard user fees that re-
flect the cost of providing them with services.35 Moreover, if we as-
sume that a particular regulation is a good one, then presumably we 
do want it to affect people's behavior. Thus, to the extent that a levy 
imposed by a state or local government is a user fee or regulation, 
rather than a tax, additional issues are presented - on the user fee 
side, concerning whether it may reduce locational or other distortions 
by making the payer internalize actual social costs of her presence;36 
and on the regulation side, concerning whether any distortions result-
ing from the levy might be either desirable in themselves or worth the 
price of achieving the regulatory aim. 
The provisions commonly called taxes, however, and on which all 
34. See GIPSON, supra note 18, at 184. 
35. The efficiency issue is more complicated where user fees pay for a service with high fixed 
costs and low variable costs. In the case of subway fares, for example, if price discrimination 
were feasible and permitted the recovery of fixed costs from high-valuing users, it would be 
efficient for a low-valuing user to pay a fare that compensated the state only for the trivial varia-
ble costs imposed by her ride. 
36. Even when a user fee recovers actual social costs attributable to a class of users, it may be 
apportioned among them in a locationally distortive fashion. See, e.g., American Trucking 
Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (holding that fixed highway user charges imposed on 
truckers unconstitutionally discriminated in favor of in-state truckers who paid the same amount 
as out-of-staters despite averaging far more miles of use). 
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governments in this country depend for most of their revenue, are in 
their dominant features unlike either user fees or regulation. They 
tend neither to recover specific governmental costs in the context of a 
market-style transaction nor to be regulatory so much as revenue-rais-
ing devices. For example, consider an income tax on salary or a sales 
tax on consumer purchases. A taxpayer probably does not impose sig-
nificant costs on society by deciding to work for a salary rather than 
enjoy leisure, or to purchase a consumer item rather than take a walk. 
Nor is the taxing government likely to be attempting (other than very 
marginally in its choice of tax base) to discourage work or consumer 
purchases. The act of earning or purchasing merely serves as a conve-
nient occasion for the government to demand payment. 
Taxes emerge from the intersection of two of governments' princi-
pal characteristics. The first is that they provide public goods, such as 
police protection, clean streets, and national defense, that cannot be 
sold separately to individual users through standard market transac-
tions. 37 This prevents governments from charging users directly for 
many of the benefits provided. The second is that they possess coer-
cive powers, enabling them to seize property or claim monopolies. 
Thus, governments can successfully extract payments without regard 
to the cost or value of any benefits provided. 
The separation between benefits received and taxes imposed has 
important implications even if all taxpayers receive an acceptably "fair 
deal." In particular, it explains why taxpayers should, but are unlikely 
to, disregard tax costs in making decisions. However much value one 
receives from the government, one generally does not get more at the 
margin by increasing one's own tax bill. Thus, tax payments are 
purely a cost to the taxpayer, and one that bears no direct relationship 
to either the social cost or the subjective value of the benefits one re-
ceives. For society, by contrast, the tax payment itself is a pure trans-
fer (even if its existence and the act of payment have associated costs) 
that leaves aggregate social monetary wealth unchanged. 38 
37. Government also can serve the function of redistributing wealth. I do not separately 
address redistribution here because, to the extent desirable, it can be defined as a public good. 
For example, if one's goal is a significant transfer of wealth to the poor, one's own efforts may be 
inadequate if others with money "shirk" their shares of the overall transfer. Governmental taxa-
tion to redistribute wealth thus can be seen as solving the collective action problem faced by 
voters with money who favor redistribution. I later discuss redistribution, and conclude that it is 
most effectively conducted at the national rather than the state or local level. See infra section 
111.C.2. 
38. Tax payments are pure transfers for society even if one believes that all government 
spending is wasted, so long as the amount and kind of such spending is not affected at the margin 
by short-term variations in the amount of tax collected. If this spending-invariance condition 
holds, a taxpayer's avoidance of liability merely reallocates the cost of paying for government 
expenditures, in some hard-to-determine way, from herself to other current or future members of 
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In calling taxes revenue-raisers devoid of independent regulatory 
purpose, I have ignored two issues. The first is the classification prob-
lem presented by a provision within a tax that reflects regulatory 
rather than revenue-raising purposes. Such a provision can be a reve-
nue-raising tax penalty,39 but perhaps more commonly is a revenue-
losing "tax expenditure" that departs from the ordinary course of the 
tax to serve regulatory purposes, such as homeowners' income tax de-
ductions. 40 Or a provision, while plausibly within the ordinary course 
of the tax, may have been chosen over a comparably plausible alterna-
tive for regulatory reasons. 41 In general, for reasons to be explained 
later, 42 I will exalt formalism over substance, and treat provisions as 
"taxes" so long as they are part of the structure of a tax (for example, 
an income tax deduction or a sales tax exclusion). Second, any basic 
choice of tax base by a government presumably reflects regulatory pur-
poses regarding how liability ought to be apportioned or the expected 
behavioral effects of different taxes.43 These points do not so much 
rebut the inefficiency of taxes that influence behavior as suggest offset-
ting benefit or justification, and I therefore will defer considering 
them. 
We have now seen the grounds for the claim that an efficient tax is 
one taxpayers ignore. Because this article examines federalism in taxa-
tion, I will focus on locational efficiency to the exclusion of other sorts. 
Conceptually, a locationally efficient tax is one that does not affect 
people's decisions about where to live, travel, invest, and so forth. In 
other words, such a tax replicates as closely as possible the state of 
affairs that would prevail under a uniform national taxing scheme, dis-
society. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative 
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1990). 
39. Consider, for example, § 280E of the Internal Revenue Code, which denies dealers in 
illegal drugs deductions for certain items that plainly are business expenses, such as rental or 
salary costs incurred in the illegal business. I.R.C. § 280E (West Supp. 1991). Such provisions 
mismeasure income in order to penalize drug-dealing relative to other business activity. 
40. On the tax expenditure concept, see STANLEY s. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 
(1973). The concept rapidly became controversial and has remained so. See, e.g., Boris I. Bitt-
ker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NATL. TAX J. 244 (1969); 
Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 
(1989); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155. While mo~t 
commonly used in the income tax context, the term tax expenditure is equally applicable (or 
inapplicable) to any other tax that is claimed to have a discernible "normal" structure. 
41. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 309 (1972) (arguing that medical deductions may not be preferential departures from 
"normal" income tax rules). 
42. See infra section 111.C.3. 
43. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283 (1990) 
(arguing that a consumption tax should replace the current income tax in order to ameliorate the 
tax system's bias against saving and in favor of current consumption). 
March 1992] Federalism in Taxation 907 
regarding any consequent changes either in the level of taxation or in 
what is taxed. Similarly, a locationally equitable tax is one in which 
real tax burdens do not vary with location, and therefore are the same 
as under a uniform national taxing scheme. It may be objected, how-
ever, that the case for locational neutrality in taxation is less compel-
ling than the case for other sorts of tax neutrality - for example, 
neutrality in the taxation of different types of investment income under 
an income tax. I therefore will consider the special issues raised by 
locational neutrality before examining more comprehensively what it 
means. 
C. The Comparative Value of Locational Neutrality and Tax 
Neutrality in General 
Even if one accepts the view that taxes should usually be neutral, 
locational neutrality presents special complexities and difficulties. The 
key difference between it and, say, neutral treatment of different types 
of investment income under an income tax is that the cost and value of 
the services people receive in different geographical areas from the op-
eration of their state and local governments are likely to differ, 
whereas there may be no reason to expect differences in the govern-
ment services that holders of different types of investments receive. 
Consider again my statement that a tax, as distinct from a user fee, 
involves no relationship between the amount paid and the benefits re-
ceived. While true at the margin as one's own tax bill increases, it is 
not necessarily true over a broader range of variation in tax levels. 
Governments that charge more taxes often may provide more value in 
the form of services, and may be able to direct most of this value to 
resident taxpayers. These residents, in their capacity as voters, ration-
ally may take a different view of taxes than in their capacity as taxpay-
ers. A voter is helping to determine everyone's tax burden, not just 
her own, and therefore has less reason to be tax-averse. Voting for 
higher taxes does not automatically create an externality problem: one 
may receive significantly more services if everyone pays more. More-
over, even in one's capacity as a taxpayer there may be a relationship 
between taxes paid and services received. If a government provides 
insufficient value in exchange for the taxes it extracts, residents may be 
able to "vote with their feet" by leaving. If exit costs are sufficiently 
low, state and local taxes are user fees, voluntarily exchanged for the 
state or local government's service package. 44 
Thus, higher taxes in one jurisdiction are not locationally inequita-
44. See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 8. 
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ble to the extent that those paying the higher taxes also receive greater 
value from government services,45 and are not locationally inefficient 
to the extent that this value is effectively linked to the payment of tax. 
Moreover, since voters have some control over taxing levels, we might 
expect an equitable and efficient service offset in cases where voters 
impose higher taxes on themselves. This point holds even more 
powerfully if one "votes" in the notional sense of declining to exercise 
a cheap exit option, since one can decide on one's own where to live 
without needing to be part of a voting majority. 
The significance of these points is diminished to the extent that 
they ignore tax burden and service benefit disparities within the tax-
paying class and expect too much both of the often costly exit option46 • 
and of voting.47 Thus, at the margin for any one taxpayer, taxes often 
do function simultaneously as costs to the taxpayer and transfers from 
society's perspective. Yet the voter or resident benefit and consent 
points arguably are significant enough to suggest that one particular 
form of locational disparity merits special attention: the problem of 
tax exportation, which occurs when governments succeed in placing 
tax burdens on outsiders.48 Tax exportation might seem merely a 
standard case of locational distortion, inducing taxpayers to stay en-
tirely inside the exporting jurisdictions or else avoid them altogether. 
From the broader perspective, however, tax exportation may pose un-
usually serious equity and efficiency problems by placing tax burdens 
on what may often be nonconsenting nonbeneficiaries. 
So far, in exploring the limits to locational neutrality as an equity 
and efficiency value, I have considered only differences in tax level that 
result from people's different decisions regarding how much govern-
ment service to pay for. Differences in tax level may arise, however, 
even if people in all jurisdictions have identical preferences. The social 
costs of what all deem to be essential services may vary, due to differ-
ences in geography, climate, population density, or any number of 
other factors. Many of these differences would efficiently be reflected 
in user fees varying with location if it were feasible to finance all gov-
ernment operations through user fees rather than taxes. How, then, 
45. By focusing on the value received in return for paying truces, I do not argue that wealth-
redistributing truces are inequitable. I ignore wealth redistribution because it seems irrelevant to 
locational equity, which presumably requires that the amount taken from one for redistributive 
purposes not vary with location. 
46. See, e.g., Brookes D. Billman, Jr. & Noel B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local 
Taxes: The Case for Deductibility, 28 TAX NOTES 1107, 1113 (1985). 
47. On imperfect information, the danger that one group of voters will exploit another, and 
other standard voting paradoxes and problems, see IAIN McLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE (1987). 
48. See infra section III.C. 
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can it be argued that locational neutrality, rather than a system of 
highly nuanced variation in local tax levels, is optimally efficient? 
The answer to this challenge, in part, is that locationally neutral 
taxation concededly is not optimally efficient. No taxation can be, 
given that it is an imperfect substitute for user fees, made necessary by 
the public goods problem. The argument for locationally neutral taxa-
tion, as for tax neutrality in general, is a ceteris paribus argument: that 
absent differences on the service side taxes should be neutral and mini-
mize behavioral responses. The ceteris paribus argument is reasonable, 
however, given the difficulty of measuring the cost or value of govern-
ment services received by different persons or in different areas, unless 
the actual variations are quite large. 
In other words, despite such actual variations, one should not re-
ject locational neutrality in favor of either a more nuanced standard 
that incorporates all cost-of-government-service variations or aban-
donment of the notion of a standard altogether. The former, while 
theoretically preferable, is too complex and indeterminate to be usable. 
The latter is unnecessarily skeptical and despairing if it appears plausi-
ble that, in most cases, differences in government services received 
either are not overly significant or will accentuate, rather than offset, 
the distortive effects (considered in isolation) of locational disparity in 
taxation. The leap of faith that support for locational neutrality in-
volves - for such it is, however well founded and sensible - should 
be familiar to people who are versed in the income tax policy literature 
of the past fifty years. For similar reasons income tax policy often is 
based on a neutrality norm that ignores both variations in services re-
ceived by different taxpayers49 and the arguments for a more nuanced 
(but too complex and indeterminate) optimal taxation norm under 
which rates of taxation would vary with the elasticity of what is being 
taxed.50 
D. Broader Ramifications of Locational Neutrality 
1. Differences Between Tax Systems as Inherently Distortive 
The previous three sections described the principle of locational 
neutrality and the reasons for considering it desirable. We saw that 
locational equity and efficiency generally require that taxes not vary 
with location or affect business or personal decisions regarding loca-
, 
49. On the problems with using a benefit standard, see WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY 
KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXATION 35-39 (1953). 
50. On optimal taxation, see, e.g., Walter Hettich & Stanley Winer, Blueprints and Pathways: 
The Shifting Foundations of Tax Reform, 38 NATL. TAX J. 423, 428 (1985). 
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tion. While benefits received and voters• or residents• consent also 
may enter the picture and make taxes the equivalent of user fees that 
ought to vary with location, it is plausible to begin the analysis by 
assuming the general case where taxes are disjoined from benefits or 
unconstrained consent. This section therefore explores the ramifica-
tions of locational neutrality in its general sense, leaving the benefit 
and consent points to be addressed later.51 
In a locationally neutral system, the level, kinds, and geographical 
distribution of all activity would be the same as if the country had a 
uniform national taxing system, disregarding any effects that such a 
reallocation of taxing authority would have on the types of taxes levied 
or tax rates. Unfortunately, this notional touchstone for measuring 
locational neutrality is not only abstract and counterfactual, but ut-
terly unattainable other than by actually establishing a uniform na-
tional taxing system. Consider the administrative and compliance 
effects of having federal rather than national taxation. The existence 
of multiple taxing authorities - including, for example, several thou-
sand different sales tax jurisdictions - inevitably creates burden, un-
evenly distributed among taxpayers, that changes outcomes. The 
compliance costs alone of having multiple taxing jurisdictions are 
great enough, according to one recent commentator, to constitute "a 
drag on interstate trade almost as debilitating as the border restric-
tions our federal system was originally designed to prevent."52 
Even disregarding compliance costs, locational neutrality is unat-
tainable as virtually an immediate consequence of having separate tax-
ing jurisdictions. As soon as there are any differences in the taxes 
levied by such jurisdictions, locational neutrality disappears. For ex-
ample, assume that North Dakota has a ten percent flat rate income 
tax on residents and South Dakota has a five percent flat rate income 
tax on residents. All else being equal, residing in South Dakota is tax-
favored relative to residing in North Dakota. Or assume that North 
Dakota taxes real property while South Dakota taxes sales. Now the 
locational biases favor owning real property in South Dakota and 
making sales in North Dakota. Finally, assume that both states have 
identical income taxes except that South Dakota allows more 
favorable depreciation. Even if the states' depreciation rules apply to 
property owned in other states, the effects are the same as in the rate 
51. See infra section 111.C. 
52. Gordon D. Henderson, What We Can Do About What's Wrong With the Tax Law, 49 
TAX NOTES 1349, 1352 (1990). See infra section I.E for a discussion of administrative and 
compliance costs. 
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difference example for taxpayers who own or anticipate owning depre-
ciable property. 
Tax base disparities present obvious planning opportunities for 
both taxpayers and governments. The taxpayer side of maximizing 
after-tax returns by minimizing tax liability is obvious. The govern-
ment side is significant as well, however. States can choose tax bases 
that seem likely to draw tax revenues from outsiders. Consider, for 
example, severance taxes that Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming levy on 
the extraction of oil or coal (principally for use out of state), or the 
tendency of states with large tourist industries to charge higher gen-
eral sales taxes than other states, 53 as well as higher hotel taxes than 
their general sales taxes. 54 Taxes of this kind penalize interstate rela-
tive to intrastate commerce, since wholly in-state items and transac-
tions tend to be more lightly taxed, but any attempt to strike them 
down involves line-drawing problems if one assumes that states have 
authority to decide what they want to tax.55 
Clearly, then, disparities in state and local taxation would defeat 
locational neutrality even if no person was present in more than one 
jurisdiction. When taxpayers straddle jurisdictions and thus become 
directly subject to more than one tax system, the disparities grow 
worse. The income tax-property tax example above suggested one 
problem, arising when states have different types of tax bases: the pos-
sibility of being either double taxed (as when one has real property in 
North Dakota and sales in South Dakota) or not taxed at all (if one 
reverses the states). Yet problems arise even when all states have the 
same type of tax base, and that base does not in any inherent way 
target interstate commerce. For each of the major taxes widely em-
ployed at the state and local level, a set of coordination problems be-
tween jurisdictions, commonly lacking easy solution, has emerged over 
the years. These problems involve determining which states have tax-
ing authority, and to what degree, over a particular taxpayer or trans-
action, as well as how one state's exercise of authority should affect 
another's. Imperfect coordination, which often is unavoidable, tends 
to distort taxpayers' choices regarding entry into multiple jurisdic-
53. See JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LocAL STRUC-
TURE AND ADMINISfRATION 12 (1983). 
54. See, e.g., Betsy Wade, Tax Collectors Lean on the Out-of-Towners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
1991, § 5, at 3. 
55. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the Supreme Court 
relied on this assumption to sustain Montana's coal severance tax against constitutional chal-
lenge. The Court rejected arguments that the tax unduly exported tax burdens to out-of-staters 
and exceeded the value of any benefits provided to out-of-staters, largely on the ground that real 
economic incidence and the value of benefits provided (such as police protection) are prohibi-
tively difficult to measure. I address the merits of the Court's position at section 111.C.1 infra. 
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tions. The following is a brief description of some of the major coordi-
nation problems in the principal existing state and local truces. 
2. Multijurisdictional Coordination Problems 
a. Personal income taxes. If income could be taxed only in the 
state where it was earned and the identity of that state were always 
clear, the personal income tax might present no coordination 
problems. At the other extreme, if all states could and did tax all 
income, regardless of whether the earner or earning activity had any 
connection with the taxing state, coordination problems would not 
arise. In that instance, multiple trucation would be a fact of life to 
which all persons were subject without regard to their locational 
decisions. 
In legal and economic fact, however, neither alternative holds. 
States can and do tax their residents on all income, and nonresidents 
on income earned within the state. 56 The resulting threat of double 
taxation when a trucpayer resides in one state and earns income in 
other states is widely addressed by true credits for liability incurred 
elsewhere, or by states' declining to exercise their full taxing powers. 
However, these countermeasures are not constitutionally required, are 
not universally employed, and provide incomplete protection due to 
built-in limitations and disparities in their application.57 
Even when the states consistently apportion a person's income so 
that each dollar is truced only once, one's overall tax liability may ex-
ceed what it would have been if any one of the states had been the only 
taxing authority. This results from provisions that limit or prorate 
personal exemptions, deductions, or credits for persons (such as non-
residents or part-year residents) associated with other states, or that 
count income earned in other states to determine the applicable rate 
bracket under a progressive rate structure, meaning that some never 
benefit from the lower brackets. 58 Double trucation may result even 
when the states ostensibly try to apportion a person's income, if the 
location where it was earned (or where one resides) is sufficiently un-
clear for the states to take inconsistent positions. 
A final personal income tax coordination problem involves the in-
teraction between issues of tax timing and changes in the taxpayer's 
56. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); New York ex rel. Cohn v. 
Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Walter Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation of a 
Nonresident's Personal Income, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1309, 1310 (1974). 
57. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 968-71; Hellerstein, supra note 56, 
at 1310. 
58. See Wheeler v. State, 249 A.2d 887 (Vt.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 4 (1969); Hellerstein, 
supra note 56, at 1346-54. 
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state of residence. When a state income tax rule permits the taxpayer 
to defer recognizing otherwise taxable income and she moves to an-
other state before recognition, then upon recognition both the current 
and the former state of residence may make a claim, potentially lead-
ing to duplicative taxation. This problem has arisen under state in-
come tax rules providing that salary invested in a retirement annuity, 
along with the annuity fund's inside buildup, is taxable only upon 
withdrawal. States allowing such deferral have attempted to reach 
withdrawals by taxpayers who move out of state upon retirement, 
leading to overlap with residency-based claims by the taxpayers' new 
states.59 
b. Property taxes. Not all property taxes present coordination 
problems. Since real property generally is immobile and has an unam-
biguous location, its taxation at the state and local level ordinarily 
does not create coordination problems between different jurisdictions. 
The main danger to interstate commerce is simply one of property 
assessments that are biased against outsiders. Assessment tends to be 
highly discretionary and is only subject to independent administrative 
review in four states and the District of Columbia. 60 
Mobile personal property presents a danger both of double taxa-
tion, if more than one jurisdiction makes a claim, and of tax avoid-
ance, as when taxpayers temporarily move property out of the taxing 
jurisdiction on tax day.61 In addition, the taxation of intangible prop-
erty (such as mortgages or corporate stock) can result in overlapping 
taxation by different jurisdictions that penalizes taxpayers for multiju-
risdictional presence. The problem is not only that intangible property 
may have no clear location, but that its value may result from the 
rights that it conveys in tangible property already subject to property 
tax. Consider, for example, a property tax on shares of corporate 
stock held in North Dakota, where all of the corporation's tangible 
property is located and taxed in South Dakota. 62 
Property taxes can yield further coordination problems if the tax-
payer's domicile or residency, in addition to the property's location, is 
a ground for imposing liability. In illustration, Florida's intangible 
property tax, recently upheld by an evenly divided Supreme Court, 
applies to items that either have an in-state business situs or are owned 
59. See, e.g., 137 CONG. R.Ec. Sll59, Sll89-90 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (describing a bill 
introduced by Senator Reid to bar states from taxing nonresidents' pension incomes). 
60. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSfEIN, supra note l, at 192-93. 
61. See id. at 198-203. 
62. See id. at 204-07. There is no locational coordination problem (although still double 
taxation) if North Dakota and South Dakota each tax both the tangible property and the stock if 
both are located in-state. 
914 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:895 
by Florida domiciliaries. 63 If other states similarly tax property on the 
basis of both business situs and domicile, without granting credits for 
other states' taxes on the same property, multijurisdictional presence is 
penalized. 
c. Retail sales and use taxes. Perhaps no coordination problem in 
state and local taxation is better known than that arising under sales 
taxation. When a buyer in one jurisdiction makes a purchase from a 
seller in another jurisdiction, both jurisdictions may have a claim. 
There may be no right answer as to where the sale occurred. More-
over, even if the place of sale is clear, residency provides an alternative 
ground supporting the imposition of a tax. To prevent avoidance of 
their sales taxes by residents, many jurisdictions impose use taxes on 
goods purchased out-of-state but used in-state. 64 
As most people who have ordered from out-of-state by telephone 
or mail to avoid sales tax know, however, nontaxation, not double tax-
ation, is the main problem. Pursuant to a Multistate Tax Compact, 65 
most states accept consistent rules allocating exclusive tax jurisdiction 
(such as deeming sales to occur in the state of destination) and grant 
credits where necessary to avoid double taxation. The remaining 
problems, such as holdouts from this pattern of agreement or the im-
position of use taxes that are harsher than the analogous sales taxes 
and thereby disfavor out-of-state sales, are relatively minor. 66 
A significant coordination problem still remains, but it goes in the 
opposite direction. While use taxes commonly require self-assessment 
by the purchaser, collection often depends on the active cooperation of 
the seller. Given the many thousands of sales tax jurisdictions in this 
country, however, sellers with nationwide mail or phone order busi-
nesses might suffer from intolerable burden if, in keeping with usual 
sales tax practice, they were required to remit all taxes due from pur-
chasers on their sales to the purchasers' jurisdictions. Although, espe-
cially in an age of computers, such a result might not overly burden 
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has ruled otherwise. In Na-
tional Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 61 the Court held 
that, at least absent congressional authorization, sellers cannot be re-
63. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2049 (1991); Divided 
Court Affirms Florida Court's Ruling Upholding Tax on Intangibles, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 
98, at G-4 (May 21, 1991). 
64. See, e.g., HELLERSfEIN & HELLERSfEIN, supra note 1, at 770-71. 
65. State Tax Guide (CCH) ~ 351, at 356 (1991) [hereinafter State Tax Guide]. 
66. See HELLERSrEIN & HELLERSfEIN, supra note l, at 781-85. Double taxation of an in-
terstate sale may in any event lead to invalidation of one of the taxes under the Commerce 
Clause. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1989). 
67. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
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quired to remit the sales tax due from the purchaser to any state where 
they have not established a sufficient presence to constitute nexus. 68 
The rule of National Bellas Hess creates two distortions. First, 
purchasers often find that they can avoid taxation by making out-of-
state purchases, including some that were more expensive before tax 
than the in-state alternatives. Thus, interstate transactions are tax-fa-
vored based on the Supreme Court's concern that the only practical 
alternative is to tax-penalize them. Second, sellers are deterred from 
increasing their presence in a taxing jurisdiction at the margin where it 
would establish nexus. 
A further coordination problem under sales and use taxes arises 
when states tax sales other than final retail sales. When one state taxes 
an intermediate sale of raw materials or services to a manufacturer, 
and another state taxes the final product without allowing a credit for 
the prior sale, the effect is double taxation of the end product. This 
problem can of course arise within a single state, but may be most 
likely to occur where states are trying to reach sales that would other-
wise escape their jurisdiction - as Florida recently attempted when it 
abortively imposed a sales tax on services, including many rendered 
out-of-state, without limiting the tax to final retail sales. 69 
d. Business taxes. States levy a number of taxes on corporations 
and other business entities. These taxes commonly resemble general 
income, property, or sales taxes in that they are based on a measure of 
the taxpayer's profits, value, or gross receipts. Thus, they present 
many of the same coordination problems as these provisions, but in a 
particularly significant setting, given that legal entities such as corpo-
rations do such a large share of the interstate business in this country. 
Taxing companies that are involved in interstate business would 
present no coordination problems if each company could neatly be di-
vided, such that each piece belonged for tax purposes to one state. 
Where the proper lines of division are unclear, however, some pieces 
may be taxed more than once or not at all, leading to over- or un-
dertaxation of interstate business relative to other business. Histori-
cally, the Supreme Court long feared overtaxation more than 
undertaxation - or else simply interpreted the Constitution's "nega-
tive Commerce Clause" with numbing literalness70 - and therefore 
68. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case in which it apparently in-
tends to reconsider the holding of National Bellas Hess. See State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 
203 (N.D.}, cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991). 
69. See George Mundstock, Florida Services: You Only Tax Twice?, 35 TAX NOTES 1137 
(1987). 
70. As a literal textual matter, of course, there is no negative Commerce Clause and thus no 
possibility of its being interpreted with numbing literalness. The Commerce Clause of the Con-
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barred all direct state and local taxation of interstate commerce. The 
result might be called chronic undertaxation mitigated by judicial my-
opia, since it allowed indirect taxes on interstate commerce that might 
be identical to the direct kind in economic incidence and effect. 71 The 
Court eventually decided, however, that the coordination problem de-
served a facially neutral answer. It now holds that interstate business 
may be taxed, whether directly or indirectly, but that the Commerce 
Clause bars undue relative burdens on such commerce, such as dupli-
cative "multiple taxation."72 The states therefore collectively may 
reach all of an interstate business' profits, value, or gross receipts, but 
must apportion the resulting revenue base among themselves. 
The differences between the tax bases of profits, value, and gross 
receipts, along with the difficulty of defining each, guarantee that 
states will not achieve the outcome of taxing everything exactly once. 
States can opportunistically choose whatever base, within the permis-
sible range, appears most favorable to themselves, and thereby collec-
tively engage in effective multiple taxation. Businesses can 
opportunistically exploit disparities in state tax bases in the effort to 
avoid even single taxation. The Supreme Court, lacking the institu-
tional competence or any plausible ground for picking any one tax 
base as the right one, may be unable to go beyond crudely weighing 
the equities case by case or else imposing new formal requirements to 
replace the old "direct-indirect" line. 73 
Coordination problems would remain even under a uniform tax 
base, however, because for large interstate businesses there often is no 
definite place where gross receipts or income are earned or value ex-
stitution states only that "Congress shall have Power •.. To regulate Commerce •.. among the 
Several States." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This eventually was interpreted as implying what 
is now called the "negative Commerce Clause": the proposition that Congress' jurisdiction over 
interstate commerce is exclusive and that therefore, even in the absence of congressional action, 
the federal courts can and should strike down improper state and local government infringe-
ments of this national power. See, e.g., Sholley, supra note 11, at 559-83. 
71. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 42-48 (1987); William B. Lockhart, A Revol11tion 
in State Taxation of Commerce?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1025, 1027-34 (1981). "Directness" de-
pended, for example, in the case of taxes on commercial freight transportation by interstate rail-
ways, on whether the tax was computed with regard to the amount of freight transported (direct 
and therefore impermissible) or the proceeds earned by the railway (indirect and therefore per-
missible). See Hellerstein, s11pra, at 43-44. 
72. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977). 
73. An example of a new formal rule to address the multiple taxation problem is the require-
ment that a tax "have ... 'internal consistency - that is [it] must be such that, if applied by 
every jurisdiction,' there would be no [multiple taxation]." Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 
638, 644 (1984) (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 
(1983)). Internal consistency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for multiple taxa-
tion, but the Court looks to it because "[a]ny other rule would mean that the constitutionality of 
[any one state's] tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other 
States." 467 U.S. at 644-45. 
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ists. The problems go to substance, not just administration or record-
keeping. For example, consider a merger between two previously 
separate businesses in different states, creating synergies, as of integra-
tion, centralized management, and scale, that increase profits and 
value. Even if everything else remains unchanged, the increased value 
and income resulting from the synergy do not inherently belong to 
either state. In any instance where factors of production in more than 
one state are deployed cooperatively, that which is being taxed may 
have no "real" location - for example, where income is generated by 
intangible assets (such as patents) that have no clear location, where 
contracts are negotiated across state lines, or where property is con-
structed in one state, transported through a second, and sold in a 
third. 
The difficulty of determining where income, value, or gross re-
ceipts are located need not prevent the development of a set of consis-
tent and plausible allocation rules. Such a set of rules may impose 
social costs of its own as taxpayers plan to minimize tax liability and 
in some cases enter interstate commerce solely to realize "tax syner-
gies," but at least the rules might solve the basic coordination problem 
of multiple or nontaxation of a portion of the tax base. While states 
have in part cooperated and adopted similar rules, complete uniform-
ity predictably has not emerged given opportunism and random varia-
tion by the states and the courts' lack of institutional competence (or 
confidence) to impose a uniform rule when no particular rule is clearly 
correct. 
The federal courts require, therefore, only that the method of ap-
portionment be reasonable. No tax can be levied .absent a sufficient 
nexus, a not very demanding standard74 that nonetheless deters at the 
margin establishment of an in-state presence. Moreover, at least in 
principle, extraterritorial value cannot be taxed.75 Where in-state and 
out-of-state operations, even if conducted by separate corporations 
that belong to the same control group, constitute a "unitary business," 
however - another not very demanding standard76 that affects incen-
tives at the margin - the state can use any number of apportionment 
methods in identifying the in-state component that is subject to tax. 
74. Nexus may be found, for example, if the company maintains an office, employees or 
agents to conduct its business, or property in the taxing state. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLER-
STEIN, supra note 1, at 362. 
75. See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983). 
76. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), for example, Ver-
mont was held entitled to treat Mobil's entire international petroleum operations as a unitary 
business because a Mobil subsidiary owned and operated a few in-state gas stations. 445 U.S. at 
446-49. 
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In practice, for income taxation of a unitary multistate business, 
almost all states employ a three-factor formula based on property, 
payroll, and sales, but the exact formula and the three factors' defini-
tions vary.77 For example, while some states weigh all three factors 
equally, others give extra weight to the sales factor;78 not surprisingly, 
these tend to be market states, where the percentage of a national busi-
ness' sales in-state is likely to exceed the in-state percentage of its 
property and payroll. Standards other than a three-factor formula are 
also allowable, 79 even if in practice they clearly favor local residents or 
businesses, so long as they are not " 'out of all appropriate proportions 
to the business transacted.' " 80 
Controversy recently has arisen over some states' application of 
unitary business rules, not just to companies that are active in more 
than one state in this country, but on a worldwide basis. A multina-
tional corporate group, if present in such a state, is taxable on the 
apportionable share of its worldwide income. 81 Taxpayers subject to 
worldwide unitary taxation have argued against it on a number of 
grounds, including the following: (1) requiring foreign corporate affili-
ates to report their taxable income to the United States under U.S. 
rules creates severe compliance difficulties; (2) since no foreign coun-
try engages in worldwide unitary taxation, its implementation here 
creates effective double taxation of foreign income, along with compet-
itive disadvantage for worldwide businesses relative to those operating 
purely in-state; and (3) worldwide unitary taxation's departure from 
prevailing domestic practice, both at the national level and in most 
states, adds to its undesirability. 82 The Supreme Court has held states' 
use of worldwide unitary taxation constitutionally allowable, however, 
leaving only a political remedy for those who oppose it.83 
The basic choice of apportionment formula for unitary businesses, 
while important, answers only a subset of the issues concerning the 
location of business income that commonly arise. Whenever an activ-
ity's location is ambiguous or arguably crosses state lines, how to ap-
77. See HELLERSfEIN &. HELLERSfEIN, supra note 1, at 473-79. 
78. See id. at 506-08. 
79. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
80. 437 U.S. at 278 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 
123, 135 (1931)); see also Joel Michael, The Constitutionality of Minnesota's Business Tax Credits 
After Westinghouse Electric Corp., 4 J. ST. TAXN. 163, 166-67 (1985). 
81. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). 
82. See CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON STATE TAXATION OF 
MULTUURISDICTIONAL CORPORATIONS 204-08 (1986). 
83. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); see Mobil Oil Corp. 
v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980). 
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ply any formula becomes unclear, and a host of competing claims of 
tax jurisdiction can be made. Consider, for example, a baseball team 
that plays games in one state during spring training and a number of 
other states during the season, and whose games are broadcast on 
cable television across the country. Or consider a telephone company 
that provides interstate calling services, thus arguably entering not 
only the states in which the parties to phone calls are located but all 
states through which the phone lines or electrical signals pass. In such 
situations, states can easily and plausibly take inconsistent positions, 
under which they may collectively claim more than one hundred per-
cent of the income derived from the activities. 84 
In summary, states can choose their apportionment standards op-
portunistically and make overlapping or inconsistent claims, although 
this will not necessarily lead collectively to overtaxation of interstate 
business relative to intrastate business. Businesses also can respond 
opportunistically to coordination problems - for example, by tax 
planning to minimize liability, 85 deploying superior resources to win 
contested factual issues at audit, and applying in-state political pres-
sure, backed by the threat of leaving, to obtain favorable rules in the 
first place. 
E. Administrative and Compliance Costs of Disparate State and 
Local Taxation 
While I have thus far emphasized the burdens that state and local 
taxation deliberately places on interstate commerce, those that arise 
incidentally may be even more important. The existence of multiple 
separate tax systems, each with its own set of rules and enforcement 
personnel, imposes a number of different costs on the national econ-
omy. It adds substantially to taxpayers' costs of tax planning and 
compliance. It increases the costs of tax administration, as each state 
hires its own bureaucracy and, in many cases, conducts its own audits 
and imposes its own reporting requirements. 86 It leads to more litiga-
tion, in the state courts as well as from federal constitutional chal-
84. Other industries that arguably require special apportionment rules include public utili-
ties, railroads, trucks, airlines, insurance companies, and savings and loan associations. See HEL-
LERSrEJN & HELLERSfEJN, supra note 1, at 498-99. 
85. In one recent case, a corporation apparently was able to exploit differences between 
states' rules to report only 20% of its domestic source income for federal tax purposes as income 
of any state. See Little Support Seen for Proposals to Harmonize State Taxation of Intangibles, 
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 197, at G-10 to G-11 (Oct. 10, 1991). 
86. See Michael J. Graetz et al., United States, in ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE 
COSTS OF TAXATION 329-26 (International Fiscal Assn. ed., 1989). 
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lenges. It means that more legislative bodies consider tax law changes 
and are lobbied by a host of different interests. 
The aggregate social costs of all the tax planning, compliance, ad-
ministration, litigation, and politicking attributable to state and local 
taxation cannot readily be estimated, but plainly are enormous. 
Although only the avoidable costs are fairly at issue here, state and 
local tax receipts exceed $400 billion annually; for sales taxes (which 
are the best documented), rough estimates suggest that the costs of 
state government tax administration plus direct costs of taxpayer com-
pliance equal almost five percent of the amount collected. 87 Even if 
this impressive level of collection efficiency holds across the board, 88 
annual administration and compliance costs for all state and local 
taxes would approach $20 billion annually. This number, however, is 
unrealistically low because it excludes such costs as tax planning, liti-
gation, and politicking. 89 
Unnecessarily high compliance costs are virtually an inevitable 
consequence of state and local government autonomy in defining tax 
bases even under optimistic assumptions about levels of interstate co-
operation. Even assuming that everyone generally wants to cooperate, 
the positive transaction costs of cooperation, along with the occasional 
countervailing factors motivating legislators, suggest that there will re-
main at least residual differences between states' tax bases, as sug-
gested by the substantial but incomplete degree of state 
"piggybacking" onto the federal definition of taxable income. Even a 
small residual degree of variation may impose substantial compliance 
costs, however - for example, by requiring duplicative recordkeeping 
regarding tax attributes such as loss carryovers and basis. Compliance 
costs are not purely proportional to the quantum of divergence be-
87. DUE & MIKESELL, supra note 53, at 323-27, estimate state administrative costs at .73%, 
and vendor compliance costs at 3.93%, of the revenue collected through sales taxation - total-
ing 4.66%. A more recent study by the State of Washington estimates administrative costs at 
.93%. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPT. OF REVENUE, PROGRAM ADMIN. SECTION, TAX AD-
MINISTRATION SURVEY 20 (1988) [hereinafter WASHINGTON TAX SURVEY]. 
88. The sales tax may be above average in collection efficiency. In particular, compared to 
state income taxes, it concentrates compliance costs on a relatively small number of persons -
the retailers who are responsible for collecting it - thus potentially creating scale efficiencies, 
and it is unlikely to elicit anything near the same level of tax planning. Moreover, while for 
many taxpayers the state income tax presents relatively light marginal burdens due to federal 
income tax "piggybacking," for multistate businesses - admittedly, a small group that substan-
tially overlaps with retailers - the extra costs of state and local taxation are increased by income 
allocation issues. Finally, Washington's tax administration survey estimates state collection costs 
for the sales tax to be lower than those for business or income taxes. WASHINGTON TAX SUR-
VEY, supra note 87, at 20. 
89. While political activity may be viewed as valuable in itself, rather than as a social cost, 
that view seems relatively inapplicable to the straightforward economic lobbying by interest 
groups that undoubtedly accounts for a large portion of the political activity in the tax area. 
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tween states' tax bases; a significant fixed cost results from the bare 
fact of divergence. 
In particular, divergence requires taxpayers (1) to know about a 
host of different rules, (2) separately to exercise judgment about the 
application of different jurisdictions' rules, (3) to engage in separate 
numerical calculations (often the least of the problems in a computer 
age), (4) to keep duplicative records, for example, of an asset's basis 
under different income tax regimes, (5) to file multiple forms - not 
only tax returns, but information reports, requests for extensions, re-
ports of tax return adjustments required by other jurisdictions, and the 
like, and (6) to engage in a host of parallel interactions with govern-
ment officials, such as auditors and legislators. 
These burdens, while not entirely avoidable given the existence of 
multiple governmental units, need not be nearly so great as they are in 
practice. The following is a brief description of the features of each of 
the principal state and local taxes that create arguably unnecessary 
burden. 
1. Personal and Business Income Taxes 
Despite substantial piggybacking by state and local governments 
onto the federal income tax base, enough differences remain, along 
with legal or factual issues and compliance requirements unique to the 
state and local level, to create substantial added compliance costs. 
Several companies that I contacted during my research indicated that 
they devote as much manpower and other resources to state and local 
income taxation as to federal income taxation. This suggests that, at 
least for multistate businesses, compliance efficiency (compliance costs 
in relation to taxes paid) is lower for state and local income taxes than 
for federal income taxes, even treating all shared compliance require-
ments as attributable to the latter. While a company's state and local 
income tax bills may occasionally exceed its federal income tax bill -
for example, if it has net taxable income in several states but not for its 
overall operations - ordinarily federal income tax liability is higher 
given the higher federal marginal rates and aggregate tax revenue. 
The compliance burdens faced by multistate businesses - and at 
times by individuals - arise at several different ".Onceptual stages. 
First comes the problem of identifying the taxpaying unit. In particu-
lar, consolidated corporate groups must determine the set of affiliates 
subject to tax in each state. Not only may the set of affiliates with 
direct jurisdictional nexus vary from state to state, but so may the 
legal standards for determining both nexus and which members of the 
groups are engaged in a unitary business (obviating the need for direct 
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nexus by each separate affiliate). Even if the legal issues are clear, tax 
recordkeeping by the overall group may be complicated by the varying 
sets of in-state taxpayers. Moreover, if some affiliates are deemed 
outside the state's taxing jurisdiction, transactions between the inside 
and outside affiliates may be reviewable under state provisions incor-
porating Internal Revenue Code section 482,90 which empowers the 
IRS Commissioner to reallocate income among affiliated taxpayers 
across national boundaries. Section 482 is a notorious quagmire that 
involves factual complexity and lacks a clear underlying standard. 
The Commissioner often seeks to reconstruct the true arm's-length 
terms of an intercorporate transaction, but such terms often do not 
exist and would depend in large part on the outcome of bargaining 
that never occurred. States nonetheless have begun to take an increas-
ing interest in section 482-type issues.91 
The possible application of worldwide unitary taxation creates ad-
ditional costs for multinational companies. Where applicable, taxpay-
ers must procure information from foreign affiliates that may be 
reluctant to provide it and that may not keep records similar to those 
required for federal income tax purposes. Even some states that fol-
low, or permit as an election,92 a "water's-edge rule," under which 
foreign affiliates are excluded from the taxpaying group, require tax-
payers to file comprehensive spreadsheets detailing their income and 
operations on a worldwide basis. These spreadsheets generally are not 
required annually, but the length of time between required filings var-
ies from state to state. 93 
An additional issue in identifying the taxpaying unit arises for 
small closely held companies. For federal income tax purposes, such a 
company may elect to be classified as an S corporation and have its 
income taxed directly to its shareholders, essentially on the partner-
ship model, instead of being taxed itself.94 However, eight states de-
cline to recognize S corporation status for their own income tax 
purposes. 95 
Once the precise taxpaying unit is known, taxpayers must deter-
90. I.RC. § 482 (1991). For an example of an analogous state provision, see CAL. REV. & 
TAX. CoDB § 17551 (West Supp. 1992). 
91. I learned while interviewing companies' tax staffs that Connecticut has been raising § 482 
issues and that California recently sent tax personnel to § 482 training sessions. 
92. Taxpayer elections tend to be socially undesirable even if politically popular, in that they 
encourage taxpayers to substitute compliance costs that are deadweight social costs for tax pay-
ments that are transfers. 
93. This information was derived from my interviews with companies' tax staffs. 
94. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-63 (1988). 
95. See State Tax Guide, supra note 65, 11 10-100, at 1033-37. 
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mine the potential tax base that is within each state's reach. States 
follow different income apportionment formulas - in some cases, for 
example, giving extra weight to the sales factor in a variety of de-
grees. 96 Even where the formulas are ostensibly the same, their precise 
meaning may differ. As an example, the includability~ and if includ-
able the location, of intangible property and income ~der what ap-
pear to be·identical formulas may raise questions. Other potential tax-
base issues that create burden include determining what municipal 
bond interest is tax exempt (since most states, unlike the federal gov-
ernment, exempt only the interest on their own municipal bonds), and 
identifying for deduction disallowance the expenses that are attributa-
ble to income that a given state does not tax.97 
A third stage in income tax compliance involves applying the rules 
for determining taxable income once the potential tax base is known. 
States' rules for computing taxable income vary from the federal rules 
and from each other in a number of different respects. For example, 
California and New York have their own depreciation systems for 
business property. All property subject to these systems therefore has 
a different basis, and potentially a different amount of gain or loss 
upon taxable transfer, for state than for federal tax purposes.98 Other 
states, while generally following the federal depreciation rules, require 
that a portion offederal depreciation deductions be added back to tax-
able income. Five states reject federal depletion rules and five others 
have modified them in varying degrees.99 Net operating losses and 
capital loss carryovers are allowed everywhere, but with a range of 
different carryover periods. Foreign income taxes are alternatively 
creditable (with an election to deduct them instead) as under the fed-
eral income tax, deductible only, or disregarded altogether (the pre-
dominant state rule for corporate taxpayers). Foreign or out-of-state 
dividends received by a corporation may be taxable in-state under a 
variety of different rules. States provide a variety of different invest-
ment incentives - for example, rewarding investment in designated 
enterprise zones. Eight states levy an alternative minimum tax, paya-
ble to the extent that it exceeds the amount due under the regular tax, 
96. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 506-08. For example, New York 
double-weights the sales factor for regular tax (although not minimum tax) purposes; Illinois, 
Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Ohio simply double-weight the sales factor; and 
Minnesota's three-factor formula is weighted 70-15-15 in favor of sales. Id. 
97. I.R.C. § 265 (West Supp. 1991) is a federal example of such a rule. · 
98. An item of property also may have different bases for state and federal income tax pur-
poses owing to differences in the allowance of tax credits that give rise to basis adjustments. 
99. See State Tax Guide, supra note 65, 1f 10-060, at 1027. 
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in order to reduce the value of tax preferences. too 
A fourth stage in income tax compliance is reporting to state tax 
commissions. The tax return is only one of many documents that 
must be filed separately for each jurisdiction on its own forms. In 
addition, thirty-one states require separate applications for an exten-
sion of time to file the tax return, instead of granting extensions auto-
matically when granted by the federal government. 101 States typically 
require that all adjustments to federal income tax returns be reported 
to them, but both the form and the deadline for making such reports 
differ. 
A fifth and final stage in income tax compliance is the audit pro-
cess. States generally conduct their own audits of major corporate tax-
payers. These audits typically take from several days to several weeks, 
tend to be influenced more by political and budgetary considerations 
than are federal income tax audits, often take the form of nonspecific 
denials that particular deductions or other tax benefits are allowable 
- requiring voluminous documentation in response - and are con-
ducted very much in light of the taxpayer's expected unwillingness to 
litigate unless large amounts or broadly important principles are at 
issue. 
2. Property Taxes 
The compliance costs resulting from property taxes differ in kind 
from those resulting from income taxes in two respects. First, prop-
erty taxation is predominantly used by local governments, while in-
come taxation is predominantly used by state govemments. 102 
Second, the difficult or unclear issues that need to be resolved in deter-
mining one's liability for property taxation are to a greater extent fac-
tual rather than legal. 
The first of these differences makes property tax compliance more 
of a "retail," rather than a "wholesale," operation than state and local 
income tax compliance. Property tax compliance involves more sepa-
rate jurisdictions, and, for a given amount of revenue, more individual 
100. See id. 1[ 10-104, at 1051. The alternative minimum tax, in comparison to the regular 
tax, is computed by applying a lower rate to a larger base (due to the denial of specified tax 
preferences). Pennsylvania, while not levying an alternative minimum tax, treats certain tax pref-
erences as modification addbacks to taxable income. Id. 
101. See id. 11 10-115, at 1075-76. This counts both states that do not honor the federal 
extension and those that honor it upon application. 
102. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 7, 10 (stating that in the mid-
1980s, state governments derived 37.6% of their revenue from income taxes and 1.9% from 
property taxes, whereas local governments derived 37. 7% of their revenue from property taxes 
and 3% from income taxes). 
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officials than income tax compliance. This tends to make the compu-
tation of property tax liability more subjective, political, and depen-
dent on the intervention of persons (such as local attorneys) having 
working relationships with tax administrators. 
The greater emphasis of property tax compliance on factual rather 
than legal issues further adds to the subjectivity of property tax assess-
ment. The difference from income taxation is relative, not absolute. 
Income taxes frequently pose case-specific issues of fact, such as what 
was the section 482 arm's-length transfer price for an item transferred 
by one corporate affiliate to another, or which of a company's expenses 
related to tax-exempt income. Property tax liability often turns on 
questions oflaw, such as what categories of property are taxed at what 
rates, and exactly how these categories are defined. Different jurisdic-
tions not only recognize different categories of property for rate pur-
poses - for example, real property, personal property, equipment, 
inventory, intangible property, and the like -but define what is osten-
sibly the same category in a variety of different ways. 
Nonetheless, for property taxes case-specific factual issues have rel-
ative prominence due to the centrality of the issue of valuation. The 
amount of property tax due typically depends on the property's value, 
rather than, say, its historical cost. Although some jurisdictions apply 
formulas to known data, determining a property's value frequently re-
quires the exercise of judgment, often culminating in an administra-
tor's subjective assessment of conflicting expert testimony. 
The differences in kind between income tax and property tax com-
pliance costs do not make either tax inherently better or worse than 
the other. They are relevant chiefly to questions such as which tax's 
compliance costs could more easily be reduced, and which tax involves 
a greater risk of discriminatory application at the administrative level. 
The differences suggest that, barring significant changes (such as a 
shift from value to a formula based on historical cost), compliance 
costs are less easily reduced, and discrimination against interstate 
commerce less easily eliminated, for property taxation than state and 
local income taxation.103 
3. Retail Sales and Use Taxes 
From a compliance standpoint, retail sales and use taxes resemble 
income taxes in one sense and property taxes in another. Like income 
taxes, they often tum simply on the numbers, such as the gross reve-
nues derived from sales transactions, rather than routinely requiring 
103. See infra Part IV. 
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the exercise of judgment about indefinite facts. As with property tax 
compliance, however, retail sales and use tax compliance is itself a 
"retail" rather than a "wholesale" operation for multistate businesses. 
This country has about 7000 separate sales tax jurisdictions.104 Often, 
even neighboring jurisdictions within the same state impose different 
classifications and rates, collect their own taxes separately, impose sep-
arate documentation requirements (such as the use of their own certifi-
cates attesting to tax exemption or that taxes have been paid), and 
conduct their own audits. Local jurisdictions' incentive to cut their 
own costs by either cooperating or delegating administrative duties to 
state governments may be outweighed at times by the political desire 
to impose diverse rules (with the effect of impeding cooperation or 
delegation), or by the interest of local bureaucracies in maintaining 
their own power and function. 
The compliance costs incurred by sellers pursuant to their legal 
obligation to remit sales taxes due from purchasers are significantly 
increased by the need to comply with so many separate jurisdictions. 
The burden results not only from parallel or duplicative papenvork 
but from the need to know and understand each jurisdiction's rules. 
As with property taxes, not only the rates but the categories (and pre-
cise meanings of these categories) to which rates and exemptions apply 
often vary between jurisdictions. Moreover, burden results from the 
need under use tax provisions, pursuant to National Bellas Hess or 
state and local law, to determine nexus for a large number of separate 
jurisdictions, and before that to engage in tax planning regarding 
nexus. 
4. Other Taxes 
State and local governments impose a vast array of other taxes, 
along with licenses, user fees, and other charges that may serve in part 
to raise general revenue and thus are conceptually indistinct from 
taxes. For example, a recent growth area is environmental taxes, 
which often may serve both environmental and revenue-raising objec-
tives. The sheer number and variety of such charges (whether or not 
"taxes" under my definition) can create massive compliance costs for 
nationwide businesses, particularly if state and local laws change 
rapidly. 
104. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1 SIGNIFICANT FEATURES 
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 58-59, Table 27, (1989) [hereinafter Advisory Commission]; ABA 
SALES & USE TAX HANDBOOK (D. Michael Young & John T. Piper eds., 1988). When National 
Bellas Hess was decided, the number of such jurisdictions was about 2300. National Bellas Hess, 
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759 n.12 (1967). 
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In some cases, the structure of these taxes seems to suggest a lack 
of concern by state and local governments about taxpayers' compli-
ance costs. One example is severance and excise taxes on mineral ex-
traction, which often take the form either of a "netback" based on 
mineral value (so called because it requires "netting back" from the 
contract price to the value of the mineral deposit by ·subtracting pro-
duction costs) or of a "volumetric" tax based only on the quantity 
extracted. Netback taxes impose significantly greater burden than vol-
umetric taxes, due not only to the additional records and computa-
tions that they require but to the fact-specific judgmental issue of what 
costs are appropriately subtracted from the contract price. Netback 
taxes nonetheless continue to be widely used. 105 
F. Responding to the Problems Caused by Locational Disparity 
This Part has attempted to suggest the magnitude and intractabil-
ity of the locational disparities resulting from federali!!m in taxation. 
Merely having different tax rates or bases defeats locational neutrality, 
and thus is economically similar to having tariffs imposed at state bor-
ders. Differences between state and local tax systems also give rise to 
serious coordination problems, potentially inducing taxpayers to seek 
or avoid a multijurisdictional presence purely for tax reasons, and 
presenting strategic opportunities, as for tax exportation or protection-
ism, to state and local governments. Such differences also impose 
massive costs of compliance, administration, tax planning, politicking, 
and litigation. 
One might take some satisfaction from the fact that taxpayers and 
state and local governments both have strategic opportunities, since 
this suggests that a rough balance may emerge between the taxation of 
interstate and intrastate activity, except for two sobering considera-
tions. First, the opposing forces do not offset in all cases; instead, 
there are "pockets" where one side has the decisive advantage, result-
ing in significant over- or undertaxation. As an example, Alaska's and 
Wyoming's capacity to tax natural resources that are mainly ·con-
sumed by outsiders gives them a special opportunity to engage in sig-
nificant tax exportation - or at least to persuade themselves that they 
are doing so, although the actual economic incidence of their sever-
ance taxes is unclear. 106 There is evidence that this perception of 
105. The principal advantage of the netback method - since rates can be adjusted to yield 
the same revenue under either method - is that it automatically, without requiring the legisla-
ture to amend the rates, adjusts for changes in the minerals' value, which might be thought 
somehow to correlate with the appropriate, or revenue-maximizing, level of tax. 
106. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 6, at 186-87; Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 29-35. 
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spending other people's money not only encourages the two states to 
burden interstate commerce - an effect of their taxes regardless of 
incidence - but also removes the political discipline, from voter aver-
sion to visible high taxes, that ordinarily constrains waste in govern-
ment spending. Alaska and Wyoming are the two leading states in the 
country in per capita government expenditure - with Alaska spend-
ing five times, and Wyoming two times, the national average - and 
anecdotal evidence indicates that they waste much of the excess, 
rather than spend it productively. 107 Even if they spend the excess 
relatively productively, the difference in spending might be undesirable 
if based on the special opportunity to tax resources consumed by out-
siders, rather than on a voter preference for more government services. 
Second, even if the tax burdens on intrastate and interstate activity 
are roughly equivalent overall, the result may still be allocatively inef-
ficient. Opposing inefficiencies of over- and undertaxation of interstate 
commerce in different sectors of the economy may compound each 
other as distortions, rather than cancel each other out. Moreover, 
shifts between interstate and intrastate commerce are only one cate-
gory of allocative inefficiency resulting from federalism in taxation. 
Other examples include the shifting of investment to low-tax jurisdic-
tions, to activities whose proper apportionment between jurisdictions 
is unclear and manipulable, and to more mobile forms of capital, 
which can flee when jurisdictions raise their taxes.1os 
Costly departures from locational neutrality are inevitable under a 
federal system. If we accept the Framers' starting point of wanting 
both a federal system and some sort of antitariff principle that con-
strains departures from locational neutrality (without being limited to 
what are tariffs on their face), we encounter an intellectual quandary. 
How are we to define and identify impermissible departures from loca-
tional neutrality, given that many departures will be permitted? Par-
ticularly if courts are in charge of applying the antitariff principle, 
some sort of general legal standard is needed; courts presumably can-
not be quite so ad hoc as legislatures in weighing each case on its indi-
vidual merits. 
The legal standard most widely accepted in this area is one barring 
discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce. The leading 
Supreme Court authority concerning state taxation of interstate busi-
107. See, e.g., Dwight R. Lee, A Bigger Oil Spill That No Alaskan Seems to Notice, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 20, 1989, at A24. An alternative explanation for Alaska and Wyoming's high per capita 
spending is that their low population densities deny them economies of scale in providing govern-
ment services. 
108. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 108 (1987). 
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ness, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 109 lists four requirements 
for upholding such taxes, the most stringent and important of which is 
the absence of discrimination against interstate commerce.110 Among 
commentators, the antidiscrimination standard even more clearly 
stands out as a dominant, if not quite exclusive, legal norm.111 
What constitutes discrimination against outsiders or interstate 
commerce is far from clear.112 Yet a bedrock illustration is both sim-
ple and intuitive. For North Dakota to impose a ten percent income 
tax while South Dakota imposes a five percent income tax would cre-
ate locational distortion but not discrimination, because North Da-
kota's tax applies alike to all taxpayers both in-state and out-of-state. 
By contrast, for North Dakota to tax out-of-state businesses at ten 
percent and local businesses at five percent would be discrimina-
tory.113 The following Part explores more thoroughly both the mean-
ing of a federal judicial standard barring discrimination against 
outsiders or interstate commerce, and whether this standard provides 
a workable and attractive fallback from requiring complete locational 
neutrality. 
II. THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW To BAR 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OUTSIDERS OR INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE 
While the notion of discrimination against outsiders or interstate 
commerce seems easy to grasp intuitively, it has proven slippery in 
109. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
110. 430 U.S. at 279. The other three factors are the existence of a nexus with the taxing 
state, fair apportionment where there is interstate activity, and a fair relationship to the services 
provided by the taxing state. 430 U.S. at 279, 287. On the greater stringency and importance of 
the antidiscrimination requirement, see Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 60; Tatarowicz & Mims-
Velarde, supra note 14, at 883-84. 
111. See, e.g., PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LoCAL TAXA-
TION§ 2:19 (1981 & Supp. 1990); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 6-17 (2d ed. 1988); James F. Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause 
and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-
State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473, 497-518 (1978); Walter Hellerstein, State Tax-
ation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 
75 MICH. L. REv. 1426, 1446 (1977); Lockhart, supra note 71, at 1034-38; Regan, supra note 14, 
at 1115-18 (articulating an "antiprotectionism" standard that resembles barring discrimination); 
Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1203, 
1213 (1986); Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 14; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 130-31. 
112. See, e.g., Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of 
the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 228 (1957); HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2-19; Hellerstein, 
supra note 10, at 60. 
113. See, e.g., West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957) (striking 
down a tax that applied solely to merchants outside the taxing jurisdiction). 
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practice. Some dismiss it as a "shibboleth,"114 while even the more 
hopeful concede that it is "not ... self-defining" and can appear "delu-
sively simple."115 Essentially, discrimination is a subset of locational 
nonneutrality, founded on comparing two groups - the persons inside 
and outside the taxing jurisdiction or, alternatively, the commerce 
originating inside and outside. Since the groups being compared are 
taken as given, the antidiscrimination standard reflects an assumption 
either that taxes have no effect at the margin on where one resides or 
locates one's business or that any such effect is irrelevant. After all, 
low taxes as an inducement to move in (such as South Dakota's five 
percent rate in the earlier example) are permissible, and a claim of 
discrimination cannot be rebutted by arguing that if only the victim 
moved into the taxing jurisdiction she would no longer be discrimi-
nated against. Instead, outsiders are compared to insiders as they 
stand, and deemed victims of discrimination if, in cases where mem-
bers of the two groups are alike in some relevant sense, the tax system 
treats the outsiders worse, either by directly taxing them more, or by 
otherwise imposing a burden that places them at a competitive 
disadvantage.116 
Below, I examine why the antidiscrimination standard often is 
thought appealing - specifically, why discrimination is considered 
worse than other types of locational disparity, what it should be con-
strued to mean, and how workable a standard it provides. I then tum 
to the problems in defining and applying the standard. 
A. Discrimination Compared to Other Locational Disparity 
The antidiscrimination standard is highly selective in addressing 
locational distortion. In addition to placing taxpayers in two fixed 
groups, insiders and outsiders, and ignoring marginal effects on which 
group one chooses to join, it treats one of the two groups, the outsid-
ers, as uniquely needing protection. It does not bar discrimination 
114. Brown, supra note 112, at 228. 
115. HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2:19, at 122; Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 14, 
at 885. 
116. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1987) (stating that to violate the 
Commerce Clause it is not necessary that the tax facially discriminate against outsiders or appor-
tion a larger share of the tax burden to interstate commerce); HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2:19, 
at 127 ("A tax is ... discriminatory .•. when [it] ... provides a commercial advantage to local 
business at the expense of out-of-state business."); Hellerstein, supra note 22, at 22 ("[A] tax 
which ... imposes greater burdens on out-of-state goods or activities than on competing in·state 
goods or activities will be struck down."); Regan, supra note 14, at 1126 ("The classical tariff or 
embargo .... improves the competitive position of local economic actors, just because they are 
local, vis-a-vis their foreign competitors."); Smith, supra note 111, at 1213 ("A regulation is 
discriminatory if it imposes greater economic burdens on those outside the state, to the economic 
advantage of those within."). 
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against insiders, for example, to attract outside investment. Moreover, 
given the requirement of nexus that outsiders potentially subject to tax 
must have entered the taxing jurisdiction at least to a limited extent 
(for example, by offering to sell goods there), the antidiscrimination 
standard reflects an assumption that marginal effects on such limited 
entry are important, in contrast to marginal effects on where one pri-
marily resides or locates one's business. 
The reasons for the antidiscrimination standard's selective focus 
are easily deduced. Presumably, the decision to focus on marginal ef-
fects on limited entry into a jurisdiction, while ignoring marginal ef-
fects on primary residence or business location, reflects a judgment 
that the former is more elastic, and thus more substantially disrupted 
by disparate taxation, or else more likely in practice to draw state and 
local governmental hostility (since once one fully joins a community 
one may have a greater chance of being treated as well as the other 
members). The decision to intervene only when outsiders are disad-
vantaged, not when they are advantaged, reflects the judgment that 
insiders' exclusive political representation as voters leaves the outsid-
ers uniquely vulnerable.111 
As Professor Mark Tushnet has noted, however, this political ex-
planation for the antidiscrimination standard, while superficially ap-
pealing, misses an important point.118 Outside merchants (or 
consumers) ordinarily have grounds for hoping that in-state political 
processes will reflect their interests, even aside from the possibility that 
their campaign contributions will be accepted like any other. When 
they are taxed discriminatorily, they rarely suffer alone. Their actual 
or prospective in-state customers (or merchants) typically suffer with 
them, bearing some portion of the tax burden or losing the opportu-
nity to buy (or sell) desired goods. Indeed, it is plausible that, in most 
cases where a state discriminates against interstate commerce, it 
reduces its own well being on balance.119 Discriminatory taxes thus 
are not purely products of a lack of political representation after all. 
Rather, they result from a combination of that problem and a well-
known public choice problem of intrajurisdictional politics: widely 
dispersed groups with low individual stakes (such as consumers) suffer 
117. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 
n.2 (1938); see also TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-5. 
118. Tushnet, supra note 111, at 132-33. Professor Tribe makes the same point as Tushnet, 
but dismisses it without further analysis for the sin of "turning traditional commerce clause 
analysis on its head." TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-5, at 413. 
119. In the paradigmatic case of tariffs on both imports and exports, this has been well 
known at least since Adam Smith. See I ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 450-69 
(R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). 
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from collective action and information cost problems relative to con-
centrated groups with high individual stakes (such as producers in 
particular industries ).120 
The argument for barring discrimination against outsiders or inter-
state commerce therefore has less to do with political representation 
than one might have thought. Accordingly, one might question the 
antidiscrimination standard for using federal judicial powers to ad-
dress intrastate distributional issues or, alternatively, for reaching only 
a part of what Mancur Olson called the "systematic tendency for 'ex-
ploitation' of the great [in number] by the small."121 One might also 
want to complicate the standard by applying it with an eye to just how 
deficient in-state political processes seemed in the particular case. 122 
For example, one might be more tolerant of questionable statutes in 
cases where, at the time of enactment, the issue of effects on consum-
ers was widely discussed, in-state consumer groups were well organ-
ized, or some of the adversely affected narrow interest groups were 
from in-state. 
While the Supreme Court has occasionally articulated the political 
representation argument for barring discrimination against outsiders 
or interstate commerce, 123 it has only sporadically examined whether 
significant in-state political forces were on the losing side.124 It may 
not understand the underlying public choice problem well enough to 
consider in any consistent fashion the significance of adversely affected 
but politically unorganized in-staters. This would explain the recent 
case of Goldberg v. Sweet, 125 where the Court stated that a tax paid by 
in-state consumers on their out-of-state telephone calls was constitu-
tionally innocuous because the consumers could complain as political 
insiders, and "[i]t is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect 
state residents from their own state taxes."126 To follow this principle 
consistently - which the Court has not done127 - would either elimi-
120. See MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 16-36 (1971); Tushnet, 
supra note 111, at 133. 
121. OLSON, supra note 120, at 29 (footnote and emphasis omitted). 
122. Tushnet seems to suggest this. See Tushnet, supra note 111, at 133. 
123. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945); South Carolina 
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); Cooley v. Board of Port War· 
dens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315 (1851); see also TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-5. 
124. But see South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) 
(upholding questionable statute that directly affected in-staters in large numbers); Raymond Mo-
tor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating statute that barred large tractor-
trailers from state highways but provided exemptions that applied to many in-staters); Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (same). 
125. 488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
126. 488 U.S. at 266. 
127. As Justices Stevens and O'Connor noted in concurrence, numerous Supreme Court 
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nate most negative Commerce Clause scrutiny by making adverse im-
pact on in-staters a defense (probably beyond the Court's intention), or 
else revive the old formalist distinction between "direct" and "indi-
rect" taxes, with the issue now being whether local consumers (rather 
than interstate commerce as previously) were taxed directly or only 
indirectly .12s 
Other than a relative lack of political representation, the antidis-
crimination principle could rest on one of three alternative bases. 
Each shares with the representational view a potential to influence 
how one would define discrimination. First, the "enmity between 
states" ground for objecting to tariffs, which I rejected earlier as less 
important than locational neutrality, 129 could be revived here now that 
we are considering distinctions within the category of nonneutral 
taxes. This ground would presumably suggest striking down state and 
local taxes that visibly and obviously harmed outsiders, while paying 
less heed to taxes with uncertain or well-disguised effects. 
Second, one could object morally or aesthetically to states' subjec-
tive intentions to harm outsiders, on the ground that such intentions 
are - in the words of Professor Donald Regan - "inconsistent with 
the very idea of [a] political union."130 Under this view, it need not 
matter whether a particular tax has actual distortive effects or is per-
ceived by outsiders as hostile, although one might expect strong posi-
tive correlation on both points. This ground suggests focusing on a 
subjectively defined discriminatory intent, and striking down statutes 
that upon analysis exhibit such intent even if the harm to outsiders or 
interstate commerce is uncertain or well disguised. 
Finally, one could object equally to all locational distortion but 
single out discriminatory taxes for opportunistic reasons. For exam-
ple, such taxes may be the easiest to oppose politically since the term 
"discrimination" is so pejorative, or the Constitution may afford 
grounds for judicial intervention in these but not other cases.131 Op-
precedents have recognized that interstate commerce is impermissibly burdened when in·staters 
are penalized for engaging in it. 488 U.S. at 268, 270. For example, in Boston Stock Exchange v. 
State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318 (1977), the Court invalidated a securities transfer tax on 
state residents that discriminated against out-of-state sales. 
128. The Court in Goldberg purported to rely on the economic burden of the challenged tax, 
which it assumed was the same as the direct incidence. 488 U.S. at 266. 
129. See supra section I.A. 
130. Regan, supra note 14, at 1113. 
131. I ignore the nonopportunistic argument that we should simply do what the Constitution 
says for its own sake, because I am here discussing policy, not constitutional interpretation. As 
discussed infra in section 11.D, however, it is far from clear that the Framers intended or ex· 
pected courts to discern and vigorously enforce a negative Commerce Clause. 
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portunism's only apparent implication for the meaning of discrimina-
tion is that it be made as broad as possible. 
For better or worse, we have largely been spared overt reliance by 
the Supreme Court on any of these grounds for distinguishing discrim-
ination against outsiders or interstate commerce from other locational 
distortion. The perception standard perhaps could not be openly fol-
lowed in any case, as it appears unprincipled and may be difficult to 
apply. Any suggestion that it secretly motivates the Court was contra-
dicted by Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 132 upholding a 
state's transparent and politically controversial attempt to shift tax 
burdens to outsiders by simultaneously reducing various in-state taxes 
and increasing a coal severance tax that out-of-state consumers princi-
pally paid, at least in the short run. 133 The discriminatory intent stan-
dard is conceded by its principal scholarly advocate not to explain 
state and local tax cases, 134 and its lack of influence is suggested by 
Commonwealth Edison and other recent cases where the state's inten-
tion was fairly clear.135 Opportunism, in the sense of striking down 
taxes that create locational disparity whenever a case for "discrimina-
tion" can be made, even more plainly has not guided the Supreme 
Court's lurching course, which instead has largely been tempered by 
what Professor Laurence Tribe calls "an extra dose of judicial sympa-
thy for state taxing power."136 
In sum, the Supreme Court has largely ignored the relevant but 
potentially highly complicating question of whether the reasons for 
focusing on discrimination against outsiders or interstate commerce 
should shape the definition of discrimination. Nonetheless, as we will 
132. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
133. On the political controversiality of Montana's severance tax, see, e.g., Hellerstein, supra 
note 22, at 75-76. 
134. See Regan, supra note 14, at 1186. 
135. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). Moorman upheld Iowa's use 
of a single-factor test {based only on sales) for apportioning the interstate income of a unitary 
business. The test, in contrast to the three-factor test 44 other states used (based on property, 
payroll, and sales), sufficiently obviously benefited Iowa, predominantly a market state, to sug-
gest to a recent commentator that "[i]t takes no great feat of imagination to conjure up the 
legislative purpose underlying the Iowa statute." Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Re-
straints on State Taxation: Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
758, 765 (1987). 
136. TRIBE, supra note 111, at 442. Consistent leaning either in favor of or against state 
taxing power is particularly unlikely given the lack of clear ideological guideposts. A harsh line 
against state and local governments' exercise of their taxing powers is judicial activism protecting 
persons against the government on the one hand, and support for business against government on 
the other. Perhaps reflecting this lack of clear guideposts, the conservative Justice Scalia consist-
ently takes the state governments' side, while the conservative Professor Richard Epstein gener-
ally takes the taxpayer's side. See Richard Epstein, Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433, 445-49 (1982). The liberal Justice Marshall took the business tax-
payer's side in Commonwealth Edison and the taxing government's side in Moorman. 
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see below, the antidiscrimination standard has an almost excruciating 
unclarity and inconsistency in practice, due partly to the Court's mis-
takes and erratic behavior in interpreting it, but more fundamentally 
to the standard's built-in difficulties. 
B. Theoretical and Historical Difficulties in Defining Discrimination 
Against Outsiders or Interstate Commerce 
The question now arises whether, given antidiscrimination's lim-
ited focus, it is reconcilable with state and local taxing power, as loca-
tional neutrality is not. The answer, unfortunately, is no. Only one 
type of locational neutrality problem is eliminated by narrowing one's 
gaze as antidiscrimination dictates: that resulting when jurisdictions 
impose different tax rates, as when North Dakota taxes all in-state 
income at ten percent, and South Dakota at five percent: but each 
state's rate applies to insiders and outsiders alike. Problems resulting 
from the use of different tax bases remain. The very existence of in-
consistent tax bases creates the possibility that outsiders alone will in 
effect be taxed more than once (or not at all), and states may oppor-
tunistically choose tax bases designed to shift tax burdens to outsiders 
or interstate commerce. Yet it may seem plausible to regard the power 
to choose one's own tax base as central to state and local governments' 
sovereignty. 
Coordination problems further impede identifying instances of dis-
crimination. The lack of clear answers regarding how even consist-
ently defined tax bases should be allocated among the states creates the 
possibility that what looks like the reasonable exercise of discretion in 
providing allocation methods may lead to relative overtaxation of in-
terstate commerce, whether resulting from states' opportunism or sim-
ply from their making different decisions. 
Short of imposing uniform tax bases and coordination rules, we 
cannot expect state and local taxation never to harm any outsiders 
relative to any insiders. Concern for state and local autonomy may 
seem to require allowing some flexibility, and perhaps even some dis-
parate impact on outsiders, so long as it remains within reason. More-
over, we may not want to err too much on the side of protecting 
outsiders, given their strategic opportunities to minimize their tax bur-
dens and the equity and efficiency reasons for wanting to tax them 
neutrally, not preferentially. 
Consequently, an antidiscrimination standard, like a broader loca-
tional neutrality standard, is fundamentally in tension with state and 
local government autonomy. Once autonomy is given countervailing 
weight, the standard's capacity to yield consistent and predictable de-
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cisions evaporates. One must weigh the facts case by case, even if 
guided by general principles such as that discriminatory intent man-
dates application of a stricter rule of invalidity. 137 Realism must flour-
ish, if at all, at the expense of predictability, and judges' idiosyncratic 
responses to particular sets of facts become prominent. 
At the same time, formalism is hard to banish altogether. Realistic 
considerations too complicated for a court to consider systematically 
- such as whether a particular tax rate is too high,138 whether an 
interstate business is overtaxed given all fifty states' constantly chang-
ing laws (and if so which states' laws should change),139 and whether 
the apparent discrimination in one part of a state's tax code is cured by 
some offsetting feature elsewhere in the code140 - may be thought 
necessary to ignore even if their import is clear in a particular case. 
Moreover, if one believes (as many do) as a premise of federalism that 
states must have the right to set their own tax bases, one way of 
achieving discriminatory effect - indirectly, through a tax base 
designed primarily to reach outsiders but that does not on its face treat 
them differently - inevitably does better than other methods from 
which it may differ only in form. 141 Thus, the antidiscrimination stan-
dard can lead to the worst of both worlds: all the unpredictability of 
attempted realism and all the arbitrariness and circumventability of 
formalism. 142 
This unfortunate potential has been all too richly realized in prac-
tice. Even the Supreme Court, while bravely forging ahead, repeatedly 
confesses that its decisions form a "quagmire"143 that "leaves much 
room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise 
guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of tax-
ation."144 This harsh judgment has become enough of a truism145 that 
137. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984). 
138. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 628. 
139. See Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984). 
140. See American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 288·89 (1987). 
141. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 624-25; Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 
267, 280 (1978). 
142. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (disparaging the 
earlier constitutional era's formal rule distinguishing direct from indirect burdens for "stand[ing] 
only as a trap for the unwary draftsman"). 
143. See, e.g., American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987); Boston Stock 
Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. 
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959). 
144. Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 329; Northwestern States, 358 U.S. at 457; see also 
Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 269 ("[T)he uneven course of decisions in this field reflects the difficulties of 
reconciling unrestricted access to the national market with each State's authority to collect its 
fair share of revenues from interstate commercial activity."). 
145. See, e.g., HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 2:9, at 53; TRIBE, supra note 111, § 6-14, at 439; 
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it need not be proven anew here. Nonetheless, to show the magnitude 
of the problem and its relationship to the antidiscrimination standard's 
underlying dilemmas, it is worth briefly exploring the Court's ten-
dency in this area repeatedly to contradict itself or narrowly hem in a 
line of reasoning, even when it is not, as happens frequently, con-
sciously overruling a precedent146 or announcing a new test. 147 The 
following sample of inconsistencies and odd juxtapositions in recent 
cases concerning state taxes should help bring to life the difficulties, 
both inherent and self-inflicted, with which the Supreme Court has 
been struggling. 
(1) Are courts institutionally capable of examining the rate or level 
of a state tax in order to decide whether it is reasonable? Common-
wealth Edison says no in the context of a coal severance tax, 14s while 
American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner says yes in the context of a fiat 
tax on truckers' use of in-state highways. 149 
(2) Commonwealth Edison and Scheiner are similarly at odds on 
the question of how to determine whether a tax imposed on outsiders 
is justified by the benefits they derive from the state government.150 
According to Commonwealth Edison, the question requires no detailed 
factual inquiry, but is automatically satisfied where the state exercises 
its police powers, and thus provides the "benefits which it has con-
ferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society," to all who 
pass through. 151 The case rejects the taxpayer's argument that only 
costs and services directly related to coal extraction were relevant to 
Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 81; see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 332-33 
(11th ed. 1985) (declining even to discuss, in an otherwise comprehensive constitutional law 
treatise, the constitutional issues raised by state and local taxation because the "intricacies ... 
would require more time and space than the undertaking warrants"); Julian N. Eule, Laying the 
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 426 n.2 (1982) (declining to synthesize 
Dormant Commerce Clause tax cases because they are so confusing and complex). 
146. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977) (overruling 
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)); Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 
U.S. 638, 642 (1984) (citing with approval Justice Goldberg's dissent in General Motors Corp. v. 
Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 459 (1964)); Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 298 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Court expressly overruled the holdings of three cases directly on point that it had 
cited with approval only nine years previously, and after issuing Brady to overrule Spector). 
147. See, e.g., Brady, 430 U.S. at 277-78 (describing four-part test for taxes on interstate 
business); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983) (announc-
ing new "internal consistency" and "external consistency" tests for the allocation of multijuris-
dictional business income). 
148. 453 U.S. at 628. 
149. 483 U.S. at 289-90 (deeming tax "excessive" and distinguishing from reasonable fiat fees 
that were significantly lower). 
150. Brady, 430 U.S. at 287, describes this as a requirement apart from discrimination for 
upholding a tax on interstate commerce, but notionally it appears related, since charging the 
same tax for fewer services arguably is a kind of discrimination. 
151. 453 U.S. at 625, 624-29. 
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the comparison of tax and benefit. In Scheiner, however, the tax had 
to "approximate fairly the cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania's 
roads." 152 
(3) Anticipating Scheiner's can-do approach to problems of mea-
surement, the Court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair 153 is will-
ing to draw lines between extreme and moderate disparities in the tax 
burdens imposed on interstate business. Moorman therefore permits 
the use of a single-factor income allocation formula that overattributes 
income from interstate commerce to the taxing jurisdiction, thus creat-
ing relative burden, so long as the disparity is not too great. 154 Moor-
man distinguishes Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel 
Maxwell, 155 in which a state's single-factor allocation formula was 
struck down, because there the disparity between the scope of inter-
state operations and the in-state allocation of income was greater. 156 
Apparently, then, line-drawing is not a problem (unlike in Common-
wealth Edison), and some burden on interstate commerce is allowable, 
but not too much. In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 157 however, we 
learn in the context of a tax exemption for local business that no dis-
crimination against interstate commerce is allowable. 158 The state 
cannot argue that the burden is only slight. In short, where it is diffi-
cult to measure burden precisely, the answer may be to allow no bur-
den (as in Bacchus), some burden (as in Moorman), or any and all 
burden (as in Commonwealth Edison). 
( 4) Perhaps Bacchus is special because it concerned a tax that, by 
exempting local businesses, facially discriminated against interstate 
commerce. 159 The meaning of facial discrimination is by no means 
clear, however. In Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Depart-
ment of Revenue, 160 a tax was described as "facially discriminatory" 
where it required both local and outside manufacturers to pay a 
wholesale tax on sales in-state, and locals alone to pay a manufactur-
ers' tax in lieu of the wholesale tax (but calculated at the same rate) on 
their sales out-of-state. 161 In short, facial discrimination was found 
even though the statute explicitly treated in-staters and outsiders alike 
152. 483 U.S. at 290. 
153. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
154. 437 U.S. at 274. 
155. 283 U.S. 123 (1931). 
156. Moonnan, 437 U.S. at 274. 
157. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
158. 468 U.S. at 269. 
159. See 468 U.S. at 268-71. 
160. 483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
161. 483 U.S. at 244. 
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except where it only taxed the former. 162 By contrast, in Boston Stock 
Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 163 the Court apparently regarded 
as neutral a state tax that, analogous to the Washington wholesale tax, 
applied exclusively to sales in-state, here of securities that were trans-
ferred or delivered in-state by either in-state or outside stock 
exchanges.164 
(5) The problem in Tyler was that other states might charge a 
wholesale tax on Washington exports or a manufacturers' tax on 
Washington imports, thus leading to double taxation of interstate 
commerce. (This danger was equally presented by the statute the 
Court called "neutral" in Boston Stock Exchange.) Yet in Moorman, 
where Iowa used an allocation formula almost certain to create multi-
ple taxation of interstate commerce, there was no facial discrimina-
tion. The only apparent difference is that in Moorman the threat of 
multiple taxation was deducible only if one knew certain clear and 
undisputed facts about other states' income allocation rules and Iowa's 
status as a market rather than a producer state, 165 whereas in Tyler the 
threat was abstractly deducible if one assumes knowledge of basic 
Supreme Court nexus doctrine. Accordingly, whether a tax is facially 
discriminatory when it creates a danger of multiple taxation depends 
not just on the face of the statute, but on what types of facts (among 
the broader set available to the relevant state actors) need be known to 
demonstrate a significant danger. This distinction apparently is so im-
portant that in Moorman the Court dismissed a strong showing of ac-
tual multiple taxation as overly "speculative," whereas in Tyler it 
stated that actual multiple taxation need not be shown in order for the 
statute to be invalidated.166 
(6) The Court desires, to the extent possible, to rely on the "practi-
cal consequences" and " 'actual effect' " of state taxation, not on 
"metaphysic[s]" or" 'legal terminology.' " 167 Yet cases such as Tyler, 
by applying an "internal consistency" test to strike down state taxes 
that would burden interstate commerce if enacted by more than one 
jurisdiction, create a peculiar formal distinction, given the states' basic 
discretion to decide what they want to tax. Whereas the hypothetical 
162. 483 U.S. at 256-57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
163. 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
164. See 429 U.S. at 330 (approving in dicta of a tax that was the precursor to the one being 
litigated). Justice Scalia noted the contradiction in his Tyler opinion. 483 U.S. at 255 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165. See Hellerstein, supra note 135, at 765. 
166. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); Tyler, 483 U.S. at 247-48. 
167. American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 294-95 (1987) (quoting Complete 
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977)). 
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double taxation that would arise if two states enacted similar taxes is 
constitutionally intolerable, the actual double taxation that results 
from existing dissimilar taxes is permissible.168 For example, if State A 
taxes in-state manufacturing only and State B taxes in-state sales only, 
taxpayers may have no constitutional complaint, even though compa-
nies exporting from A to B face multiple taxation, and even though the 
states may be able to predict what tax bases will tend to favor in-state 
businesses or taxpayers.169 
(7) As far as the Supreme Court has openly said, internal consis-
tency remains a substantive requirement in the state and local tax area. 
Yet in a recent case, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Department of 
Revenue, 170 an evenly divided Court (with Justi.ce O'Connor not par-
ticipating) upheld without opinion a tax that plainly violated the re-
quirement. The tax at issue in this case applied to intangible property 
that either had an in-state situs or was owned by a Florida domiciliary. 
Its unambiguous effect, therefore, if adopted by all jurisdictions, would 
be to double tax all intangible property that was located in one state 
and owned by a domiciliary of another state. 
(8) According to Bacchus and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. 
Tully, 171 striking down a New York State investment tax credit that 
applied only to in-state investment, states may not "'foreclose[] tax-
neutral [investment] decisions' .... in an attempt to induce 'business 
operations to be performed in the home State that could more effi-
ciently be performed elsewhere.' " 172 Yet other decisions explain that 
states may "structur[e] their tax systems to encourage the growth and 
development of intrastate commerce and industry," and to "compete 
with other States for a share of interstate commerce."173 Westing-
house regards as particularly significant that the credit, since com-
puted by determining the New York State percentage of the taxpayer's 
total investment, "not only ... 'provide[s] a positive incentive for in-
creased business activity in New York State,' ... but also it penalizes 
increases in ... activities in other States.''174 Bacchus, by contrast, 
rejects the distinction between a "benefit" and a "burden," and be-
tween the motives of helping in-state producers and harming 
168. See Tyler, 483 U.S. at 258-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
169. See Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 645 (1984). 
170. 111 s. Ct. 2049 (1991). 
171. 466 U.S. 388 (1984). 
172. Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 
U.S. 318, 331, 336 (1977)). 
173. Armco, 467 U.S. at 645-46 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336-37). 
174. 466 U.S. at 400-01. 
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outsiders.175 
(9) Despite the ostensible lack of a distinction between benefits and 
burdens, states may in some situations discriminate in favor of local 
businesses relative to outsiders if the mechanism is a direct spending 
program rather than the tax system. The only definite limitation on 
favoring in-state businesses through direct subsidies is that the state 
act as a "market participant," or buyer of goods, rather than as a regu-
lator.176 The underlying notion is that states, as sovereign entities, 
must be permitted to buy the goods of their choice and, if they so 
prefer, to deal solely with their own citizens.177 Yet this rule has been 
held to apply even where the state is not in any real sense using the 
goods it purchases - for example, where it pays private parties to 
destroy inoperable cars.178 Moreover, there apparently is no bar on 
overpaying local sellers or bidding up the market price to their 
advantage.179 
(10) As noted earlier, Goldberg v. Sweet denies that the Commerce 
Clause protects in-state residents against discriminatory taxation.180 
Numerous earlier cases, however, explicitly hold to the contrary where 
in-staters were subjected to a higher tax rate on interstate than intra-
state transactions.181 
* * * 
As the above instances show, legal doctrine in the state and local 
tax area is shot through with uneasy juxtapositions and outright con-
tradictions. Some of the disparities may be explainable in a principled 
and convincing fashion. For example, the internal consistency test 
may eliminate a category of taxes burdening interstate commerce that 
courts can easily identify and states cannot easily replace with other 
discriminatory taxes. Other disparities may be isolated mistakes, such 
as the dictum from Goldberg v. Sweet, 182 or unannounced changes in 
legal standard, such as Ford Motor Credit. 183 Yet the Supreme Court's 
175. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984). 
176. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 
(1976); Michael, supra note 80, at 184-87. Additionally, states may not be allowed to favor local 
businesses through overly pervasive and open-ended discriminatory spending programs. See id. 
at 187. 
177. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436, 441. 
178. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 805-06. 
179. See, e.g., Hughes, 426 U.S. at 806. 
180. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984). 
182. 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989). 
183. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2049 (1991). 
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lurching course clearly reflects underlying conceptual problems. 
Surely its performance, from a technical and consistency standpoint, is 
not always this bad.184 
In part, the Supreme Court's error has been to look for the middle, 
implicitly balancing aversion to discrimination against concern for 
state and local autonomy. Strangely, the Court apparently regards the 
tax area as justifying greater deference to state and local government 
autonomy than Commerce Clause cases involving regulation.185 This 
seems exactly backwards. To the extent that state and local taxes 
serve only revenue-raising, not regulatory, purposes, the taxing gov-
ernment may have little stake in their particular form, and they should 
be relatively substitutable .. Thus, compare the severance tax upheld in 
Commonwealth Edison to a famous example of regulation with inter-
state effects: a Wisconsin city's rule, struck down in Dean Milk Co. v. 
City of Madison, 186 that milk had to be pasteurized within five miles of 
the city center, ostensibly to facilitate plant inspection by city officials. 
While Montana's need for revenue plainly could have been met by 
other taxes, the lack of need for the Dean Milk rule at issue cannot be 
assumed until one examines the facts. Dean Milk was an easy case 
solely because the sham nature of the city's health concerns and the 
underlying protectionist motive were so obvious. If the health justifi-
cations had been plausible, however, the case would have been diffi-
cult, given the importance of allowing Madison to protect its residents 
against unsafe milk and the presumably limited ways of doing this 
conveniently. 
The Supreme Court may treat tax cases as meriting greater defer-
ence to state and local governments than regulation cases because it 
regards the power to tax as at the heart of a government's sovereignty. 
Another explanation is that the Court simply lacks confidence in its 
ability to understand tax cases and resolve them intelligently, and thus 
prefers to let most challenged taxes stand. 187 While both explanations 
may be persuasive descriptively, neither provides much support for the 
normative proposition that the Supreme Court should defer. As to the 
first, while effective sovereignty requires an ability to raise revenue, it 
does not depend so strongly on the power to choose a particular means 
of revenue raising. Indeed, the relative substitutability of one revenue-
184. Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has long been an area of relative weakness for 
the Court. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 234 (1985). 
185. See TRIBE, supra note 111, at 442; Kitch, supra note 4, at 31. 
186. 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
187. These two explanations were suggested to me by Richard Briffault and Henry 
Monaghan, respectively. 
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raising device for another suggests that state and local government 
sovereignty may be less threatened by judicial review of taxation than 
of regulation. As to the second explanation, a better course than re-
laxing judicial review of tax cases would be to achieve greater compe-
tence in deciding them, and I ultimately suggest legal standards that 
should make adequate performance by the courts more feasible. 188 
Some might argue that, even if the Supreme Court's heightened 
deference to state and local taxation is not always justified, in today's 
political and economic environment it makes sense. Over the past few 
years state and local governments have borne an increasing share of 
the responsibility for providing government services, and this, along 
with transfer payments obligations, has strained their fiscal capacity. 
Increased revenue need, however, cannot justify greater judicial defer-
ence when it principally derives from voters' unwillingness - reflected 
as well in budget deficits at the national level - to pay through taxes 
for the services that they wish their governments to provide. If any-
thing, the current fiscal situation at the state and local level, by creat-
ing greater incentives for tax exportation, calls for more careful 
judicial scrutiny.189 
Thus, the Supreme Court should reverse its current practice and 
defer less to state and local government autonomy in tax cases than in 
regulatory cases. Despite the inherent problems with the discrimina-
tion concept, this would enable the Court to perform in the area far 
more coherently and predictably. Alternatively, if the Court viewed 
the discrimination standard as overly vague even with this improve-
ment, it might move in the opposite direction and replace its current 
balancing with a general refusal to strike down state and local tax pro-
visions. Both directions of doctrinal movement have their advocates, 
and I consider prominent examples of both in the next section. 
C. Attempts To Improve the Discrimination Standard by 
Broadening or Narrowing Its Application 
The previous section showed that an antidiscrimination standard is 
inherently flawed. Yet improvement may conceivably be possible, es-
188. See infra section IV.B. 
189. Surely every state in this country has sufficient wealth within its borders to finance 
government services and transfer payments at less than confiscatory rates. To the extent that 
states cannot raise additional revenue because increased taxation would prompt exit, the answer 
(where the affected government spending is desirable) is to shift financing to the national level. 
There might, in some instances, be a second-best argument for tax exportation as correcting the 
misallocation of properly national spending functions to the state and local level, but it seems 
plausible that the dominant marginal effect of tax exportation generally will be to increase spend-
ing for the benefit of state and local residents, which generally should be financed by them rather 
than nationally. 
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pecially if the countervailing notion of state and local autonomy is 
given either far less or far more weight, pushing balancing problems to 
the margin. Thus, two recent proposals are worth examining. The 
first is Professor Ferdinand Schoettle's proposal that ideas from public 
finance economics, and in particular comparing the marginal tax costs 
of in-state and outside businesses, be employed more openly and con-
sistently.190 The second is Justice Scalia's view that the courts should 
bar only facial discrimination, defined narrowly to mean that which 
appears clearly on the face of the taxing statute. 191 This subsection 
explores these proposals in tum. 
1. Schoettle's Comparative Marginal Cost Standard 
Professor Schoettle argues that the Supreme Court has done far 
worse than necessary in its treatment of state and local taxation, 
largely due to its taste for simple catchphrases at the expense of case-
specific economic analysis. He urges the Court to replace its ever-
changing bevy of tests with detailed factual examination of the single 
question: "Does the challenged tax have effects that place interstate 
commerce at a disadvantage?"192 He insists this question can be ad-
dressed intelligently by persons who lack formal economic training, so 
long as they keep in mind a basic principle of price theory: that firms 
decide whether to sell at a given price by comparing that price to the 
marginal cost of a sale, not to any measure or fraction of their total 
costs. He deduces from this principle that marginal, not total, tax 
costs need to be equalized between in-state and outside businesses, and 
that courts should therefore require such equality from state and local 
taxes.193 
Two of Schoettle's illustrations help to explain his point. First, a 
source rule for income taxation, under which states can tax only the 
income earned in-state, preserves equality of marginal cost between 
residents and nonresidents who are considering limited entry. If the 
state could tax the outside income of an outsider who earned any in-
come in-state, that outsider's tax cost of initial entry would exceed an 
insider's tax cost of increasing his in-state business by the same 
amount (since his preexisting in-state business would already be sub-
ject to the state's income tax). 194 Schoettle admits that income often 
190. Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Facts, Law, and Economics in Commerce Clause Challenges to 
State Taxes, 50 TAX NOTES 1149 (1991). 
191. See especially Justice Scalia's opinion in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Tax 
Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987). 
192. Schoettle, supra note 190, at 1150. 
193. Id. at 1151. 
194. Id. at 1153-54. Similar problems presumably arise when one's state of residence taxes 
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has no clear geographical source, 195 and he does not address, presuma-
bly as beyond the scope of a plausible constitutional analysis, the point 
that all differences between state or local taxes distort market decisions 
even under a perfectly applied source rule. 
Second, Schoettle argues that double taxation of interstate com-
merce is not distortive where taxpayers face equal marginal costs. He 
posits a case akin to my example where North Dakota had a property 
tax and South Dakota a sales tax. While a company is double taxed if 
it uses property in North Dakota to make widgets for sale in South 
Dakota, its entry into South Dakota is not thereby competitively 
handicapped. Since the property tax is a preexisting fixed cost, only 
the sales tax is a marginal cost of entry, and therefore the North Da-
kota business can compete with South Dakota businesses for sales in 
South Dakota without competitive disadvantage.196 
This example might be criticized as insufficiently dynamic in its 
assessment of the effects of state and local taxes. What if a North 
Dakota firm considers building an improvement to its in-state prop-
erty, thus increasing its North Dakota tax bill, in order to produce 
additional widgets for sale in South Dakota? Now the added North 
Dakota property tax is a marginal cost. More generally, one might 
expect firms that were deciding where to locate widget plants to 
choose South Dakota, all else being equal, thereby disadvantaging 
business in North Dakota at the margin.197 
Or consider Tyler, where the Supreme Court struck down Wash-
ington's application of a wholesale tax on in-state sales, whether by 
local or foreign firms, and a manufacturing tax on goods exported by 
local firms. The Supreme Court struck down the tax under the inter-
nal consistency test that Schoettle criticizes as overly ad hoc.198 His 
test would seem to have several different plausible applications here, 
however. If the manufacturing tax is treated as a given, in-state firms 
are tax-favored at the margin since they avoid it by manufacturing for 
income earned in other jurisdictions, because then, absent tax credits or other adjustments, one 
pays the other state's income tax (if any) plus one's own. 
195. Id. at 1153. 
196. Id. at 1154. Professor Schoettle follows this example with one where a state, if it had 
both a property tax and a sales tax but gave a tax credit for the former against the latter in order 
to avoid double taxation of its own businesses, would thereby discriminate against interstate 
commerce, because in-state businesses, even if paying about the same overall tax as outsiders, 
would have lower marginal costs of making additional sales. Id. 
197. To be sure, the differences in the two states' taxes would also favor interstate commerce 
by encouraging companies to locate in South Dakota and sell in North Dakota, but Schoettle 
correctly notes that advantaging interstate commerce is as inefficient as disadvantaging it. Id. at 
1151-52. 
198. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1947); 
see Schoettle, supra note 190, at 1150. 
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the home market. If the manufacturing test is regarded as wholly sep-
arate, however, then within the Washington market all firms are taxed 
alike. Yet if other states also have manufacturing taxes, then at the 
margin the outside firms are taxed more heavily. But this is only due 
to the combination of two jurisdictions' decisions - the very point 
made by application of the internal consistency test - and it is unclear 
to what extent, if any, each jurisdiction should have to give way. 
In order to be administratively workable, Schoettle's test might re-
quire a relatively narrow view of what tax costs are marginal in partic-
ular cases. This would reduce its power to address locational 
distortion without completely eliminating the line-drawing problem of 
deciding whether a particular tax cost is marginal or fixed. Three fur-
ther conceptual and line-drawing issues are also worth noting. First, 
given the difficulty of sourcing income from a multistate business, 
what should be done about a case like Moorman, where Iowa used an 
aggressively self-serving sourcing rule but there is no "correct" rule? 
Given the fortuity that almost every other state used some variant of a 
single, more sophisticated rule, the case may be easy for Schoettle: 
Iowa loses. If the dominant sourcing rule grew less clear over time, 
one would encounter line-drawing problems in deciding when only 
Congress could prescribe a uniform rule. Moreover, should Iowa lose 
under Schoettle's standard after all? He has no objection to double 
taxation per se, and any imperfect sourcing rule will have the distor-
tive effects that he describes, by causing a mismatch between the ac-
tual increase in income that results from one's entering a new 
jurisdiction and the amount of income attributed to that jurisdiction, 
and by causing tax planning that is motivated by the sourcing rule 
itself - for example, inefficiently keeping employees out of a high-tax 
state that uses payroll in its allocation formula. 
Second, Schoettle's standard does not address tax exportation. 
The coal severance tax in Commonwealth Edison, for example, does 
not disadvantage interstate commerce if one compares in-state with 
outside users of coal (who are taxed alike). It is disadvantageous only 
if one compares coal to products that are not exported to nearly the 
same extent. This is a standard problem for questions of discrimina-
tion throughout the law: what is the appropriate comparison?199 As-
suming that the severance tax is discriminatory due to the obvious 
199. Cf. LoUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 147-77 (1961) (describing at-
tempts to introduce principles of equity into the tax system); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory 
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 940-46 (1989) (outlining different 
approaches to the concept of unconstitutional discrimination). 
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singling out of an item that is predominantly exported, one again has a 
line-drawing problem regarding less clear-cut cases. 
Third, Schoettle treats the receipt of benefits from state spending 
as irrelevant to the tax issue.200 While for most purposes I make the 
same assumption,201 it is worth recalling that tax payments and bene-
fits received may correlate to some extent. Even aside from the margi-
nal costs imposed on Montana by coal mining, which presumably 
should be recovered through a levy (whether termed a tax or a user 
fee), what about the Supreme Court's suggestion that almost any level 
of tax was appropriate given the benefits fl.owing to outsiders from 
Montana's exercise of police powers to maintain a basic level of civili-
zation? This analysis may have been laughable2°2 - indeed, the Court 
seems to have feared as much, self-consciously denying that the refer-
ence to maintaining civilization was "a disingenuous incantation"203 
- but it was laughable only for a special reason. Maintaining civiliza-
tion is a public good, and public goods may be undersupplied by voters 
if only they, not nonvoting beneficiaries, are taxed to pay for such 
goods. Thus, one might think it efficient to require outsiders to make 
some contribution toward Montana's exercise of police powers. 
These various problems reflect less on Professor Schoettle's inge-
nious contribution to Commerce Clause thinking than on the basic 
intractability of the underlying issues. Very likely his standard, ap-
plied with a more consistent judicial solicitude for interstate commerce 
in cases (such as Moorman and Commonwealth Edison) where the 
standard's implications are unclear, would significantly improve the 
law, making it more coherent, predictable, and better focused on a real 
set of economic distortions than the prevailing "quagmire."204 Yet the 
inherent problems with an antidiscrimination standard that his propo-
sal cannot eliminate should be kept in mind as we ask whether we 
want courts to be active in the first place in the state and local tax area. 
This is the very question that underlies Justice Scalia's position. 
2. Justice Scalia's Facial Discrimination Standard 
Justice Scalia, in a series of recent concurring and dissenting opin-
ions in state tax cases, denounces what he views as systematic judicial 
200. Schoettle, supra note 190, at 1160. 
201. But see supra section I.C where I discuss the problems with ignoring the benefit side. 
202. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 136, at 447. 
203. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981). 
204. Thus, I recommend at infra section IV.B that Schoettle's standard be used as one part of 
the Supreme Court's negative Commerce Clause analysis. 
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overreaching.205 Rather than "expanding our beachhead in this im-
poverished territory," Scalia suggests at most "being satisfied with 
what we have already acquired by a sort of intellectual adverse posses-
sion. "206 To this end, although on a clean slate he might virtually 
eliminate federal judicial review of state and local taxes,207 he advo-
cates barring only facial discrimination, which he finds when a provi-
sion by its own terms taxes outsiders more heavily than insiders.208 
Justice Scalia relies principally on the lack of textual support for 
the negative Commerce Clause, as the text mentions only Congress' 
positive power to regulate interstate commerce, and on his belief that 
no such provision was intended by the Framers.209 Yet he also finds 
policy reasons for his position, arguing that the Court has produced a 
"quagmire" that "[makes] no sense"210 for reasons rooted in the un-
derlying enterprise. State tax cases cast courts in the "essentially legis-
lative role of weighing the imponderable - balancing the importance 
of the State's interest in this or that ... against the degree of impair-
ment of commerce."211 Courts are institutionally incapable of per-
forming this role well. Moreover, even if they look exclusively at 
discrimination rather than balancing it against state interests, they will 
struggle with the fact that state taxation "spans a spectrum, ranging 
from the obviously discriminatory to the manipulative to the ambigu-
ous to the wholly innocent."212 Arbitrariness is unavoidable, but at 
least the facial discrimination standard minimizes uncertainty by 
reaching only a well-defined class of cases on the discriminatory side 
of the spectrum. While the standard admittedly relies on purely for-
mal distinctions and often fails to prevent intentional discrimination, 
he regards this as less damaging than the Court's plunge into legisla-
tive imponderables.213 Justice Scalia therefore would leave to Con-
205. See American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2343 (1990); Goldberg v. 
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 271 (1989); American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 304 
(1987); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987). 
206. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
207. Justice Scalia would still bar "rank" state tax discrimination against outsiders under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 265 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Whether this differs from facial discrimination is unclear. 
208. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 257-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
Scalia would confine his inquiry to the contested provision itself, not to the state's entire tax code. 
Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
209. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 260-63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Smith, 
110 S. Ct. at 2344 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
210. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
211. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2344 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
212. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 305 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
213. See Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 305-06. 
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gress the task of policing the more subtly discriminatory state taxes.214 
Although Justice Scalia detests balancing, he implicitly does so at 
the level of framing general rules of decision. To make his textual 
interpretation of the Constitution more palatable, he argues that the 
cost of his rule's lesser reach in barring undesirable state taxes is less 
than the benefit of its greater coherence and predictability. Professor 
Schoettle presumably would argue to the contrary. One important 
variable in choosing between these positions is what Congress would 
do absent active judicial oversight. If judicial review has discouraged 
it from handling the same range of problems more skillfully, there is 
all the more reason to agree with Justice Scalia; if Congress would not 
act, then only the courts can fill an arguable need. I turn to this and 
related questions of the politics of federalism in taxation in Part III, 
but first, given the constitutional issues Justice Scalia raises, I consider 
whether the federal courts must as a matter of constitutional interpre-
tation follow one course or the other. 
D. The Significance of the Constitutional Grounds for Federal 
Judicial Review of State and Local Taxation 
Judicial review of state and local taxes that affect outsiders or in-
terstate commerce usually, though not exclusively, rests on the nega-
tive Commerce Clause - that ostensible though unstated corollary to 
the Constitution's explicit grant to Congress, through the "positive" 
Commerce Clause, of regulatory authority over interstate commerce. 
As Justice Scalia, echoing earlier commentators, has noted, the histori-
cal case for the negative Commerce Clause is unpersuasive. The text 
of the Constitution fails to mention it - contrary to what one might 
expect given its importance, and in contradiction to drafting practices 
elsewhere followed in the Constitution.215 Debate concerning enact-
ment of the Constitution seems to have rested on the assumption that 
no negative Commerce Clause exists.216 Arguably the Framers would 
not have adopted the Constitution had they understood the negative 
Commerce Clause to exist.217 Finally, the original theoretical basis for 
the negative Commerce Clause - that the positive grant of authority 
214. Tyler, 483 U.S. at 259. Justice Scalia ignores the possibility that if the Supreme Court 
announced the abolition of the negative Commerce Clause, Congress would immediately pass a 
statute barring discrimination against interstate commerce and instructing the Court to resume 
its prior role, now under the aegis of the positive Commerce Clause. 
215. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 184, at 173. 
216. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 12 (1937). 
217. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER, supra note 216, at 19. 
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over interstate commerce to Congress was meant to be exclusive, with 
the consequence that all state legislation in the area is in effect ultra 
vires - is historically and textually weak, has never been consistently 
followed by the courts, and could not be followed today without virtu-
ally eliminating states' power to legislate, given the breadth of the cur-
rently prevailing definition of "interstate commerce."21s 
This may counsel following Justice Scalia's lead and largely elimi-
nating judicial review of state and local taxation (absent congressional 
authorization). Yet counterarguments exist, on historical and other 
grounds. It may be significant, either for its own sake or as evidence of 
original intent, that the existence of a negative Commerce Clause was 
suggested as early as the 1820s, by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 219 and has been with us ever since. Moreover, the clause, even 
if a judicially created fiction, may perform the originally intended 
function of the Import-Export Clause, which bars states from 
"lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,"220 if, as some 
have asserted, that clause was meant to apply to the interstate, not just 
international, movement of goods.221 In addition, most Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence probably could continue to stand under plausible 
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, or 
Equal Protection Clauses. 222 
From a broader standpoint, we must consider how strictly we 
should feel bound by textualism and original intent. If doctrinal 
evolution to meet changing policy needs is methodologically permissi-
ble, this might be a particularly good place for it. An expansive nega-
tive Commerce Clause, if not quite uncontroversial, at least does not 
systematically favor some broad social groups against others;223 
rather, it favors the whole against the partsj to collective long-term 
benefit. It also is not identified with any particular point on the polit-
ical spectrum. Thus, the rhetoric that portrays constitutional innova-
218. See, e.g., Tyler, 483 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
219. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824); see also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat,) 419, 
448-49 (1827). 
220. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
221. See 1 WILLIAM w. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION JN THE HISTORY OP 
THE UNITED STATES 295-323 (1953); Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 39. The Supreme Court first 
held that the Import-Export Clause applies only to international commerce in Woodruff v. 
Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868). 
222. See Hellerstein, supra note 10, at 50-54 (discussing overlap between negative Commerce 
Clause and other constitutional provisions). 
223. An expansive negative Commerce Clause may favor consumers and out-of-state produ-
cers over in-state producers, but everyone is a consumer, and many in-state producers are also 
out-of-state producers elsewhere. 
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tion as offensively political and countermajoritarian224 seems less 
applicable here. 
One also could powerfully argue unforeseen circumstances, if they 
are relevant under one's theory of constitutional interpretation.225 
The Framers very likely failed to foresee the future growth either of 
interstate commerce or of state and local taxation. They may also 
have substantially overestimated the readiness of Congress to strike 
down state legislation that is hostile to interstate commerce. 226 That 
Congress never so acted during its first 180 years227 arguably suggests 
this. 
I conclude that the constitutional issue is sufficiently open to be 
decided on grounds of policy. From this perspective, the choice of 
federal judicial standard involves a tradeoff between (1) the benefit of 
enhancing locational neutrality, which turns not only on an activist 
judicial standard's effectiveness but on the burdens to interstate com-
merce that otherwise would be imposed by state and local govern-
ments and survive congressional oversight, against (2) the costs of 
broad judicial enforcement, which potentially include not only ram-
pant litigation and legal uncertainty but reduced benefit from the de-
sirable exercise of state and local government authority. The· 
following Part examines the aspects of this tradeoff that tum on an 
understanding of national or state and local politics. 
III. POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE PRACTICE OF 
FEDERALISM IN TAXATION 
The tradeoff described at the end of the previous Part turns in 
large part on questions about expected political behavior. Absent a 
federal judicial role, to what extent is Congress likely to overturn state 
provisions that burden interstate commerce or overtax nonresidents? 
Is the locational neutrality problem all that serious to begin with, 
224. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1-11 (1988). 
225. Aside from the question of whether the Framers anticipated a "living Constitution" that 
would evolve to meet changing circumstances, there is the question of whether it makes sense to 
cling to their intent piecemeal when in so many complementary respects - relating, for example, 
to the scope of government activity - we have jettisoned their intent entirely. 
226. Political naivete by the Framers regarding Congress' willingness to strike down state 
laws burdening interstate commerce hardly seems implausible if one recalls, for example, their 
miscalculations relating to the electoral college (including the belief that the college would per-
form an independent role and the failure to separate its vote for President from its vote for Vice 
President), and their apparent belief, refuted within five years of the Constitution's adoption, that 
permanent political parties would not arise. On the latter, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE 
IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1780-1840, at 53, 80 (1969). 
227. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 324. 
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given states' incentives to cooperate by promoting efficiency to their 
mutual advantage? Are there benefits to locating significant taxing au-
thority at the state and local level that appear likely to outweigh the 
harm to locational neutrality? This section examines these questions 
in order. 
A. Congress and the Political Efficacy of the ''Positive" Commerce 
Clause 
The Framers counted on Congress, acting under the positive Com-
merce Clause, to restrain states' predilection to burden interstate com-
merce or export tax burdens to nonresidents.228 The reliance seems a 
standard application of Madison's famous formula: "extend the 
sphere" of political action from the state to the national level to in-
clude more interests and thereby cure the vices of faction.229 As it has 
turned out, however, Congress has almost never barred or restrained 
state and local taxes that created burden - even though judicial re-
view of state and local taxation under the negative Commerce Clause 
does not make its role wholly redundant. In Moorman and Common-
wealth Edison, for example, the Supreme Court not only upheld taxes 
with adverse effects on interstate commerce, but explicitly described 
these effects as properly considered by Congress, rather than the 
courts.230 
It is therefore important to understand the reasons for Congress' 
pattern of inaction. If it likely would be taking a far more active role 
but for the federal courts' claim of jurisdiction, little might be lost by 
dispensing with the negative Commerce Clause. And it appears plau-
sible that the courts' role at least marginally deters congressional ac-
tion, even where a suspect tax is upheld. Once the Supreme Court 
becomes the primary filter for objectionable state and local taxes, its 
decision to let one stand may be (mis)interpreted politically as an af-
firmative endorsement or "clean bill of health." Moreover, absent a 
regular congressional practice of reviewing such taxes, the inertial bar-
riers to reviewing the provisions that survive judicial scrutiny may be 
harder to overcome. 
Despite this likely effect at the margin, there are powerful reasons 
228. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 283-84 (noting 
the "necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States"). 
229. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. IO (James Madison), at 64. 
230. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) ("It is to [Congress], and not 
this Court, that the Constitution has committed ... policy decisions [regarding income allocation 
rules]."); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 (1981) ("The simple fact is 
that the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legislative, and not judi· 
cial, resolution."). 
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for concluding that Congress would engage in little serious review of 
state and local taxes even absent a negative Commerce Clause. Con-
sider the basic fl.aw in Madison's "extend the sphere" solution to the 
problem of faction: the tendency of concentrated interests to be better 
organized and more aware of issues that affect them than diffuse inter-
ests, leading to systematic transfers from the "many" to the "few."231 
This tendency inherently discourages an active congressional role in 
the state and local tax area, where a socially harmful provision often 
yields concentrated benefit (to the enacting state government and per-
haps in-state businesses) and diffuses harm (across the other forty-nine 
states and perhaps to in-state consumers). 
To the extent that those harmed by a tax are sufficiently concen-
trated to be organized and aware of their interests, state-level political 
processes may already provide some protection. Concentrated inter-
ests need not include residents or voters in order to exert political in-
fluence. The same financial and lobbying power that one generally 
needs to be effective before Congress may also apply at the state level. 
The ability to make campaign contributions, for example, may yield 
power everywhere. Thus, the congressional filter is somewhat duplica-
tive, rather than independent or complementary, of the state-level 
political filters constraining enactment. 
Even when a harmed outside interest group has greater influence 
in Congress than in the taxing stat~'s legislature, the "extend the 
sphere" model is unlikely to work well in the state and local tax area. 
Madison counted on interest groups' inability in a large and diverse 
polity to assemble majorities that would act together to invade others' 
rights or interests. Virtue, inertia, and what we would call the transac-
tion costs of forming broad alliances offered a measure of protec-
tion. 232 In the state and local tax area, however, it is not enough for 
Congress to decline to erect trade barriers between the states. Rather, 
it must act affirmatively to bar the states from erecting barriers. Thus, 
the whole Madisonian structure of checks and balances impeding leg-
islative action has the wrong effect here, where we need action, not 
inaction, to restrain the vices of faction. 233 
231. See OLSON, supra note 120, at 29. 
232. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 10 (James Madison), at 64. 
233. While the Framers may simply have missed this point or concluded that it had no good 
solution, some language in The Federalist could be read as supporting the view (under which the 
problem would not exist) that states lack the power to burden interstate commerce, perhaps due 
to the Import-Export Clause rather than the negative Commerce Clause. See THE FEDERALIST, 
supra note 11, No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), at 41-43 (noting that states would pursue conflicting 
and mutually injurious trade policies under a confederation but impliedly cannot under the Con· 
stitution); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 42 (James Madison), at 275-76 (stating that 
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Recent scholarship in political science and law provides grounds 
for predicting congressional reluctance to strike down burdensome 
state and local taxes even when the forces demanding such action are 
quite strong. Assuming significant organized support for such taxes, 
Congress typically will face what Michael Hayes terms conflictual de-
mand patterns. Hayes finds that Congress is reluctant to legislate 
when demand patterns are conflictual (even if the side demanding leg-
islation is stronger), due to the existence of an "ungrateful electorate'' 
that punishes legislation opposed to its preferences to a greater extent 
than it rewards legislation in favor.234 Action is more visible than in-
action, and enemies have longer memories than friends, with the result 
that Congress usually tries to avoid conflictual issues altogether or de-
fer their resolution to agencies and courts.235 Professor Jonathan Ma-
cey has shown that similar considerations often lead Congress to defer 
to state governments, ostensibly on grounds of principled federalism, 
instead of addressing issues that from a public interest standpoint 
might call for resolution at the national level.236 
All this suggests that, in the absence of a negative Commerce 
Clause, Congress would be unwilling or unable to engage in much 
case-by-case review of questionable state and local taxes.237 While the 
enactment of broad general rules to cover future disputes appears less 
unlikely, it has not happened so far, in large part due to the organized 
opposition of state and local govemments.238 Thus, ifthere is to be an 
effective check, it probably must be the courts - although one still 
could argue that such a check is worse than none at all. 
absent the Constitution, states would be at liberty to regulate interstate commerce and burden it 
with taxes on the import and export of goods). 
234. MICHAEL T. HAYES, LoBBYISl'S AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MAR· 
KETS 93-9S (1981). 
23S. Id.; see also Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or 
Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, SS-S7 (1982); Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Strategy of 
Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. SSS (1972); Peter H. 
Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 33 (1983). 
236. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 26S (1990). 
237. Under the Hayes-Macey analysis, Congress might, instead of doing nothing, reempower 
the federal courts to act under its positive Commerce Clause authority, or establish an adminis-
trative agency (assuming this is constitutional) to perform the review function. Yet this would 
have largely the same effect as retaining the negative Commerce Clause, except insofar as (1) the 
empowering statute provided different (or at least clearer) directions to decisionmakers, or (2) an 
agency acted differently than the courts, for example, by reason of its having independent investi-
gative powers or being run by "experts." 
238. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32S (describing an instance of 
interstate cooperation as designed to "stave off further Federal intervention"). 
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B. State and Local Governments and the Degree of Need for a 
Commerce Clause 
Despite congressional inability to monitor state and local taxation, 
there would be little need for a negative Commerce Clause if the states 
were not likely to impose significant relative burdens on each others' 
citizens or businesses or on the act of crossing state boundaries. One 
might think that the states would refrain from imposing such burdens, 
given the general social gains from locational neutrality, the self-de-
feating nature of competition to impose greater burdens on others than 
others impose on oneself, and the capacity of threats of retaliation to 
enforce cooperation.239 Unfortunately, however, while these consider-
ations powerfully constrain state and local tax behavior and have cre-
ated significant areas of cooperation, their force is incomplete. 
While the leading tax compacts and uniform allocation statutes re-
ceive far from universal adherence,240 and while such adherence is mo-
tivated in part by the desire to forestall congressional intervention,241 
interstate cooperation is in some respects impressive. To give two ex-
amples, all states with broad-based personal income taxes grant credits 
for income taxes paid to other states with similar crediting provi-
sions, 242 and only Iowa fails to use a three-factor allocation formula 
for business income - although other states opportunistically vary the 
formula, for example, by giving greater weight to the sales factor in 
what are predominantly market states. 
Yet the history of Supreme Court Commerce Clause litigation 
richly testifies to the incompleteness of interstate cooperation. The im-
portant question is not whether existing cooperation is impressive and 
substantial, but whether it is sufficient. The practical evidence of non-
cooperation from litigated cases - which evidence presumably would 
be even greater if states did not anticipate Commerce Clause chal-
lenges - accords with powerful theoretical reasons for expecting co-
operation to fall well short of the optimum. 
The sheer number of states and tax provisions creates significant 
monitoring and collective action problems. One state may be likely to 
benefit from enacting burden-exporting taxes even if some other states 
239. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 4, at 14. 
240. The Multistate Tax Compact, developed in 1967, currently is subscribed to in full by 
only 18 states, plus 10 associate members. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 653. 
Likewise, only 25 states and the District of Columbia have substantially enacted the Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). See id. at 505. 
241. Discussion, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE, supra note 
4, at 124 (comment by Walter Hellerstein). 
242. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 968-69. 
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(but not all) are watching its behavior and retaliating. States have dif-
ferential opportunities to attempt to burden each other. For example, 
states possessing scarce natural resources (like Montana in Common-
wealth Edison), or a strategic location amid national transportation 
networks (like Pennsylvania in Scheiner) may be able to export more 
tax burdens to outsiders than outsiders can export back to them. 
Moreover, the state-level role of concentrated interest groups is ex-
tremely significant. A group in StateX that can secure a tax benefiting 
itself at the expense of State Y need not be concerned about retaliation 
unless (1) the affected groups in State Y are sufficiently concentrated to 
act, and (2) their retaliation against State X would hurt this very group 
(or other groups that are politically effective), rather than residents of 
State X generally. At the national level, it is well known that interest 
groups active in taxation tend to practice what Emil Schattschneider 
called "reciprocal noninterference," or agreeing to each other's fa-
vored tax concessions so long as each gets its own.243 One would ex-
pect this to hold even more powerfully at the state level, where 
opposing each others' special interest provisions generally might be 
more difficult and costly given the multiplicity of jurisdictions. 
A further problem with state-level tax politics goes to tax exporta-
tion, which may benefit state political actors even if it is practiced suf-
ficiently reciprocally to be, in fact, zero sum for all taxpayers and 
businesses. To understand why, it is useful to digress briefly to a re-
lated question: why states would attempt to engage in tax exportation 
when they may not, as an economic matter, actually be accomplishing 
it. Consider the coal severance tax in Commonwealth Edison. While 
directly borne by consumers (predominantly from out of state), its real 
incidence, even in the short term, cannot be determined without exam-
ining such factors as 
the degree of geographic concentration, the mobility of various factors or 
industry, cartelization by trucing states, international competition or 
price-umbrella effects, natural substitutability, government regulation, 
the prevalence of long-term contracts, the importance of transportation 
costs and the way in which such costs are determined, unionization, and 
market structure as well as the more mundane attributes of long- and 
short-run elasticities of supply and demand.244 
In-state producers or landowners might bear most or all of the real tax 
burden. While Montana's willingness to levy the tax arguably sug-
gests otherwise, on the theory that the enacting legislators or in-state 
243. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 55-56 & n.254; ELMER E. SCHATfSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, 
PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE Pou-
TICS, AS SHOWN IN 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF 135-36 (1935). 
244. McLure, supra note 6, at 171 (footnote omitted). 
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interest groups must know better, one should not ascribe too much 
weight to their apparent judgment given the inherent difficulty of de-
termining tax incidence. 24s 
Imagine, however, that one is a Montana legislator considering 
voting to increase dramatically the coal severance tax and simultane-
ously to reduce dramatically the income and property taxes on local 
residents. (These offsetting changes were in fact made simultane-
ously. 246) In order to be confident of gaining politically from this vote, 
must one resolve the tax incidence question? While in-state interest 
group opposition, if any, may be significant, a yes vote brings an obvi-
ous political benefit regardless of the proposal's real effects on inci-
dence - and even if it has no effects. The advantage is that, instead of 
being taxed visibly and directly, voters are now bearing tax burdens 
invisibly and indirectly. For politicians interested in popularity or re-
election, perceived tax exportation is better than the real thing. 
Perceived tax exportation is a particularly potent form of what Su-
san Hansen calls "fiscal illusion": the use of camouflage to pay for 
government without incurring voter wrath.247 It is well documented 
that fiscal illusions can be quite resilient and that voter support for 
spending programs often depends on how well the costs of paying for 
the programs are disguised. 248 It follows that perceived tax exporta-
tion is a valuable political tool for state legislators, permitting them to 
claim that they provide government services for free, whether or not 
tax burdens are actually exported and whether or not other states re-
spond by returning the favor. 
There is at least one more reason that state and local taxation tends 
to burden outsiders and interstate commerce notwithstanding the in-
centives to cooperate. As noted earlier, one of the principal costs of 
federalism in taxation goes to administration and compliance - ar-
guably constituting "a drag on interstate trade almost as debilitating 
as the border restrictions our federal system was originally designed to 
prevent.''249 All jurisdictions seemingly would have an incentive to 
reduce these burdens, and surely to some extent they do. At the mar-
245. The determination of tax incidence often baffies the most talented microeconomists who 
have studied it seriously. See id. at 186. In other contexts, state legislatures also frequently get it 
wrong. See McLure, supra note 24, at 341-42 (suggesting that state corporate income taxes 
typically reflect progressive redistributional motives but are regressive in their actual incidence). 
246. See Epstein, supra note 136, at 448. 
247. See SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE PoLmcs OF TAXATION: REVENUE WITHOUT REPRE-
SENTATION 22-23, 35-36 (1983). 
248. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 11-21 (1967); HANSEN, supra note 247, at 109-11. 
249. Henderson, supra note 52, at 1352. 
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gin, however, no jurisdiction is likely to feel this incentive very 
strongly, given each jurisdiction's limited effect on nationwide costs of 
compliance and administration. 
Moreover, while businesses would benefit from state (or federal) 
legislation reducing their compliance burdens, they are unlikely to 
lobby intensively for it. Collective action and free rider problems in-
hibit such lobbying, not only absolutely but relative to other lobbying. 
Here, the benefits of uniformity would be shared across a broad spec-
trum of multistate businesses. More targeted legislation - for exam-
ple, creating industry-specific tax benefits - tends to induce greater 
cooperation and easier monitoring among affected businesses, and to 
permit each such business to capture a greater share of the overall 
benefit. Cooperation also is less likely because in many cases busi-
nesses do not want uniformity. Their goal presumably is to reduce the 
sum of their tax payments and compliance costs, whereas from an 
overall social standpoint, to the extent that taxes are neutral transfers, 
the goal should be to reduce their compliance costs alone. Businesses 
may prefer socially costly locational disparity that permits them to 
reduce their tax bills - for example, through the exploitation of differ-
ences between states' income allocation rules, or by inducing state tax 
competition to provide investment incentives. 
While the costs of imposing disparate tax systems are likely to be 
undervalued by the various relevant actors, the real benefits to each 
jurisdiction of imposing the system it prefers are likely to be overesti-
mated. It seems fair enough for legislatures that take different views of 
desirable tax policy to enact different types of taxes. Unfortunately, 
however, as I have discussed elsewhere in the context of the national 
legislature: 
In many cases, Congress legislates because its members and others who 
influence it value and benefit from the activity oflegislating. The reasons 
for such behavior can be divided into two categories. First, proposing 
and enacting legislation is a means of symbolic communication with 
[poorly informed] members of the general public, of causing them to like 
a politician without the inconvenience (and possible political inconse-
quence) of actually having to benefit them tangibly. Thus, without re-
gard to its actual effects, legislation can promote reelection. Second, 
succeeding legislatively is a means of exercising and demonstrating one's 
power. It is inherently gratifying (as when an emperor enjoys seeing 
statues of himself), and it increases one's prestige and status in political 
circles. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can pro-
mote self-interested goals apart from reelection. 2so 
250. Shaviro, supra note 38, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). Cf Discussion, in REGULATION, 
FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 124 (comment by Walter Heller-
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As a consequence of these incentives, the more separate actors 
have the opportunity to legislate, the more legislation there will be 
even absent seriously held policy differences. In a federal system, for 
example, state as well as federal legislators may want to be able to say 
to voters, each other, or themselves that they have done something for 
the average taxpayer, the homeowner, the economy, education, or any 
other cause that momentarily seems salient and worthwhile. Legisla-
tures thus may end up enacting differing rules, that on balance impose 
tariff-like compliance and administrative burdens, simply because the 
members of each legislature value the opportunity to exercise their 
own discretion more than the overall outcome (net of everyone's ef-
forts) or nationwide uniformity.251 
This can be generalized into a point about the Madisonian system 
of separation of powers (of which federalism is one application).252 
Instead of less legislation or even less costly legislation, the system 
may simply tend to produce less consistent and coherent legislation 
than a more unified and centralized system. Nonetheless the system 
may be defended as a kind of "insurance" against the worst-case costs 
of centralized legislation that is consistent and coherent but thor-
oughly bad.253 Does this defense, or any other, suggest that significant 
state-level autonomy in taxation, accompanied by limited or no review 
under the negative Commerce Clause, is a good idea despite the result-
ing harm to locational neutrality? The following section considers the 
principal forms that such an argument could take. 
C. Possible Benefits of Preserving Broad State and Local 
Government Autonomy in Taxation 
So far, I have emphasized the benefits of large-scale rather than 
small-scale units of political decisionmaking. Yet small political units, 
however ill-suited to advance locational neutrality, may have offsetting 
advantages of their own. Indeed, if this were not the case, large units 
would be so obviously and unambiguously superior that the debate 
over optimal size would never have become such a durable and popu-
stein) (arguing that state legislators move toward uniformity in state income taxes so as to dis-
courage federal intervention, thereby protecting their own power and patronage). 
251. Consistent with this observation, in relatively nonpolitically salient areas, such as rules 
of evidence and commercial law, states tend to subscribe to uniform codes far more than in the 
area of taxation. Even in tax, there are some uniformities, such as widespread piggybacking, 
often with particular modifications, to the federal income tax code for state and local income tax 
purposes. 
252. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11 (James Madison), No. 51, at 346. 
253. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 106. 
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lar genre in American political theory.254 
The principal arguments are as follows. First, in the tax context, 
state and local government autonomy helps to ensure that public 
goods, many of which are local rather than national in scope, will be 
provided and financed at the most efficient scale. Second, such auton-
omy promotes desirable tax competition between separate jurisdictions 
for residents and business investment, founded on the ease of exit by 
those dissatisfied with the tradeoff between taxes paid and government 
services received. Third, even disregarding exit, small-scale govern-
ment is more responsive to voters' preferences than large-scale govern-
ment. Fourth, unfettered taxing powers permit state and local 
governments more readily to exploit and develop the resources that 
they possess, thus benefiting their residents and arguably promoting 
efficiency for much the same reason that private ownership of property 
commonly is thought efficient. Fifth, state and local autonomy has the 
Madisonian advantage of dividing political authority and thus reduc-
ing its capacity to do great harm. Sixth, such autonomy promotes 
experimentation by governments with different kinds of tax rules. 
This section considers these arguments in turn and concludes that, 
in the tax area, they have some validity but relatively limited conse-
quences. In particular, they suggest an important distinction. State 
and local discretion regarding the amount of revenue raised through 
taxes seems valuable and important despite its creating locational dis-
parity. State and local discretion regarding exactly how revenue is 
raised seems generally less beneficial, and thus more clearly ought to 
be minimized. Moreover, the narrower and less publicly salient the 
tax issue, the weaker the case for preserving discretion. 
1. Benefits of Fiscal Federalism in Supplying and Financing Public 
Goods 
While the United States' multi-unit federal structure is to some 
extent a historical accident reflecting its formation from separate colo-
nies, good economic arguments support such a structure. The public 
goods that government provides often vary in their spatial incidence or 
in the scale at which they are most efficiently provided.255 Assuming 
that a public good has no externalities outside of its benefit region, 
concerns of efficiency suggest that the people in that region be exclu-
sively responsible both for deciding whether to provide the good and 
254. See DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 296-97 (1988) 
(noting the "optimal size" genre's longstanding popularity). 
255. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 445-46; Gordon Tullock, Federal-
ism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1969). 
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for financing it. A larger scale pplitical unit may reduce government's 
responsiveness, by giving influence over the decision to people unaf-
fected by it, or may make government too responsive, by creating an 
incentive to seek public goods that are worth less to the beneficiaries 
than the amount society as a whole pays for the goods.256 
These principles do not provide a perfect rationale for the existing 
practice of federalism in this country, given the extreme divergences 
between units of government and scales of benefit from public goods. 
Jurisdictional lines are in many cases the arbitrary products of geogra-
phy or history. Any attempt to draw the lines more rationally would 
be hampered by each public goad's potentially having a unique scale of 
efficient provision or incidence of benefit. Thus, even if otherwise fea-
sible, perfect fiscal federalism would require, in Gordon Tullock's 
words, "a genuinely Rube Goldberg arrangement in which the individ-
ual citizen would be a member of a vast collection of governmental 
units, each ... dealing with a separate activity."251 
In practice, state and local governmental units are in some cases 
too small and in others too large to be optimally efficient in providing 
public goods. Moreover, positive and negative externalities surely 
abound from the provision of public goods within limited geographical 
units, reducing the validity of the entire model. Yet it nonetheless is 
plausible that dividing government into national, state, and local com-
ponents brings us closer to the optimum than would a purely national 
system. A strong rationale therefore exists for having state and local 
governments decide what public goods to provide to their residents 
and take the responsibility for financing those public goods. Where 
different jurisdictions separately exercise discretion about what level of 
public goods to finance, it becomes almost inevitable that they will 
levy taxes that differ in level or amount. This creates locational dis-
parity in taxation that gives rise to some social costs, but the advan-
tages of fiscal federalism may outweigh the costs. 
All this suggests that, on balance, it may be efficient for state and 
local jurisdictions to decide for themselves how much to raise in tax 
revenues. While it might also seem reasonable, absent countervailing 
considerations, to let them decide what types of taxes to use, that does 
256. Congressional pork barrel legislation provides an instructive example. Such legislation, 
while formally provided at the national scale, may in fact be decided on locally - for example, 
by the House member who seeks a particular appropriation. Local decisions in the aggregate are 
then simply ratified at the national level through logrolling and are financed nationally, often 
leading to projects that are worth less to the beneficiaries than their cost to society. See, e.g., 
Shaviro, supra note 38, at 38. 
257. Tullock, supra note 255, at 25. Tullock notes that in a world with positive information 
costs this arrangement would be "very, very far from optimum" in practice. Id. at 26. 
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not follow as clearly from the fiscal federalism model, which presuma-
bly would suggest, if this were feasible, that each resident pay for her 
precise share of the benefit from the public goods provided. And 
countervailing considerations plainly exist, since state or local discre-
tion regarding the type of taxes levied increases the locational distor-
tions already resulting from disparate levels of taxation, and has the 
added drawback of encouraging tax exportation. 
Absent positive externalities from a jurisdiction's providing public 
goods, tax exportation clearly is inconsistent with fiscal federalism. 
Given that positive externalities frequently exist, however, one could 
argue that tax exportation is not objectionable after all.258 This essen-
tially was the Supreme Court's position in Commonwealth Edison, 
where it viewed Montana's exercise of police powers, thus maintaining 
local civilization to the benefit of all who passed through, as justifying 
any degree of tax exportation, limited only by the requirement of 
nexus.259 
The Court's argument - its failure to suggest any limit to tax ex-
porting aside - may not be quite as preposterous as it initially ap-
pears. When not all beneficiaries from a public good must pay for it, 
there is a risk that it will be inefficiently undersupplied. However, our 
confidence that Montana will remain a civilized society with roads and 
police even absent tax exportation minimizes this danger. At least up 
to a point, maintaining civilization is a public good likely to involve 
enormous consumer surplus. Many Montanans presumably would 
pay significantly higher taxes if necessary to fend off the collapse of 
their society (although some might choose instead to leave the state). 
Thus, the efficiency reason for affirmatively wanting to charge outsid-
ers seems relatively unimportant, and standard economic notions of 
optimal taxation260 suggest charging the least elastic revenue source -
perhaps something pertaining to Montanans, if, as the principle con-
demning discrimination against interstate commerce implicitly posits, 
residency is less elastic than limited entry into a jurisdiction for com-
mercial purposes.261 
It seems clear that, when public goods are predominantly local in 
incidence, tax exportation tends to be undesirable even if there are 
258. Of course, if positive externalities are critical even for public goods whose principal 
incidence is local, the entire fiscal federalism model is called into question, but it is plausible that 
local decisionmakers are best suited to decide on and provide such goods. 
259. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1981). 
260. See, e.g., Hettich & Winer, supra note SO, at 428 (describing the optimal taxation norm 
that "[a]ctivities or commodities for which substitution effects are the smallest ought to be taxed 
more heavily"). 
261. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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some positive externalities. While stronger substantive cases than 
Montana's for allowing tax exportation are easily imaginable, state 
and local governments have an incentive to engage in too much of it, 
not too little. Instances of significant benefit spillover can be ad-
dressed through action at the national level, cooperation between 
neighboring jurisdictions, and the charging of user fees for separable 
benefits provided to outsiders - for example, on roads that facilitate 
coal mining in Montana, establishing tolls that are reasonably com-
mensurate with the roads' cost. When one adds together the costs of 
actual and perceived tax exportation and the other locational distor-
tions (including administrative and compliance costs) that result when 
jurisdictions even "innocently" adopt different tax bases, it becomes 
clear that the case for state and local discretion regarding the types of 
taxes used is weaker than the case for such discretion regarding the 
amount of revenue raised through taxes. 
2. Facilitating Exit Under the Tiebout and Tax Competition Models 
In public finance theory, even advocates of a relatively large gov-
ernment role commonly acknowledge the difficulty of calibrating taxes 
and expenditures to people's preferences as efficiently as well-function-
ing private markets make possible.262 This difficulty persists even 
under optimal fiscal federalism. Governments have local power mo-
nopolies, public goods cannot be sold separately just to people who 
want them, and voting is too crude to disaggregate particular prefer-
ences or register their intensity. Charles Tiebout, however, argued in a 
celebrated article that localizing the scale of government where feasi-
ble makes possible a market-style solution to the problem of satisfying 
voters' preferences in the public sector. If numerous small-scale juris-
dictions offer distinctive tax and service packages, people are suffi-
ciently aware of the different packages available, and exit from one 
jurisdiction to another is sufficiently cheap (among other necessary 
preconditions), then the various jurisdictions will in effect compete for 
residents in much the same way that private businesses compete for 
customers.263 Small scale is critical to Tiebout's analysis because it 
tends to make exit cheaper and permits the existence of a greater 
number of choices. 
Tiebout's analysis parallels the traditional wisdom that federalism 
promotes tax competition among the states, since overtaxation induces 
262. See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. OF EcoN. 
& STAT. 387, 388-89 (1954). 
263. Tiebout, supra note 8. Tiebout's jurisdictions are not trying to maximize the number of 
residents, but to achieve the optimal scale. 
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exit or reluctance to enter.264 Under this view, taxation is seen purely 
as a cost to businesses or individuals of locating or remaining in a 
particular jurisdiction, devoid of offsetting benefits at the margin from 
added spending. Taxpayers' ability to flee accordingly encourages a 
desirable "race to the bottom" in levels of taxation or at least inhibits 
an undesirable "race to the top." 
The two related models can be challenged in a number of respects, 
however. First, they may expect too much from the exit option. Exit 
often is costly. For individuals, even beyond the direct costs of a move 
(including information and search costs), the decision to "vote with 
one's feet" may be discouraged by personal attachments to particular 
areas and by geographically limited job or housing opportunities. 
Businesses not only must consider a wide range of nontax factors in 
deciding where to invest, but once located may be unable to move 
without sacrificing fixed investments (ranging from physical plant to 
goodwill). 265 To the extent that exit is prohibitively costly, the benefits 
of the Tiebout and tax competition models are lost. To the extent that 
exit is costly but still done, the costs incurred yield a social loss, reduc-
ing or even eliminating the net social benefit predicted by the models. 
Put differently, locational disparity still has costs even if it also has 
benefits. 
A second problem with the Tiebout and tax competition models is 
that the information needed for their effective functioning may not be 
available. Recent studies suggest that, even in urban areas containing 
a multiplicity of local governments - seemingly ideal settings for the 
Tiebout model - voters typically lack sufficient information about al-
ternative tax and service packages to make the kinds of decisions that 
Tiebout posits.266 The vast diversity existing today between jurisdic-
tions' tax systems surely contributes to this problem. Voters would 
find it easier to compare more similarly structured types of tax pack-
ages. The existing diversity leads (perhaps deliberately) to information 
overload. 
264. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 236, at 291 (noting the "traditional defense of a strong 
federalist system as a device for achieving a more efficient legal system by encouraging competi-
tion among the states"). 
265. A business may also incur the cost of preserving its future mobility by keeping its capital 
in mobile form where, exit considerations aside, creating immobile capital would be more 
profitable. · 
266. See David Lowery & William E. Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Boundaries: An 
Individual-Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73 (1989). Businesses, due to advantages 
of scale, may be more likely to have relevant information about tax levels, but even they may be 
unable to predict the future levels of taxation that will apply to fixed investments. See Schoettle, 
supra note 190, at 1152 (arguing that taxes significantly affect business decisions in the long run 
even though skeptics and some evidence from surveys may suggest otherwise). 
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In addition, the diversity that creates this information overload 
yields few offsetting advantages. One of the most attractive features of 
the Tiebout model - its promise of diversity in the packages that are 
offered to suit diversity in people's tastes - has also been questioned 
empirically. The greatest differences in jurisdictions' spending pat-
terns apparently result, not from whether local voters prefer, say, art 
museums or swimming pools, but instead from differences in fiscal ca-
pacity. 267 Spending on education, for example, as between jurisdic-
tions with similar proportions of children, varies principally based on 
wealth rather than voters' taste for spending on education. 268 
Reliance on diversity in preferences appears even less appropriate 
for issues of taxation. Given people's varying preferences, diversity 
may be valuable with regard to a jurisdiction's choice to be high-tax 
and high-service or low-tax and low-service. Yet the same may not be 
as true with regard to the choice of how to raise a particular amount of 
revenue. Services are provided in kind, and therefore may vary 
sharply in subjective value depending on one's taste, but taxes are paid 
in the invariant form of cash. Thus, to the extent that people care 
principally about their own taxes, it seems doubtful that they often 
will be much concerned about what types of taxes they are paying 
(other than in preferring low compliance costs), holding the amount 
that they pay constant. 269 
Moreover, to the extent that people care about the allocation of tax 
burdens within the jurisdiction as a whole,270 the Tiebout and tax 
competition models suggest an inherent problem with attempting to 
provide diversity at the local level. Assume that voters differ in their 
267. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 422-25 (1990). 
268. Some jurisdictions may specialize either in providing good public schools or in having 
low taxes, thus encouraging geographical sorting between parents of school-age children and 
others. Yet this example of Tiebout-style behavior is in large part an artifact of the federal 
income tax system, which denies deductions for the costs of sending one's children to private 
schools but allows deductions for real property taxes that are used to finance public education. It 
also may respond opportunistically to the exit costs that prevent some nonparents from leaving 
high-tax, good-school jurisdictions, thereby making such persons subsidize a benefit that, even if 
partly a public good, primarily benefits its direct recipients. 
269. Even where people manifest strong aversion to one particular type of tax - as in Con-
necticut currently, where Governor Weicker's push for an income tax has aroused strong opposi-
tion - popular sentiment may rest in large part on the belief that enacting the unpopular tax 
would cause overall taxes to increase, at least over the long term. See Maria Newman, Anger 
Against Governors Reflected in 3-State Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al. Note that, just as 
creating a new income tax in addition to the sales tax is unpopular in Connecticut, so at the 
national level is enacting a sales (or value-added) tax in addition to the income tax unpopular. 
Many attribute Ways and Means Chairman Albert Ullman's electoral defeat in 1980 to his advo-
cacy of a national value-added tax. See Jeff Gerth, Treasury's Objections to a Sales Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1984, at A31. 
270. People may also care about the policy arguments aside from incidence for different 
taxes, an issue that I discuss at infra section 111.C.3. 
966 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:895 
attitudes toward progressive taxes that redistribute wealth. Even if the 
voters who favor such taxes concentrate in particular jurisdictions, 
they cannot realize their preference unless suitable targets of redistrib-
utive taxation consent to live in those jurisdictions.271 Wealthy tax-
payers and holders of capital - the most likely and plausible targets 
of redistributive taxation - are precisely the ones most likely to enjoy 
high mobility.272 
This reveals a normatively controversial aspect of the Tiebout and 
tax competition models. Assume that "conservatives" favor a small 
government sector, little or no wealth redistribution, and favorable tax 
treatment for capital, while "liberals" favor a large government sector, 
significant wealth redistribution, and high taxes on capital. Under 
these assumptions, conservatives but not liberals will like the conse-
quences for progressivity of cheap exit.213 
Yet each side has its own countervailing considerations. First, 
both may be dismayed by the inefficiency of departures from locational 
neutrality. Moreover, in a country where support at the national level 
for tax progressivity and redistribution is at most "weak and ambiva-
lent,"274 highly liberal policies may be most likely to prevail politically 
at smaller-scale jurisdictions that diverge from the mainstream 
(although highly progressive taxation may be ineffective at the local 
level given the ease of exit).275 This may in some instances make liber-
als friends, and conservatives foes, of state and local discretion in the 
tax area.276 Another consideration is that the exportation of perceived 
or actual tax burdens to nonvoters may be most feasible at the state 
and local level, where only one state's voters are represented. This 
may favor the liberal objective of promoting high levels of taxation 
and spending, but liberals may disapprove of the lack of taxpayer con-
sent or the taxes' incidence. 
Finally and most importantly, the question presented is not 
271. Ifl want to redistribute my own wealth, I can make voluntary contributions to suitable 
persons or causes and do not need the tax system's assistance. 
272. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 267, at 420. 
273. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); KAREN ORREN, CORPORATE 
POWER AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1974) (discussing the distributive consequences of cheap exit). 
274. JOHN F. WITrE, THE PoLmcs AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
352 (1985). 
275. The same may be true of highly conservative policies that diverge from the mainstream, 
but the point is that, in the area of tax progressivity, the mainstream tilts to the conservative side. 
The reverse may be true in other areas, such as abortion policy, where tight restrictions (typically 
a "conservative" position), if constitutionally permitted, might be most likely to prevail in se· 
lected states and localities. 
276. See STONE, supra note 254, at 304 (arguing that support for making decisions at a par-
ticular level in the federal system typically reflects "a belief that some particular interest is 
stronger in a particular arena"). 
March 1992] Federalism in Taxation 967 
whether taxation should be exclusively national or exclusively state 
and loca1. Continuing nationa1 taxation is a given. Moreover, since 
the argument for state and local discretion regarding the amount of 
tax levied is relatively strong, consider focusing on discretion regard-
ing the types of taxes used. Arguably, given the potential for per-
ceived tax exportation and the greater mobility of the wealthy and 
capital, the dominant effect of such discretion is to increase the net 
amount of state and local taxation (and thus the size of government), 
but to make such taxation less progressive. The result could be the 
worst of both worlds: the inefficiency many conservatives abhor277 
without the redistribution many liberals favor.278 
3. Greater Responsiveness of Small Government Units to Voter 
Preferences 
A further possible advantage of smaller government units is that 
they may be more responsive to the policy preferences of local vot-
ers. 279 In smaller units, each individual's vote counts for relatively 
more, there may be greater internal homogeneity and thus agreement, 
a sense of community participation may be easier to foster,280 and, as 
even James Madison (while generally preferring the larger scale) ad-
mitted, government officials may be more familiar with loca1 senti-
ments and conditions.281 These considerations plainly strengthen the 
case for state and local control over taxation. Once again, however, 
they apply more forcefully to the amount of fax levied than to the 
types of taxes used. 
Given fisca1 illusion, popular understanding of the amount of taxa-
tion imposed by a jurisdiction and its relationship to the value of gov-
ernment services provided can be disappointingly limited.282 Yet it 
277. Liberals, of course, should and often do oppose inefficiency, but it often is less promi-
nent in their rhetoric. 
278. This suggests that at least certain liberals and conservatives (those who disagree mainly 
about the merits of what is often called the "equity versus efficiency" tradeoff posed by an in-
crease in the size of government) should agree that state-level discretion in the tax area should be 
reduced. Yet American politics, or, for that matter, the Supreme Court, reaches no such consen-
sus. If anything, a consensus to preserve such discretion prevails. I suspect that liberals and 
conservatives alike tend to cherish the existence of multiple levels of political discretion because 
it increases the chance that they will enjoy the satisfaction of prevailing somewhere, albeit that 
the real effects of prevailing anywhere are reduced. 
279. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 7, at 1493. 
280. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cit-
ies in a Federal System, 19 URBAN LAW. 553 (1987). 
281. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 11, No. 10 (James Madison), at 63. 
282. Thus, the demand for public goods often depends on how visibly they are financed 
rather than on their cost, and many people apparently believe that government services can be 
provided for free. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 248, at 11-21; HANSEN, supra note 247, at 
39, 262. 
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often functions as a powerful constraint - for example, causing the 
defeat of politicians who enact or threaten unwanted tax increases.283 
Thus, for amount-of-tax issues, the argument that people will get more 
of what they want if more control remains at the state and local levels 
has some force. For type-of-tax issues, however, it appears considera-
bly less persuasive. 
Voters may care about what types of taxes their jurisdictions use 
for reasons of incidence or of effect. We have already seen, however, 
that issues of tax incidence are poorly understood by voters (and even 
economists), with the result that support for particular taxes often de-
pends on questionable or downright erroneous factual premises. Con-
sider, for example, state-level corporate income taxes, which probably 
gain much of their political support from the apparently erroneous 
belief that they are borne by shareholders, rather than by employees 
and consumers.284 We have also seen that control over incidence is 
impeded at the state and local level by the relative ease of exit by 
targets of redistribution, and that control can be misused to export tax 
burdens to persons neither participating as voters nor benefiting signif-
icantly from the jurisdiction's spending. The social gain from maxi-
mizing state and local-level voter control over tax incidence therefore 
appears relatively weak. 
Issues of tax effect go to the fact that taxes not only raise revenue 
but function as regulation. For example, the choice between a sales 
tax and an income tax may affect levels of saving, and the decision to 
grant homeowners a tax preference may affect home ownership.285 
Voters in different jurisdictions may want different regulatory effects 
for themselves, and while in some cases their efforts may simply offset 
each other, in others the resulting differentiation might increase aggre-
gate satisfaction. 
The problem with supporting broad state and local discretion on 
this ground is that, while taxes are only one type of regulation, they 
are a type that voters poorly understand. For a variety of reasons, 
including the simple dislike of taxation, people tend to assess regula-
tory uses of the tax system less rigorously than regulation by many 
283. Recent examples include the defeat of Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential election 
after he promised a tax increase, see Howell Raines, The One Thing Democrats Agree On: They 
Must Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1985, at E2, the defeat of Senator Dole in the 1988 New 
Hampshire Republican presidential primary after he failed to "take the pledge" not to raise 
taxes, see Bush v. Dole: Behind the Turnaround, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1988, at Al, and the 1991 
state legislative elections in New Jersey, where the Democrats were overwhelmingly defeated 
after Governor Florio increased taxes, see Jerry Gray, Democrats Fail to Kill the Tax Rise that 
Doomed Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at D6. 
284. See McLure, supra note 24, at 341-42. 
285. See supra section I.B. 
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other means. 286 Thus, to limit state and local discretion in the tax area 
would not be sufficiently broad to prevent regulation where desired, 
because alternative means to regulatory ends will usually exist; nor 
would it be so formalistic and easily evaded as to serve no purpose, in 
that the alternative means might be more likely than tax provisions to 
receive meaningful political scrutiny.287 Accordingly, the responsive-
ness argument for preserving state and local control over the types of 
taxes levied, while not completely without force, plausibly is out-
weighed by the arguments for greater uniformity and centralized con-
trol over state and local tax bases. 
One could argue that tax issues in general - the amount of tax 
levied aside - are too poorly understood for increasing our political 
system's aggregate responsiveness to voter preferences to have much 
value. Certainly many observers of the federal income tax political 
process have concluded that responsiveness commonly fails to yield 
not only a fair or efficient tax system, but even one satisfying to the 
voters whose preferences it ostensibly reflects.288 Without pushing this 
argument too far, it seems clear that for some types of tax issues - in 
particular, those too narrow or esoteric to attract widespread attention 
and concern - political responsiveness has relatively little value. 
Compare, for example, the issue of choosing income tax deprecia-
tion schedules to the issue of whether to use an income tax or a sales 
tax for the bulk of a state's revenue. The former issue is far less salient 
than the latter, and thus the power to control it locally seems unlikely 
to affect directly, to any significant extent, real levels of public satisfac-
tion. By contrast, voters across the country frequently express interest 
in the choice between an income tax and a sales tax (as Connecticut's 
Governor Weicker has recently leamed289). However skeptical one is 
of the underlying level of public understanding of each tax's incidence 
and effects, it is difficult to argue that when voters express a preference 
for one type of tax over another they are mistaken about what they 
truly prefer. Even if their preference is based on erroneous factual 
286. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 62-63. This is not to deny that some other forms of 
regulation - such as keeping social programs off-budget by requiring businesses to provide spec-
ified services - may be judged with a similar Jack of rigor. 
287. Similarly, a well-known argument in the context of the federal income tax system holds 
that the extensive use of "tax expenditures" is undesirable for structural political reasons. See, 
e.g., SURREY, supra note 40. 
288. See, e.g., Wrrrn, supra note 274; Shaviro, supra note 38, at 63-64; Stanley S. Surrey, 
The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1957). 
289. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Budget Is Passed for Connecticut with Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 23, 1991 at Al; Kirk Johnson, Effort to Repeal New Tax on Income Fails in Hartford, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1991, at Al. 
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premises - meaning that they are asking to live in a fool's paradise -
acceding to the preference might still yield the highest attainable level 
of public satisfaction (assuming that their ignorance cannot be reme-
died). After all, a sense of satisfaction is no less subjectively real for 
being founded on illusion. 290 
Again, however, the fool's paradise argument for state and local 
autonomy in taxation reaches only those issues that are sufficiently 
salient to evoke strongly held opinions on a broad scale. For the nar-
row and esoteric types of issues that are most common in the tax area 
-generally, those of tax base design as opposed to the choice between 
well known types of tax base - the case for greater uniformity and 
centralized control remains strong. 
4. Statewide Control over Resources and the Efficiency Gains from 
Monopoly 
One of the consequences of broad state and local government au-
tonomy in taxation is that it affords particular jurisdictions the oppor-
tunity to exploit their natural or other resources. Montana, for 
example, can use the coal severance tax to extract a higher price for its 
coal (assuming that its market power is in fact sufficient to raise the 
after-tax price paid by out-of-state customers). Similarly, Penn-
sylvania can attempt to exploit its highly strategic geographical loca-
tion if it permits levies such as the one in Scheiner, 291 and New York 
City and Florida can use hotel taxes to exploit their attractiveness as 
tourist destinations.292 The presumably intended effect in each case is 
not so much to tax in-state resource owners as to raise the after-tax 
prices paid by outsiders. In effect, states organize cartels that individ-
ual owners of coal mines, hotels, and the like would be unable to or-
ganize, given collective action problems and the antitrust laws, and the 
states then appropriate the monopoly profits to themselves. 
290. In endorsing the "fool's paradise," I argue, for the moment, against the pro-centraliza-
tion theme of this article. The reader who disagrees with me about the fool's paradise should 
conclude that the case for increased centralization is even stronger than I recognize, and thus 
should be moved in the direction of greater rather than lesser agreement with my overall 
conclusions. 
291. Recently, while traveling through Pennsylvania after having been warned that the state 
rigorously enforces its 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, I conjectured that this was one more exam-
ple of an attempt to export taxes and burden interstate commerce. A large proportion of the 
speeding fines levied in Pennsylvania no doubt are paid by outsiders, who may tend to be less 
familiar with the state's policy and to have long distances to travel (increasing the urge to travel 
fast). As is often the case with public choice explanations, however, this one proved difficult to 
verify. I observed that Pennsylvania also seemed to make greater-than-normal use of speed 
bumps and signs warning motorists to reduce their speed, perhaps evidencing a culture of traffic 
safety independent of tax exportation. 
292. See Wade, supra note 54. 
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If this does not sound like an argument in favor of state and local 
government autonomy in taxation, it can be converted into one by ad-
ding the assertion that the residents of the taxing states ought to be 
able to exploit their resources to their profit. This assertion can be 
defended either as a matter of entitlement or on efficiency grounds. 
The entitlement argument - for example, that Montanans ought 
to reap maximum benefit from Montana's coal - is relatively easy to 
answer. While "Montana for the Montanans" may sound, as a base-
line matter of justice, no less plausible than "Montana for the benefit 
of all Americans" or "Montana for the benefit of all humanity,'' in 
practice it has disadvantages. When all states attempt to exploit their 
particular advantages at the expense of those in other. states by or-
ganizing in-state monopolies, society as a whole is left worse off, due to 
the well-known deadweight welfare triangle loss that monopoly 
causes. 293 Thus, behind a veil of ignorance all states presumably 
would agree, and arguably by adopting the Constitution they did 
agree, mutually to forgo the advantages of being able to use taxation to 
extract monopoly profits from their resources. 
Monopoly power, however, has the advantage of eliminating, not 
only the collective action problem that we are glad inhibits seekers of 
monopoly profit, but also the regrettable collective action problem that 
inhibits those who would like more fully to develop a state's resources. 
Assume, for example, that the infrastructure needed by New York to 
host a thriving tourist industry will not be built or maintained unless 
its costs can be charged to tourists, and that public good and collective 
action problems prevent anyone other than the government, through 
taxes, from collecting the amounts that are needed. 
The argument is a standard one about the welfare advantages of 
monopoly294 (as well as collective or public ownership of property), It 
also is identical in form to the standard argument for allowing private 
property by granting the owner monopoly rights over a particular as-
set - namely, that by internalizing to the owner the social benefits 
from the property, we can induce her to use and develop the property 
to maximum social advantage.295 For both monopoly and private 
293. See, e.g., RYAN c. AMACHER & HOLLEY H. ULBRICH, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNOMICS 519 
(4th ed. 1989). 
294. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-82 (2d ed. 
1946), and JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 86-87 (2d ed. 1956), argue 
that monopoly increases business innovation by ensuring that none of the gains from innovation 
will be captured by imitative competitors. The available empirical evidence about innovation 
essentially refutes that argument, however. See AMACHER & ULBRICH, supra note 293, at 563. 
295. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. EcoN. REV. 347 
(1967); CASS SUNSfEIN, ON PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 (Chicago Law and Eco-
nomics Working Paper No. 3, 2d Series, 1991). 
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property rights, the assessment requires comparing benefits of inter-
nalization with harms, such as the welfare triangle loss, across a broad 
spectrum. While such an assessment is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, the standard wisdom over the years has been that for private prop-
erty the benefits tend to outweigh the harms, while for monopoly the 
harms tend to be greater. This assessment certainly seems plausible in 
the state and local tax context, where only rarely does it seem likely 
that the tax revenues extracted from outsiders both are needed and 
would be used for infrastructure that is desirable yet would not other-
wise exist due to collective action problems. 
5. Reducing Worst-Case Harm by Decentralizing Authority 
over Taxation 
A further argument for broad state and local government discre-
tion in matters of taxation is the standard Madisonian separation of 
powers view, under which the creation of multiple independent au-
thorities reduces the harms feared from vigorous government. Here 
again the argument is not completely without force, but seems of rela-
tively minor import. In particular, state and local governments cannot 
directly constrain the exercise of federal taxing authority and thereby 
prevent "tyranny." Thus, their only separation of powers benefit is to 
make national tax policy as a whole less consistent and coherent -
which, while conceivably desirable if one is sufficiently pessimistic 
about such policy, has significant costs. 
The fact that control over taxes at the state and local level is in 
addition to, not a potential substitute for, control over taxes at the 
national level is important for more than the standard Madisonian rea-
sons. It largely eliminates the relevance of any claim that tax base 
standardization is a mistake because national authorities are unlikely 
to make better decisions than local authorities. Whether that claim is 
factually correct is debatable, given the greater number of represented 
interests and the reduction of incentives for interstate tax exportation 
at the national level. The claim nonetheless is not clearly wrong: a 
simple glance at the Internal Revenue Code shows that it is rife with 
special interest provisions, often (as with oil and gas tax preferences) 
betraying a regional bias. Yet the relative merits of localized and na-
tional decisionmaking are not decisive when the question presented is 
to what extent we should have "one of the most undesirable outcomes 
in a federal system - dual state and federal regulation of the same 
subject matter,"296 leading at a minimum to higher costs of tax com-
296. Kitch, supra note 4, at 47. 
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pliance and administration. 
6. Promoting Experimentation by Governments in the Tax Area 
A final argument for broad state and local autonomy in the tax 
area is that it facilitates governmental experimentation. When there 
are more separate units controlling their own tax systems, not only 
can a greater number of different ideas be tried, but each experiment 
involves less aggregate social risk than if it were attempted nationwide. 
Therefore, a decentralized federal system ostensibly promotes a pace 
of intellectual progress in matters of tax policy that would not other-
wise be possible. 291 
This argument is powerful to the extent that tax politics is an or-
derly, rational process in which the principal (or a major) impediment 
to developing good law is simply the lack of hard empirical knowl-
edge. Under the skeptical view of tax politics that I and many others 
have taken, however,298 the case for promoting experimentation loses 
most of its force. Given the inherent difficulty of establishing causal 
relationships between provisions that are enacted and subsequent so-
cial effects, "experiments" often have surprisingly little evidentiary 
value.299 Moreover, what value there is tends not to be examined very 
cogently. Consider the national-level experiment of the early 1980s 
with greatly expanded tax incentives to promote saving and invest-
ment, which was followed by a sharp decline in national saving and 
investment (although arguably for unrelated reasons), but which has 
failed to dismay or even compel much explanation from those who 
advocate restoring these incentives.300 Given both interest group poli-
tics and politicians' incentives to seek salient and dramatic legislation 
as an end in itself, 301 the experiments simply are not being conducted 
by a reliable set of "scientists." Even the lessons that are learned may 
be the wrong ones, such as what types of provisions are effective in 
297. Cf. McConnell, supra note 7, at 1498 (arguing that federalism gives state and local 
governments greater opportunity to experiment with different policies and pursue innovations). 
298. See, e.g .. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: 
THE PoLmCAL LEGACY OF LoRD KEYNES 129-34 (1977); HANSEN, supra note 247; 
SCHATI'SCHNEIDER, supra note 243; WITI'E, supra note 274; Shaviro, supra note 38; Surrey, 
supra note 288. 
299. Cf. Daniel N. Shaviro, Exchange on Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 834 (1990) 
(arguing that the political market contains the same types of misinformation and transaction 
costs as are found in the private market). 
300. While the tax incentives of the early 1980s have not, for the most part, been restored as 
yet, this may be due more to budgetary considerations than to the evidence suggesting that the 
incentives were ineffective. See Shaviro, supra note 38, at 52-53. 
301. See id. at 8-9. 
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disadvantaging outside businesses or creating perceived tax 
exportation. 
The rhetorically appealing metaphor of a national "laboratory" 
where state and local governments conduct valuable experiments that, 
when successful, can be emulated elsewhere, surely is not entirely 
without foundation. Yet as one surveys the area that this metaphor 
describes - for example, the 7000 separate sales tax jurisdictions and 
the forty-odd state personal and business income taxes, each with its 
own array of provisions - and reflects on the real but often invisible 
consequences, both substantive and administrative, of so much diver-
sity, it is hard to remain confident that the "laboratory" is yielding an 
acceptable ratio of benefit to cost. The case for moving at least some 
distance in the direction of nationally imposed uniformity remains 
compelling. 
* * * 
In summary, while state and local governments serve a number of 
important purposes, the case for preserving their discretion in deciding 
what to tax (as opposed to how much to tax) seems weak. Even if 
problems such as administrative complexity and breakdowns in inter-
state cooperation are no more serious in the tax area than elsewhere, 
the offsetting benefits of localized control seem inadequate. This 
seems particularly true for relatively narrow and esoteric tax issues, 
such as the design details for a particular tax base. 
In principle, one might even want to establish a uniform tax base 
that all state and local jurisdictions were required to use when levying 
taxes, and allow them discretion only regarding the rate. Yet such a 
course would not only be politically implausible and constitutionally 
suspect - even Congress' modem Commerce Clause powers may not 
reach that far302 - but would have significant disadvantages. Reli-
ance on a single uniform tax base would tend to make state and local 
tax revenues overly subject to fluctuation. Using a variety of bases 
serves as a kind of insurance, reducing the likely revenue effects of any 
particular kind of economic change; moreover, it permits marginal 
rates to be lower across the spectrum, thus reducing the distortive ef-
fects of any one base. The following Part incorporates this constraint, 
along with the stronger arguments for preserving state and local au-
tonomy, into the development of specific recommendations for chang-
ing the current practice of federalism in taxation. 
302. Depriving the states of all authority over taxation, other than concerning the rate ap-
plied to a single uniform base, might be too far removed from the Framers' expectations regard-
ing state-federal relations to survive constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 32, 
33 (Alexander Hamilton). 
March 1992] Federalism in Taxation 975 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
So far, this article has reached the following main conclusions: 
(1) A principle opposing tariffs within the United States' borders 
seems not only substantively correct but politically, historically, and 
constitutionally uncontroversial. The best argument for this principle 
is that tariffs impair locational neutrality. Tariffs are not unique in 
this regard, however, and locational neutrality almost inevitably suf-
fers if state and local governments have authority over taxation. 
(2) Since complete locational neutrality is unattainable in a federal 
system (and not even unambiguously desirable given'considerations of 
fiscal federalism), some narrower principle must be used by courts that 
are charged with determining which state and local taxes are imper-
missible. In this context, the case for a principle barring discrimina-
tion against outsiders and interstate commerce is plausible, although 
not overwhelming. While such a principle may not reach all of the 
cases in which one would like to intervene, it serves a valuable func-
tion to the extent that it facilitates line-drawing and filters out the very 
worst state and local taxes. Yet in these respects the antidiscrimina-
tion principle has worked extremely poorly in practice, due to its theo-
retical limitations and the courts' implicit balancing of it against the 
positive value ascribed to state and local government autonomy. 
(3) Neither at the national level nor at the state and local level are 
ordinary political processes likely to keep the harm to locational neu-
trality within acceptable bounds. Arguments that the state and local 
political process serves important purposes, outweighing the harm 
done to locational neutrality, are fairly persuasive with regard to levels 
of taxation but not with regard to tax base design, particularly in light 
of the resulting administrative costs and the incentives for actual or 
perceived tax exportation. Therefore, we may want to limit state and 
local governments' discretion to specify tax bases, while permitting 
them to set the tax rates that apply to acceptable bases. 
These conclusions have strong positive implications for both Con-
gress and the federal courts. At least some congressional action seems 
desirable because it can take the form of coherent rules, based on con-
textual policy considerations, that no one need pretend the Constitu-
tion mandates. Even if judges are intellectually capable of prescribing 
better rules than legislators - despite the handicaps of addressing 
only the cases that arise, and hearing principally from adversaries with 
narrow litigating interests - they may conclude with some justifica-
tion that their role does not extend to specifying precise rules that may 
look arbitrary and political. Moreover, while there is little reason to 
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expect congressional intervention in specific disputes as they arise, it is 
less implausible that Congress will enact general rules to govern future 
disputes that are as yet unknown. I therefore consider what Congress 
should do before turning to the federal courts. 
An important countervailing consideration, however, is the possi-
ble danger of involving Congress on an ongoing basis in specifying 
state and local tax bases. Regular involvement might activate the in-
centive for Congress to respond to interest group pressures by repeat-
edly giving away potential revenue at the state and local level, 
unconstrained by the budgetary concerns that may arise when it con-
siders the effect of tax rules on its own budget at the national level. 
Accordingly, even when Congress can specify detailed rules that 
would improve state and local taxation, it should exercise caution un-
less it can explain such rules as one-time legislation predicated on cre-
ating uniformity for its own sake. 303 
A. Congress 
The steps that Congress ought to consider taking can be arrayed in 
three groups. I will discuss each, in order of increasing ambitiousness, 
and then consider whether any exceed the constitutional limits to Con-
gress' power over the states. 
1. Addressing Coordination Problems Between Comparable State 
and Local Tax Bases 
Perhaps the least controversial proposal is to require the states to 
use uniform apportionment rules in dividing among themselves tax ba-
ses of potentially national scope, such as income or sales. In particu-
lar, a uniform apportionment rule should be prescribed for the area 
that is most problematic: business income taxes. Given that no ap-
portionment rule is truly correct, since income often has no specific 
location, the exact content of the rule is unimportant so far as the tax 
merits are concerned. One particular rule, however - a three-factor 
formula based on profits, payroll, and sales that counts all three fac-
tors equally to connote simplicity and objectivity - might be the most 
consistent with both current practice and the message that Congress is 
303. The preferred model for congressional action would be that of policy entrepreneurship, 
overcoming political inertia by selling an attractive and simple idea to the general public, or at 
least the Washington political community, over the heads of the most narrowly interested par· 
ties. Similar dynamics have led in the past to federal income tax reform, deregulation of such 
industries as trucking and the airlines, and regulatory legislation addressing air and water pollu-
tion, automobile safety, consumer product safety, and racial discrimination. See Shaviro, supra 
note 38, at 94. Legislation too detailed and political in appearance to fit this model may be 
undesirable because it would invite continual tinkering by Congress. 
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simply providing a fair and uniform rule, not making a nuanced polit-
ical or policy judgment. Whatever rule Congress chooses should ap-
ply not only to corporate income taxes, but also to the income of 
business entities such as partnerships that are included in the taxable 
income of individuals. 304 
Such a rule would not end all controversy over the location of tax-
able income. Recall, for example, issues such as where baseball teams 
or phone companies have their profits, payrolls, and sales. A host of 
industry-specific rules might be warranted, and on these one might 
expect lobbying and political disagreement. To limit the ongoing 
political input, Congress could direct that industry-specific elabora-
tions of the general rule be developed administratively, as by the 
Treasury Department, pursuant to the general directive that in all 
cases one hundred percent of a taxpayer's U.S. income, neither more 
nor less, should be apportioned to all the states together. 
For personal income taxes, questions of business entity income 
aside, the allocation problems tend to be less serious in practice. 
When one works and resides in a single state, only that state can im-
pose an income tax under the judicial requirement of nexus. While 
disparate multiple taxation may arise when a taxpayer resides in one 
state and works in another, the states generally, although not univer-
sally, coordinate their exercise of taxing powers under the Multistate 
Tax Compact, particularly by providing credits to residents for liabil-
ity incurred elsewhere. 305 The existing degree of interstate coopera-
tion here - presumably founded on residents' capacity to perceive the 
double taxation and complain effectively about it - reduces the need 
for a national-level solution, but one might still want to require that 
the Compact be followed in all cases. 
For sales and use taxes, the relatively high level of interstate coop-
eration once again ameliorates coordination problems. Congressional 
action could again take the form of requiring adherence to the Multi-
state Tax Compact, thus making universal the "destination" rule for 
place of sale and the requirement that states provide tax credits for 
sales or use taxes previously paid to other states. 306 Congress also 
could require greater uniformity between a state's sale and use taxes so 
that out-of-state sales could not be disfavored. 307 Perhaps more im-
304. A statutory answer to many income allocation issues already exists at the state level, in 
the form of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITP A), currently sub-
scribed to by 25 states and the District of Columbia. See HELLERSrEIN & HELLERSrEIN, supra 
note 1, at 500-05. 
305. See id. at 968-69. 
306. See id. at 781-82. 
307. See id. at 783. 
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portantly, to eliminate what is in effect a tax preference favoring out-
of-state purchases, Congress could overturn National Bellas Hess and 
require all out-of-state vendors to collect use taxes and remit them to 
the taxing jurisdictions. 308 
A further coordination problem that is worth addressing arises 
under sales taxes other than those on final retail sales of property -
for example, taxes on the sale of services that are used to produce 
property for sale, or on transfers during the production and marketing 
process. Here, multiple taxation occurs unless the sales taxes imposed 
at earlier stages are credited against those imposed later.309 The gen-
eral requirement that retail vendors collect sales and use taxes from 
purchasers (the National Bellas Hess exception aside) should make a 
mandatory crediting process feasible. 
Property taxes present a similar danger of penalizing multijurisdic-
tional presence under at least two scenarios: when they apply to intan-
gible property in one state that is valuable due to the rights it conveys 
in tangible property in other states, and when jurisdiction over the 
same property is asserted by one state based on the taxpayer's resi-
dence or domicile and by another state based on the property's loca-
tion. Once again, mandatory tax credits would be appropriate,3•0 
particularly now that the Supreme Court has cast doubt on its willing-
ness to intervene.311 
A final proposal concerns the excise or severance taxes that states 
such as Alaska, Montana, and Wyoming use in an apparent effort to 
export tax burdens to out-of-state consumers. Such taxes could be 
308. This has frequently been proposed. See id. at 825. The most prominent proposals ex-
empt vendors with sales (overall or within the trucing state) below certain threshold amounts. 
This creates a tax preference for small business and may inefficiently discourage businesses from 
crossing the thresholds, but arguably is justified on the ground that small vendors' per-sale com-
pliance costs would be disproportionately or even prohibitively high. Commentators mostly 
agree that Congress has the power to reverse National Bellas Hess. See, e.g., Jerome R. Heller-
stein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Developments During the Past Half Century, 39 V AND. L. 
REV. 961, 982-92 (1986). 
309. See, e.g., Mundstock, supra note 69. 
310. Following practice in the personal income tax area, and in keeping with what seems to 
be the dominant thrust of Professor Schoettle's analysis of tax discrimination, the jurisdiction 
that should be required to allow a credit for the other jurisdiction's taxes probably should be the 
one where the taxpayer resides or has its domicile. 
311. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2049 (1991), where 
an equally divided Court declined to strike down Florida's intangible property tax that applied 
both to in-state domiciliaries and to items with an in-state business situs, despite the tax's evident 
inconsistency with the recently promulgated "internal consistency" requirement. Even if the 
Supreme Court were clearly willing to act, mandatory crediting would be preferable to its exer-
cise of authority. Since internal consistency is satisfied where liability rests either on domicile or 
on business situs, so long as it does not rest on both, problems would arise where states differed in 
which of the two they employed. Thus, interstate commerce might remain disfavored in prac-
tice, subject to the Supreme Court's cumbersome searching for bias in particular cases. 
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constrained, for example, by the requirement that their rates not ex-
ceed the taxing jurisdiction's generally applicable sales tax rates, ex-
cept to the extent demonstrably justified as user fees that recover 
direct costs to the taxing state specifically resulting from the extraction 
activity, such as the construction of special roads for mining, or ex-
penditures to repair environmental harm. Similar rules could apply to 
other clear-cut instances of attempted tax exportation, such as hotel 
taxes. 
2. Requiring That Particular Tax Bases, if Used, Take Prescribed 
Forms 
a. State and local income taxes. A more ambitious set of proposals 
- plainly desirable under the analysis in this article, but politically 
less likely - would involve prescribing the content of entire tax bases. 
States that levy income taxes could be required to use the federal in-
come tax base, possibly with a small number of specified allowable 
variations.312 This would not only reduce opportunities for discrimi-
nation against outsiders or interstate commerce, but would signifi-
cantly reduce compliance costs (especially for taxpayers that are 
subject to income tax in a large number of jurisdictions). The proposal 
would generalize a rule of conformity to the federal income tax that 
many states already follow, at least in part.313 Even to the extent that 
the proposal would limit states' discretion, there seems little to regret, 
for example, in ending California's use of its own depreciation system, 
or the differences in carryover periods for capital losses and net oper-
ating losses. 
One possible objection to the proposal is that it would complicate 
state and local governments' fiscal planning. Changes to the federal 
income tax base would affect state and local tax revenues, and while 
this merely calls for rate adjustments (assuming a goal of keeping ex-
pected revenues constant), in some cases state and local governments 
might be unable to respond in timely fashion. The Federal Tax Re-
312. Alternatively, conformity could be required solely for corporate income taxes, since 
corporations are far more likely to have multijurisdictional presence. A further possible varia-
tion would be to condition the federal deductibility of personal state and local income taxes on 
conformity to the federal base, thus merely encouraging rather than requiring conformity. 
313. As an alternative to federal conformity, Charles McLure has suggested barring states 
from taxing corporate income, while instead allowing them to tax corporate or all business in-
state sales and payrolls. He argued that this would not change the real economic incidence of 
state corporate income taxes, would make such incidence more widely understood (since many 
people erroneously regard such taxes as borne by shareholders), and would greatly simplify tax 
administration. McLure, supra note 24, at 341-42. While this proposal may be meritorious, I 
ignore it here because of its potentially distracting (even if misleading) appearance of reducing 
progressivity. 
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form Act of 1986, for example, which had dramatic revenue effects on 
states that voluntarily conform to the federal base,314 applied to the 
1986 taxable year yet was not officially enacted until late October of 
that year, by which time many state legislatures were no longer in 
session. This problem has a simple solution, however. Either in gen-
eral or under specified circumstances, states could be required or al-
lowed to provide for a one-year lag in their conformity to the federal 
income tax base. Given the recent rapidity of federal income tax revi-
sion, 315 the federal and state income tax bases might only rarely be 
identical under this proposal, but at least the number of income tax 
bases to which any taxpayer was subject would be capped at two.316 
Among its other appljcations, a requirement of general income tax 
conformity would bar states from engaging in worldwide unitary taxa-
tion, since that method is not employed for federal income tax pur-
poses. At present, political support for this particular application of 
the conformity principle appears to be stronger than support for in-
come tax conformity in general. Legislation has been introduced in 
both houses of Congress under which the states would be barred from 
engaging in worldwide unitary taxation.317 
Even without the enactment of a general income tax conformity 
statute, the proposed legislation barring states from engaging in world-
wide unitary taxation appears desirable, given the compliance burdens 
that such taxation involves and the benefits of nationwide uniformity. 
The proposed legislation is troubling in only one respect: as a possible 
precedent for piecemeal intervention by Congress in the state and local 
tax area. Conceivably, in the next case piecemeal intervention could 
take the form of shrinking state and local tax bases in response to 
lobbying pressure without regard to the principle of conformity be-
tween income tax systems.318 While lobbying pressures to shrink the 
314. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 937. 
315. See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987). 
316. Requiring conformity to the federal income tax base, with or without a one-year lag, 
would fail to prevent the states from diverging in their practices of administrative enforcement or 
in their judicial interpretations of the federal income tax statute (although the latter would be 
subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court, given the assumed federal statute requiring con-
formity). Yet substantial or predominant conformity clearly seems attainable. 
317. On recent legislative consideration of the issue, see HELLERSTEJN & HELLERSTEIN, 
supra note 1, at 608-09. 
318. Prior isolated interventions by Congress in the state and local tax area have not led to 
this sort of degradation of the process, however. An example of such intervention is the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1988)) (barring state and local taxation of railroad property at a 
higher rate than that generally applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same 
jurisdiction). 
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tax base may come to bear whenever Congress legislates about taxes, 
at least for provisions that apply to both federal and state or local 
taxes there is a countervailing cost: reducing federal tax revenues 
leaves Congress with less money to spend unless it incurs the political 
cost of raising someone else's taxes (assuming some constraint on defi-
cit spending). 
If the dangers of undesirable piecemeal intervention by Congress in 
state and local taxation do not appear too great, several other specific 
proposals for increasing income tax uniformity might be worth consid-
ering, assuming that Congress declines to take the better course of re-
quiring income tax conformity in general. The steps that could be 
taken - or urged of state legislatures, if congressional action is 
thought too risky - to reduce the compliance burdens resulting from 
diversity, include the following: 
• Require the allowance of S corporation elections for state and 
local income tax purposes whenever they are allowed for federal in-
come tax purposes. 
• Eliminate state-level alternative minimum taxes. By its nature, 
an alternative minimum tax is a separate tax system, applied in paral-
lel to the regular tax system, and thus in many instances doubles tax-
payers' recordkeeping and computational burdens. For example, 
depreciable assets generally have separate bases for regular tax and 
alternative minimum tax purposes, given the use of separate deprecia-
tion systems. Whatever the merits of the federal alternative minimum 
tax,319 imposing such burdens in numerous state jurisdictions clearly is 
undesirable. States that wished to parallel the reduction in the value 
of tax preferences that the federal income tax system accomplishes 
through the alternative minimum tax could rely instead, at a lower 
compliance cost to taxpayers, on a rule adding back to regular taxable 
income (subject to apportionment among the states) a percentage of 
the difference between federal regular and alternative minimum taxa-
ble income. 
• For similar reasons, bar states from applying their own deprecia-
tion systems. States could be permitted to require that a portion of 
federally allowable depreciation deductions be first added back to tax-
able income and then treated as a separate tax account to be deducted 
over a longer period. This would simplify recordkeeping, in compari-
son to the use of a separate depreciation system, by eliminating the 
319. See Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum 
Tax, 66 TAXES 91 (1988). 
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need for taxpayers to keep track of more than one tax basis for each 
separate asset. 
• Require the states to adopt the federal income tax carryover pe-
riods for tax attributes such as capital losses and net operating losses. 
• Require states to grant income tax filing extensions automati-
cally when extensions are allowed for federal income tax purposes. 
• Require all states to apply a uniform deadline for reporting ad-
justments to one's federal income tax return. 
b. Other state and local taxes. Arguments also could be made for 
standardizing tax bases other than the income tax. The problem is 
that Congress may be less trustworthy when it is specifying tax bases 
that. are not being used by the national government. Thus, barring the 
enactment, say, of a national sales or value-added tax, greater uni-
formity may best be pursued at the state and local levels - despite its 
being impeded there by the forces favoring the separate exercise of 
discretion, either to serve particular political objectives or as an end in 
itself. 
As to the sales tax, however, requiring or encouraging greater uni-
formity within the states might be useful. Arguably, 7000 separate 
sales tax jurisdictions simply is too many. The excess would be partic-
ularly objectionable if out-of-state vendors were required to collect use 
taxes under a congressional or judicial reversal of National Bellas 
Hess. Thus, either in general or as a precondition to compelling out-
of-state vendors to remit use taxes, states could be required to cap the 
number of their separate sales tax jurisdictions. For example, a cap of 
ten such jurisdictions per state - applied uniformly to all states or on 
average, with variations in proportion to state population - would 
reduce more than tenfold the current number of jurisdictions.320 In 
this connection, it is worth noting that at present twenty states have 
only one sales tax jurisdiction, and another six have fewer than twenty 
separate jurisdictions. 321 
Other steps also could be taken to reduce administrative and com-
pliance burdens, whether or not it is desirable to have Congress enter 
the field by taking action to require them. In particular, property 
taxes would be less burdensome - as well as less subject to discrimi-
natory application - if, instead of being based in many instances on 
subjective assessments of value, they followed simply from numerical 
320. Restricting the number of sales tax jurisdictions would require states to revise their 
methods for dividing revenue among local governments, but this is not necessarily regrettable. 
Given the arguments for locational neutrality made in this article, I see no reason to believe that 
the current regime ranks high in terms of either equity or efficiency. 
321. See Advisory Commission, supra note 104. 
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calculations such as historical cost plus a reasonable annual growth 
factor.322 Similarly, excise and severance taxes would be less burden-
some if they always were volumetric, instead of sometimes employing 
the netback method based ultimately on contract price. Admittedly, 
for both of these types of taxes state and local reliance on value or 
contract price has an advantage: it causes tax liability to vary auto-
matically with what might loosely be deemed the taxpayer's ability to 
pay, whereas the historical cost-based and volumetric methods would 
require legislative action to adjust for shifts in value. Arguably, how-
ever, legislatures that regard this advantage as more significant than 
the increased burdensomeness of value-based taxes, even if they duly 
consider questions of administrative cost to the state government, are 
failing to give sufficient weight to the compliance costs taxpayers in-
cur, as well as the danger of discriminatory application in the audit 
process. 323 
3. Limiting State and Local Tax Discretion in Choosing the 
Relative Tax Rates Applicable to Different Tax Bases 
Even if the states retained the power only to decide what tax rates 
to apply to federally constrained or prescribed tax bases, locational 
distortion would persist. By moving in the direction of tax base uni-
formity, one would hope merely to reduce such distortion, while stop-
ping short of the point where the costs of uniformity due to reduced 
state and local autonomy begin to outweigh its benefits. One could 
322. The Supreme Court briefly accepted for review a case (subsequently settled) that con-
cerned a property tax valuation formula based on historical cost. R.H. Macy & Co. v. Contra 
Costa County, 276 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2256, cert. dismissed, 111 S. 
Ct. 2923 (1991). The case concerned the so-called "Welcome, Stranger'' rule under California's 
property tax, whereby a property's valuation cannot increase by more than two percent per year 
while it is under the same ownership, but properties are reassessed at the purchase price upon 
sale to a third party. The problem was the unrealistically low annual inflation factor. The peti-
tioner asserted that this rule violated the Equal Protection Clause and discriminated against 
interstate commerce (by requiring new entrants from out-of-state to pay higher property taxes 
than their established in-state competitors). It then dropped the suit in the face of a threatened 
consumer boycott. One problem with the petitioner's argument, even assuming the tax was 
aimed sufficiently at out-of-staters, not just all purchasers, was that the tax could be described 
neutrally as a combination property tax and sales tax, with the latter being levied in the form of a 
stream of increased property tax payments. Thus, however unwise or inefficient the tax, it is 
difficult to see a constitutional violation. Cf. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 
488 U.S. 336 (1989) (striking down a local "Welcome, Stranger" enforcement policy where it 
caused eight- to thirty-five-fold disparities in the tax valuations of properties that were worth the 
same amount). 
323. Under ideal conditions, legislatures would take into account taxpayers' compliance 
costs, because these could be converted dollar for dollar into higher tax liability without prompt-
ing additional exit. One reason this tradeoff does not always occur may be that the tradeoff 
might not be possible without either overtly discriminating against interstate commerce or rais-
ing in-state voters' taxes along with those paid by outsiders. 
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argue, however, that the proposals I have advanced so far do not go 
far enough in the direction of limiting discretion. 
In particular, if states retain total discretion regarding which of the 
allowable tax bases they use and what rates to apply to these bases, not 
only would great variation continue to exist, but some problems of 
discrimination would be replicated. Consider, for example, Iowa, 
which, being primarily a market rather than a business state, employs 
a corporate income tax allocation formula based solely on in-state 
sales rather than on the standard three factors. Even if that opportu-
nity were eliminated by the imposition of uniform rules governing 
both allocation and measurement of corporate income, Iowa arguably 
could still accomplish a measure of perceived or actual tax exportation 
simply by continuing to rely heavily on the corporate income tax, 
rather than, say, on property, sales, and personal income taxes that are 
paid to a greater extent by in-staters. 
If state corporate income taxes present the principal remaining tax 
exportation problem, because out-of-state companies are the most nat-
ural deep-pocket targets, a simple solution would be to constrain the 
rates of such taxes, either absolutely or in relation to the rates of other 
taxes levied by the same jurisdiction. In favor of such a limitation, one 
could argue, as Charles McLure does, that state corporate income 
taxes are unusually unmeritorious. In addition to imposing large com-
pliance burdens, they are perhaps the greatest existing state-level tool 
of fiscal illusion, largely failing not only to shift costs out-of-state but 
even to allocate real tax burdens progressively (presumably one of 
their principal aims).324 The main problem with such a proposal is 
simply that, given the widespread belief that corporate income taxes 
are progressive in incidence, a proposal to limit them at the state level 
might create political confusion between the issue of federalism in tax-
ation and the separate issue of tax progressivity. 
If state corporate income taxes are merely one example of a serious 
broader problem, or if the problem is best stated in broader terms to 
avoid political confusion between the issues of federalism and progres-
sivity, it might be thought desirable to constrain state discretion more 
broadly by prescribing outer bounds to the disparities between the tax 
rates applied to different tax bases. For example, among a set of tax 
bases, such as personal income, corporate income, sales, and property, 
states could be barred from taxing any one base at a rate more than 
324. McLure argues that the real economic incidence of state corporate income taxes resem-
bles that of two tax bases that generally are agreed to be regressive: payroll and sales. McLure, 
supra note 24, at 341-42. 
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three times as high, or five percentage points higher, than the rate ap-
plied to any other of the bases. 
Yet such a proposal, while not affirmatively objectionable under 
the analysis in this article, does not appear necessary. Consider what 
are probably the three most critical locational distortion problems 
posed by federalism in taxation: administrative and compliance costs, 
discrimination against outside business, and perceived or actual tax 
exportation. The first of these is not addressed by constraining tax 
rate variations. As for the second, so long as all businesses within the 
taxing state's market pay tax at the same rate, insiders are not ad-
vantaged relative to outsiders. Thus, a state that applies extremely 
uneven rates to different types of taxes does not create competitive 
distortions like those resulting, for example, from Iowa's income allo-
cation rule, which favors wholly in-state firms by increasing the rela-
tive taxes paid by outsiders. Finally, tax exportation, while perhaps 
not negligible, is ameliorated by limiting discretion over tax bases even 
if we do not limit discretion over tax rates. A state that charges a high 
rate on a broad-based levy such as a corporate income tax cannot 
avoid directly taxing some in-staters as well as outsiders. This may 
provide some political protection for outsiders. 
In addition to being relatively unnecessary, constraining tax rate 
variations plainly would move closer to the point where the costs of 
increased uniformity begin to exceed the benefits. As discussed previ-
ously, the more visible and salient an issue, the more plausible it is that 
local control enhances real voter satisfaction, even if that satisfaction 
is based on illusions about a tax's effect or incidence. Issues of what 
type of tax to use - for example, whether to rely on income taxes or 
sales taxes for revenue - tend to be more visible and salient than the 
details of particular tax bases - for example, the system for income 
tax depreciation. 325 Requiring uniformity only for the latter type of 
issue, and thus not limiting state and local voter sovereignty on issues 
large numbers of voters may actually care about, helps to eliminate 
any serious doubt that more is being gained than lost by moving in the 
direction of national uniformity. 
4. Relevance of Constitutional Limitations to Congress' Power 
over the States 
The proposals discussed in this section might, in varying degrees, 
reduce the autonomy of state and local governments in taxation below 
what has been practiced for the past two centuries and what the Fram-
325. See supra section 111.C.3. 
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ers expected and assumed. 326 This naturally raises the constitutional 
question of whether Congress is empowered to impose such significant 
limitations on the states. The central issue is whether Congress' power 
to restrict state and local taxation, arising under the Commerce flnd 
Supremacy Clauses, is in any relevant respect limited. 
The answer here initially appears quite clear. Numerous Supreme 
Court cases interpreting the Commerce Clause, including a handful 
that specifically concern congressional restrictions on state and local 
taxation, establish that Congress' power to restrict state and local tax-
ation of interstate commerce is "plenary and all-pervasive, and un-
restricted by competing State interests."327 The only question, 
therefore, is whether a particular. restriction impermissibly reaches 
purely intrastate activity that is not within the reach of the power over 
interstate commerce. 
Given this question, one might still argue, for example, that, de-
spite the breadth of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, a rule requir-
ing conformity between state and federal income taxes is 
unconstitutional as applied to taxpayers not engaged in interstate com-
merce. In practice, however, the intrastate limitation appears to have 
little or no significance. Not only is the currently prevailing definition 
of what constitutes interstate commerce extremely broad,328 but taxing 
purely intrastate taxpayers or activities differently from those subject 
to the congressional power would raise discrimination issues and thus 
support requiring uniformity between the two. In other areas, Con-
gress' power to regulate purely intrastate activities due to their indirect 
effects on interstate commerce has long been settled. 329 
One potential complication should be noted, however. Given the 
longstanding assumption that in our federal system state and local 
governments will remain active and important within their sphere, an 
overly sweeping set of federal restrictions might make the Supreme 
Court sufficiently uneasy to invite the creation of new constitutional 
326. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). 
327. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 329. Cf. HARTMAN, supra note 111, 
§ 13:7, at 703 ("[T]he power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce seems so complete and 
paramount in character that Congress may supersede state action even in areas which admittedly 
are local or intrastate."); Paul F. Mickey & George B. Mickum, Ill, Congressional Regulation of 
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 38 N.C. L. REv. 119, 122 (1960) (noting Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation in interstate commerce). 
328. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause 
power supports federal regulation of wheat grown and consumed on the farm of the grower). 
329. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding 
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate rates of interstate railways); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause to set minimum wages and maximum hours for employees engaged in the production of 
goods for interstate commerce). 
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principles limiting Congress' preemptive power. In this regard, the 
short-lived reign of National League of Cities v. Usery, 330 decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1976 and overruled in 1985,331 is instructive. In 
National League of Cities, the Supreme Court struck down Congress' 
extension to state employees of minimum wage and maximum hour 
requirements under the Fair Labor Standard Act. In a plurality opin-
ion, Justice Rehnquist, straining desperately to make something of the 
rather vague and exhortatory Tenth Amendment, 332 claimed that it 
" 'expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not 
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their 
ability to function effectively in a federal system.' "333 
As a matter of textual interpretation, Chief Justice Rehnquist's ac-
count of what the Amendment "expressly declares" is extremely weak. 
The Amendment, in its own words, applies only to "powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution" - to wit, powers other 
than the Commerce Clause power at issue in the case. As the expres-
sion of a historically rooted constitutional instinct, however, the Chief 
Justice's position arguably has more force. Surely one might pause 
before concluding that, simply because the Commerce Clause power 
has been interpreted as virtually universal, Congress has the power to 
eliminate essentially all state and local government authority. The 
question, then, is where and on what constitutional ground to draw 
the line, assuming that such a line should be drawn judicially rather 
than by the political process. 
In this regard, National League of Cities provided little but what 
one commentator has termed "a variety of inexact and overstated ex-
pressions,"334 principally relying on the notion that Congress may not 
interfere with states' "integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions"335 which are not easily defined. In large part, it 
was the unworkability of this standard that led to National League of 
Cities' reversal in 1985, and to the Supreme Court's conclusion that 
the states must instead look to the national political process for 
protection. 336 
330. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
331. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
332. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
333. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 843 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 
547 n.7 (1975)). Justice Blackmun, concurring and providing the crucial fifth vote for the hold-
ing, appeared to suggest balancing federal and state interests case by case. See 426 U.S. at 856. 
334. HARTMAN, supra note 111, § 13:2, at 679. 
335. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. 
336. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47, 556. 
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Yet National League of Cities may not be irreversibly repudiated. 
Among current members of the Supreme Court, Justices Rehnquist 
and O'Connor are explicitly committed to the revival of National 
League of Cities. 337 Since the case seems generally to appeal more to 
conservatives (perhaps because they are more hostile to economically 
activist national legislation), it is conceivable that Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, and Thomas would consider voting to revive it, particu-
larly if Congress acts so aggressively as to reduce their confidence in 
the political check. 338 As a practical matter, then, there may be 
outside limits, perhaps more aesthetic than logical, on how far Con-
gress can go in the state and local tax area. Still, the proposals that I 
endorse, which are limited to addressing coordination problems be-
tween states' tax systems and conforming tax bases to reduce burdens 
on interstate commerce, should be well within any such limits. 
B. The Federal Courts 
If Congress took sufficient steps to regulate state and local taxa-
tion, the main federal judicial role would change from one of interpret-
ing the Constitution against a background of congressional silence to 
one of interpreting federal laws. Thus, even if the courts remained 
active in reviewing state and local taxes, their views concerning the 
negative Commerce Clause would lose significance, given the statutory 
grounds on which discriminatory taxes presumably would be subject 
to challenge in most cases. Absent substantial congressional action, 
however, the choice of judicial standard under the negative Commerce 
Clause is consequential. I have already suggested that current nega-
tive Commerce Clause doctrine is seriously deficient, in large part due . 
to the Supreme Court's effort to balance concern about discrimination 
against the value attributed to state and local government autonomy. 
Moreover, I have suggested that such doctrine should single-mindedly 
focus on harm to outsiders and interstate commerce, instead of at-
tempting to balance it against the value of state and local government 
autonomy. The principal remaining question is how to conceptualize 
this change - that is, what the revised judicial standard should look 
like. 
Unfortunately, no one concise test can capture what the courts 
should do. The problems that may arise - ranging from hostility to 
outside business competition to attempted tax exportation to correcta-
337. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
338. for Justice Scalia, however, the lack of textual support from the Tenth Amendment and 
the difficulty of drawing a simple line between permissible and impermissible national legislation 
might militate against reviving National League of Cities. 
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ble but unmalicious disregard for the creation of undue compliance 
costs - are simply too various. Moreover, the courts' institutional 
competence to detect these problems and design workable solutions 
varies significantly with the context. I therefore suggest that the 
courts invalidate state and local taxes under the negative Commerce 
Clause when these taxes violate any of the following tests: 
(1) Comparative marginal cost test. As discussed previously, this 
test has certain shortcomings. 339 Its distinction between fixed and va-
riable costs may be unclear in practice, and perhaps is even more un-
clear in theory. In the long run, all tax costs are variable and tend to 
influence the structure of interstate markets. Nonetheless, the test is 
useful, given that not all locational disparities can be struck down con-
sistently with retaining a federal system, because it identifies a class of 
undesirable tax disparities that state and local political processes may 
tend systematically to produce. As noted earlier, outsiders are rela-
tively likely to be disfavored by state and local political processes, even 
where they have potential in-state allies such as consumers.340 More-
over, Schoettle's distinction between fixed and variable costs is roughly 
compatible with the insight that basic locational decisions, such as 
where to reside or locate one's business, tend to be less elastic than 
decisions to enter a jurisdiction for limited purposes such as the sale of 
goods, 341 making the latter - the realm of his variable costs - more 
subject to inefficient distortion. The comparative marginal cost test 
therefore is a major advance over current legal doctrine, giving more 
coherent and concrete economic content to the murky concept of dis-
crimination against interstate commerce. 
(2) The Supreme Court's internal consistency test. Under this test, 
a state or local tax is struck down if its adoption by all jurisdictions 
would lead to relative overtaxation of interstate commerce. The value 
of this test lies in its requiring states to make reasonable efforts at equi-
table tax base apportionment when more than one state has a potential 
claim. 342 Concededly, merely requiring some reasonable effort at ap-
portionment is inferior in principle to mandating consistent apportion-
ment rules that all states will follow. For the courts, however, the 
internal consistency test's simplicity of application is in some situa-
tions a decisive advantage. It can eliminate the need for a court either 
339. See supra section 11.C.1. 
340. See supra section II.A. 
341. See supra section 11.C.1. 
342. The internal consistency test does not always succeed in requiring a reasonable effort at 
apportionment, as Moorman Mfg. Corp. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), makes clear. Iowa's sales-
only apportionment rule was consistent with internal consistency. 
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to act like a legislature by mandating specific apportionment rules or 
to engage in a detailed examination of how different states' apportion-
ment rules interact. 
(3) Require adherence to "rules of the road," or apportionment rules 
that have attracted widespread consensus among the states. The judi-
cial agnosticism or timidity about prescribing particular allocation 
rules that underlies the internal consistency test need not always be 
decisive. When particular allocation rules have attracted widespread 
consensus among the states, the courts can go beyond internal consis-
tency and require that holdout states accept those rules, in effect as 
"rules of the road."343 Possible applications include requiring (1) ad-
herence to consensus rules regarding which state must be the one to 
provide a tax credit when states' tax bases overlap, 344 and (2) the use 
of a three-factor allocation formula for multistate business income -
perhaps (depending on one's tolerance for specific judicial prescrip-
tion) even adding specificity to the rule of the road by requiring that 
the three factors be weighted equally. 
This test, along with the internal consistency test, could be genera-
lized as an application of a broader principle that states must make 
some good faith effort at tax base apportionment for multistate activi-
ties. A test more generally requiring good faith efforts at apportion-
ment, while worth considering, might create too much uncertainty 
about judicial outcomes. For example, assuming that Iowa's single-
factor unitary business income apportionment rule is struck down but 
that no one variant of the three-factor test is mandated, what about 
the Minnesota rule, which applies to the standard three factors but 
assigns seventy percent of the weight to sales and only fifteen percent 
each to profits and payroll? If that rule is struck down, what about 
states that double-weight the sales factor? Perhaps it is best not to give 
343. Past Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases regarding regulation by state and local 
governments have treated uniformity as an important value, and imposed what were literally 
rules of the road. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981} 
(striking down an Iowa law barring certain large trucks that were allowed on the roads of nil 
neighboring states, partly on the ground that Iowa's divergence from the norm burdened inter-
state commerce). 
344. Under state and local personal income taxes, for example, if a resident of one state earns 
income in another state and both states include such income in their tax bases, the state of 
residence generally is the one that provides a tax credit for income taxes paid to the other state. 
See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 1, at 968-69. This happens to be the correct 
place for the credit under the Schoettle test, but it might be worth following as a "rule of the 
road" even if neither state, more than the other, was the right one to provide n credit. Under 
another "rule of the road," in the case of an interstate sale that both the seller's and the buyer's 
jurisdictions subject to sales tax, priority generally goes to the state of destination, and the seller's 
jurisdiction provides a tax credit. See id. at 781-82. 
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much content to the good faith principle beyond requiring internal 
consistency and mandating adherence to consensus rules of the road. 
(4) Bar significant attempted tax exportation. To the extent feasi-
ble, significant tax exportation, whether perceived or actual, should be 
barred. To detect instances of significant attempted tax exportation, 
the courts generally should look for two critical identifying features: 
(i) the use of a tax base that disproportionately reaches outsiders, at 
least as to direct incidence or in the short run; and (ii) the application 
to that base of a tax rate that is higher than the rates applied within 
the jurisdiction to other fiscally significant tax bases. Under a test bar-
ring taxes with these two indicia, numerous states' excise and sever-
ance taxes would probably be struck down (subject to reinstatement at 
lower rates), as might certain corporate income or other business 
taxes. 
* * * 
Judicial review based on the above tests admittedly might be infer-
ior, in both effectiveness and predictability, to a well-designed legisla-
tive solution. The well-known institutional disadvantages of using 
courts to implement broad rules and policies345 are hard to overcome. 
Yet the tests should at least make possible the achievement of an ordi-
nary and acceptable level of judicial failure, as compared with the ex-
traordinary level that has characterized negative Commerce Clause 
doctrine from its earliest days until the present. Moreover, in compar-
ison to the alternative of no significant judicial review of state and 
local taxes, the tests should improve at the margin the functioning of 
our integrated national markets. 
345. See, e.g., id. at 324-25. 
